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Abstract 
This study delves into the crucial question of how well posed the financial sector of 
Qatar is to contribute to the government’s policy of economic diversification.  In 
order to answer this question, the study focuses on analysing the sub-units that make 
up the financial sector such as banking, non-banking services and the insurance 
industry. The objective of that is to reveal the development and the contribution of 
these sub-units to the economy, as well as to elucidate the changes and constraints that 
these units face.    
The Qatari government, through the accumulated oil and gas wealth, has been able to 
stimulate and support the development and expansion of financial sector services and 
this in turn has helped the economy to grow and private business to flourish.  It is 
through the huge support that the government has provided that a nascent and 
diversified financial sector has developed in Qatar since its independence in 1971.  
So, within a very short span of time the country has moved from having virtually no 
domestic financial services to a situation where many types of banks have emerged: 
commercial, Islamic and specialised, as well as insurance companies and a stock 
market, not forgetting a variety of financial and investment companies that are starting 
to make an impact.     
The study acknowledges the centrality of oil in facilitating the creation and the 
opportunities that allowed the sector to develop, at the same time acknowledging the 
constraints inherent in an economy that has a very small population and a large 
foreign workforce.  This explains the decision of the government to create the Qatar 
Financial Centre, QFC, as a driver towards economic diversification and to spur 
financial sector development.   
The study concludes that there are major challenges facing increased contribution of 
the financial services to economic diversification that necessitates, other than the 
focus on QFC, increased and substantial focus on the issue of GCC integration and 
cooperation. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
1.1 The Significance of the Study 
This study investigates the relationship between financial sector development and 
economic development in Qatar and the impact this relationship has on the 
country’s policy of economic diversification. The literature on development 
broadly acknowledges the linkage between financial sector development and 
economic growth, due to the crucial role played by financial intermediaries in 
mustering huge amounts of savings and the utilisation of these savings in 
investments. The pattern of development of the economy of Qatar indicates that 
the development of the financial system of the country has been a consequence of 
the country’s massive and sudden wealth due to the oil factor. In other words it 
presents an inverted relationship rather than the one mostly recognized in the 
literature on financial sector development. The importance of that to the current 
focus of the Qatari government on diversification of its economy relates to the 
question of how well posed this sector is to contribute to this policy as a source of 
growth, employment and income and how well suited government actions are in 
support of achieving such a goal.   
Qatar is a very young and small state that has achieved massive strides in its 
socio-economic development since its independence in 1971. It has moved from 
an economy underpinned by basic economic activities to a wealthy oil-exporting 
state. The growth and development that accompanied the consolidation of its oil 
economy has been substantial considering its very small population. According to 
the 2004 census the population was put at 744.000, an increase of 42.5 percent on 
the previous census of 1997. A 2006 survey showed that the population had 
grown to 834,754, an increase of 12.6 percent on the 2004 census. However, 
recent estimates show that the total population reached 1,650,139 in 2009 (Qatar 
Economic Review, 2009). This rapid increase is due to the large influx of foreign 
labour to meet the needs of the expanding economy. Qatari nationals represent 
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less than 34 percent of the total population. The country’s per capita GDP 
exceeded USD 54,000 in 2006 and is forecast to reach more than USD 103,500 in 
2009; one of the world’s highest (Washington Times Global, June, 2010).  
Naturally, the small size of the population in relation to the massive size of its 
GDP is a factor in this.    
This wealth has motivated the political leadership of Qatar to be extremely 
ambitious about putting Qatar on the world map, not just because of its oil and gas 
but as a financial, cultural and sports hub. Doha prides itself on housing the 
headquarters of Al Jazeera, the Arabic satellite broadcaster, and on successfully 
hosting the Asian games. It is preparing a bid to host the 2020 Olympics and 2022 
football World Cup.  What the Qatari state has achieved within a very short space 
in time is unique in terms of development, modernization and ambition. However, 
this has been led by the state and its oil and gas sector, which accounted for 
around 56 percent of GDP, 80 percent of export earnings and 70 percent of 
government revenues in 2007 (Qatar Economic  Report, 2009). Such a pervasive 
role for the state sector necessarily means that the private sector is small and plays 
a limited role in the growth and expansion of the economy. Even the performance 
of the private sector and non-oil related activities have been linked to government 
expenditure programmes and intervention in terms of subsidized loans and input 
prices, equity injections, bailouts, and preferences in government procurements.   
As a result of this overdependence on the energy sector, it has been difficult to 
develop many profitable investment opportunities outside the limited scope of real 
estate, trade and stock market activities. Consequently, there has been a 
concentration of banking lending activities mainly into consumer loans, real 
estate, construction and trade finance. Also, lending opportunities are further 
restricted considering the large proportion of the expatriate population whose 
access to bank credit is limited  due to many government regulations.   
The Qatari government is acutely aware of this dependence on oil and its 
associated challenges, as exemplified by the painful experience of 1982-86 when 
oil prices fell sharply. Qatar's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted 
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significantly, and it took over a decade to pull its GDP up to its pre-oil shock 
(1981) level. This prompted the Qatari government to focus on a clear and 
ambitious strategy of economic diversification, in order to limit the effects of oil 
price fluctuations on its economy. This strategy was aimed primarily at 
developing its large reserves of natural gas for both domestic consumption and for 
export. Qatar has the third-largest reserves of natural gas in the world after Russia 
and Iran, and its North Field is the largest single non-associated gas reservoir in 
the world. This high-risk and high-cost strategy is bearing fruit. First of all, Qatar 
is the number one exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world,, and since 
2006, this has generated immense wealth for the country. Secondly, it has aimed 
at developing its non-energy sectors by using its energy wealth; a key part of this 
has been the development of the financial sector. The contribution to the economy 
of financial services has increased, mainly due to rapid growth in both 2004 and 
2005, standing at a share of ten percent in 2008.  In addition, Qatar embarked on a 
process of liberalization and privatisation of its economy as an integral part of its 
diversification programme towards decreasing the role of the state and expanding 
private interests. Its privatization programme included transferring of 
responsibility of the state-owned electricity and water corporations to an 
independent authority, and floating the controlling stakes of major state 
companies such as Industries Qatar, Qtel and Nakilat on the national stock market.   
The ‘Qatar National Vision 2030’, published by the General Secretariat for 
Development Planning in July 2008, acknowledges the benefits of privatisation 
for the domestic capital market and the creation of market diversity and depth. 
Among the 'Four Pillars' on which the National Vision rests is economic 
diversification: 
The development of a competitive and diversified economy capable of 
meeting the needs of, and securing a high standard of living for, all [Qatar's] 
people for the present and for the future. 
As part of its goal to achieve suitable economic diversification, the National 
Vision further recognises that: 
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A diversified economy that gradually reduces its dependence on 
hydrocarbon industries enhances the role of the private sector and maintains 
its competitiveness. 
However, this process of economic diversification is slow and gradual and is still 
linked directly to oil and gas wealth. Also, meaningful diversification involves not 
only privatisation, but also eliminating structural impediments and entrenched 
rigidities such as those present in the labour market and developing a financial 
market that can respond to local and regional needs and opportunities adequately. 
It also requires lessening its association with the wealth generated by the energy 
sector.   
If Qatar’s financial sector is to play a bigger role in its economy there is a need for 
that sector to have a regional focus, especially in light of the current collapse of 
the international financial system and its impact on investment opportunities. 
Qatar’s domestic market is very small and private investment opportunities are 
limited; however, the Arab region provides ample opportunities which the sector 
can take advantage of. 
Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) has been created as an instrument for attracting and 
supporting the operations of international financial institutions in Qatar by 
allowing 100% ownership, access to local business opportunities, repatriation of 
all profits and the opportunity to use the QFC and Qatar as a regional platform 
from which to expand and conduct business.  By the end of 2007, the QFC had 
attracted and licensed a large number of firms from around the world representing 
the world’s leading banks, insurers, investment houses, asset managers, legal 
firms, accountants, auditors and consultancies (Zawya, July 19, 2009). 
Could this prove a hindrance rather than an enabling factor for the Qatari financial 
sector? Since the ability of local businesses to compete is restricted according to 
their expertise, size and sophistication, all of the firms licensed by the QFC are 
seeking to benefit from the massive investment in the region in infrastructure and 
business as well as the mega-projects planned for Qatar. These include the 
renewal of Doha’s infrastructure and transport network, the expansion of national 
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institutions such as Qatar Airways, as well as key projects such as the Pearl, 
Lusail and the new airport, all of which will create immense opportunities for the 
financial industry. The dynamics of opening up the economy to international 
business and developing a Qatari financial system is of great significance to the 
policy of creating a multi-sector domestic economy.   
 
1.2 The Central Question of the Study  
The main question this study intends to answer is the following: In a capital 
surplus economy like that of Qatar, where state revenues and state investments are 
the basis of that economy, is the financial sector limited in its role? A derivative 
question from this main one relates to the focus of government policy on the 
process of economic diversification; will this policy induce a bigger role for the 
sector in the limited domestic market of Qatar? In other words, what is the 
relationship between diversification and the enhanced role of the financial sector? 
In order to answer this question adequately, two main aspects were investigated in 
particular. The first relates to what has been the specific contribution of the 
financial sector to the Qatari economy, and the second relates to the role of QFC 
and the restrictions and challenges facing the sector as an essential part of the 
government’s policy of economic diversification.   
The contention of this study is that the growth of the Qatari economy, based on 
the hydrocarbon industry, generated and caused the expansion and increased 
demand on financial services. These financial services have been expanding in 
terms of type and size of activity, but considering the limited size of the domestic 
economy, their overall contribution to the economy remains limited, and their 
ability to significantly contribute to the policy of diversification is therefore 
limited too. The current strategy of the QFC; focusing on creating an environment 
for international players to engage in the region through Qatar is an 
acknowledgment of the limitations of the domestic financial market.  However, 
this can be seen as contradicting the policy of diversification aimed at creating 
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jobs for Qatari nationals in the private sector and away from the traditional public 
sector. These international players have no real interest in creating local capacity 
and imparting their skills and expertise. They are business entities that will be 
interested foremost in capturing the benefits for themselves.   
For a sustained growth away from oil and gas revenues, therefore, the focus 
should also be on the regional economy and on increased cooperation among the 
Gulf States and for a speedier move towards economic integration. The GCC 
market is small compared with other markets in the world and the duplication of 
projects and/or institutions, especially in the industrial and financial sector, is not 
beneficial. Competition within the GCC market is not for the benefit of the long-
term sustainability of these economies. The current global financial crisis adds a 
new dimension to this question in terms of a more challenging investment climate 
and lucrative asset classes, in addition to the obvious need that has risen to re-
evaluate the role of the financial system in sustainable growth and the necessity 
for tighter control and regulation of the system. 
Although Qatar has been in a position to limit the impact of the financial crisis on 
its banking system and to provide much-needed financial assistance to a number 
of national banks, it has shown that it is not immune to global events and its 
banking system is not as strong as was previously believed. Also, and most 
importantly, government assistance is essential for the stability of the banking 
sector. This creates more challenges to the government’s policy of diversification 
and creates the necessity to reconsider the real potential that exists in the financial 
system to create employment opportunities and the generation of revenues within 
the Qatari economy. However, Qatar, as much as other Gulf States, has ample 
opportunities within the region, if its focus is turned from an outward-looking, 
global investing pattern to a more inward-looking, regional pattern. The Qatari 
financial system can stimulate regional economies and by doing that they 
themselves can move away from the one-sector economy. 
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1.3 The Objectives of the Study 
Despite the importance of diversification and sustainable growth to all GCC 
hydrocarbon dependent economies, little debate and discussion has emerged 
within the region to investigate policy issues, challenges and opportunities 
associated with such an essential and ambitious policy for the development 
strategy of these countries. There is no doubt that economic diversification is the 
way forward for Qatar as much as for other GCC countries in order to facilitate a 
sustained non-hydrocarbon dependent  growth. However, the movement towards 
achieving it has been slow, and thus a more informed debate needs to emerge 
within the region among its researchers, policy analysts and policy makers. This 
study is a small contribution towards such a debate and consequently its specific 
objectives are the following:  
1. To fill a gap in the literature and stimulate a debate on the specific 
challenges facing Qatar in its diversification strategy by looking 
specifically at the financial sector - a priority sector in this strategy. 
2. To contribute to the literature on the subject of the relationship between 
financial sector development and economic growth. 
3. To consider the limitations or potentials that the sector faces in an 
increasingly competitive regional and international market, especially 
taking into consideration the current collapse of the global financial 
market and the lack of confidence in innovative financial activities. 
4. To review the perceptions and outlook of policy makers in Qatar, 
regarding their vision of the possibilities and challenges facing the sector 
and the government’s policy of economic diversification. 
 
1.4 The Methodology of the Study 
The study focuses on answering the question regarding the role of the financial 
sector in the oil economy of Qatar and the implications of that role to its 
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diversification policy as well as to the literature available on the subject of the 
linkage between financial sector development and growth. For that purpose the 
study was aided by using a mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative 
methods of research. This is in line with other social research where “Most 
research does not fit clearly into one category or the other. The best often 
combines features of each.” (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: p5)    
The qualitative approach is a useful tool for exploring and providing insight into 
the development and prospects of the financial sector by conversing with policy 
makers, business people and top management in the sector. The quantitative 
approach, on the other hand, provides the relevant data and analysis indicating the 
pattern of development of the sector as well as specific measurements of financial 
sector development and its contribution to Qatar’s economy. The combination of 
the two methods provides valuable and rich material to unravel the dynamics 
behind the development of this crucial sector and its role in Qatar’s economic 
growth. 
 
1.4.1 The Qualitative Method 
The qualitative method is a tradition that encompasses complex and varied 
techniques of inquiry and theoretical frameworks as well as methods of data 
collection. Data collection procedures in qualitative research involve four basic 
types: observation, interviews, documents and visual images (Creswell, 1994).    
The research interview procedure is used in this study because it essentially  
provides insight from key figures in Qatar of the prospects of the financial sector 
in contributing to sustainable development. The financial sector, although small 
and limited, has expanded significantly in Qatar within a short period of time and 
the government is keen to encourage its further development. Thus, it is essential 
to probe into the views and the expert opinion of those involved in the 
management and policy making of the sector in order to provide an analytical and 
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useful picture of the development of the sector by focusing the attention of these 
figures on providing answers to the questions of this study.    
The research interview is designed for the purpose of improving knowledge and 
delving deeply into social science issues (Wengraf: 2001, pp3-6). It is a practical 
method of collecting information that allows access to many different groups and 
different types of information. Its major benefits are summarised as follows: 
Interviews are more flexible than any other research method. They can be 
used to extract simple factual information from people. They can be used to 
ask people about their attitudes, their past, present, or future behaviour, their 
motives, feelings and other emotions which cannot be directly observed. 
Interviews can explore each question or issue in as much depth or 
superficiality as they wish (ibid, p37). 
There are different types of interviews, the most commonly used one relates to the 
level of formality and structure where interviews are categorized as structured, 
semi-structured or unstructured interviews. The structured interview is more like a 
questionnaire based on a predetermined and standardized or identical set of 
questions. The researcher reads the questions and records the responses on a 
standardised schedule, usually with pre-coded answers. The unstructured 
interview is more like a conversation, with no pre-determined list of questions and 
the interviewee is given the chance to talk freely in relation to a subject matter or 
specific area. In social research, most interviews fall in between these two 
extremes and are classified as semi-structured interviews (ibid). The interviewer 
has a list of themes and questions to be covered, although these may vary from 
one interview to another as may the order of questions. Also, the interviewer can 
seek clarification and elaboration on the answers given, which adds value to the 
research question and objectives. The semi-structured interview procedure is used 
in this research since it allows flexibility and room for improvisation while at the 
same time allowing the researcher to fully plan and prepare the questions (May: 
2001, p120- 5). In this way, it can be more challenging than the structured 
interview since more discipline and creativity is needed in the session and more 
time for analysis and interpretation after the session (ibid). 
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The Research Interview Themes: One of the essential tasks in preparing for the 
semi-structured interview is determining the themes of the research that the 
interview will cover. This focuses both the interviewer and the interviewee in 
order to fulfil the objectives of the study. The main themes that are explored in 
this study are summarised as follows: 
y The ability and suitability of the Qatari financial sector to fulfil the 
objective of promoting economic diversification. 
y The obstacles and/ or opportunities facing Qatar’s financial system, 
especially in light of increased regional competitiveness and the global 
financial crisis.  
y The impact of the Qatar Financial Centre on Qatar’s financial sector.  
y The ability of the financial sector to generate employment for Qatari 
citizens and decrease the dependency on the hydrocarbon industry.  
These themes determined the question and the choice of interviewees. The 
questions were formulated to take into account the use of three types of questions: 
open questions, probing questions and specific /closed questions, since each has 
its own advantages that enrich the collection of data (Grummitt: 1980). Open 
questions were designed to allow the interviewee to provide extensive answers 
and encourage them to reply as they wish and are worded like open questions but 
with a particular focus and direction.  Closed questions were used to obtain 
specific information or to confirm a fact or opinion.  
The Quota Sample: The researcher decided on the actual individuals to be 
interviewed by using the quota sampling technique. This has the disadvantage of 
not being truly random and consequently generalisation on the basis of the result 
is not possible. However, in this instance it fills the requirement of this research in 
that the objective of the conversations with the chosen interviewee is more about 
collecting data concerning their specific knowledge and management of the 
financial sector than the desire to make generalisations on the basis of the 
findings. In addition, this study is concerned with the specific case of Qatar and 
the link between the development of its financial sector and economic growth. It 
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is crucial to converse with those organisations that have been the drive behind the 
sector and its growth. 
The sample needed was relatively small in size as a result of the specific characteristics 
that were required. These were determined by the different organisational categories 
that needed to be interviewed as seen in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1.  The Professional Category of the Interviewees in Qatar 
Category Organisation Interviewee 
Public Sector Qatar Central Bank Sh Abdullah Saud Al-Thani (Governor) 
  Ministry of Economy and Finance Mr Yousef Kamal (Economy and Finance Minister) 
 Qatar Financial  Centre Mr Stuart Pearce (CEO) 
 Qatar Investment Authority Dr Hussain Al Abdulla (Executive-Board member) 
 Qatar Financial  Centre Mr Jon Morton (Director) 
Commercial Banks Qatar National Bank Mr Ali Shareef Al-Emadi (Group CEO) 
 Commercial Bank Mr Hussein Ibrahim Al-Fardan (Chairman) 
 Al Khaliji Commercial Bank Mr Tariq Ahmad Al-Malki (Chairman & MD) 
 International Bank of Qatar Mr George Nasra (Managing Director) 
Islamic Banks Qatar Islamic Bank Mr Salah Mohammed Jaidah (CEO) 
 Qatar International Islamic Bank Mr Mohsen Moustafa (Deputy CEO) 
 Al Rayyan Bank Mr Adel Mustafawi (CEO) 
Insurance Companies Qatar Insurance Company Mr Ali Saleh Al-Fadala (Executive VP) 
Investment Companies Investment House Mr Ahmad Ismail Moussa (General Manager) 
 First Finance Dr Khalid Bin Ibrahim Al-Sulati (President) 
Capital Market Qatar Exchange  Mr Saif Khalifa Al-Mansoori (Market Manager) 
Specialised Banks Qatar Development Bank Sh Hamad Nasser Al-Thani (General Manager) 
Money Exchange Al-Fardan Trading & Services Co Mr Fahad Hussein Al-Fardan (President) 
  Dlala Brokerage & Investment Co Mr Waleed Jassim Al-Mossallam (CEO) 
 
It was important for the sample to cover government officials, the banking sector, 
the non-banking sector and businesses. These organisations and their 
representatives were chosen based on their critical roles and their essential 
contributions to these organizations as policy makers, management and experts in 
the field.    
Data Quality and Data Analysis: In the use of semi-structured interviews, a 
number of data quality issues may arise, including reliability of data, 
generalisation and forms of bias. The lack of standardisation in these interviews 
and the difficulty in making generalisations is one of the reasons why, in some 
quarters, the quantitative method is seen as superior to the qualitative method.  Its 
standardised statistical data is perceived as reliable, if not necessarily valid, and 
closer to the methods of natural scientists. The researcher increased the reliability 
12 
 
of the data collected primarily thorough preparation and readiness of the 
researcher on the understanding of both the organisation and the themes of the 
interview as well as an appreciation of the interviewee’s expertise area. Another 
factor that ensures reliability is the level of information provided to the 
interviewee before the interview, such as the list of interview themes. This gave 
the interviewee time to prepare and increased the value of the information 
provided. The data collected was transcribed and grouped in accordance with the 
themes decided upon prior to the interviews. The manner in which the grouped 
interview data has been utilised is by embedding it in the body of the study in 
each relevant section.    
 
1.4.2 Quantitative Method 
The quantitative research tradition is associated with a number of different 
approaches to data collection. The most common are surveys and experiments, 
followed by analysis of previously-collected data such as official statistics. 
Structured observation is another method which involves the researcher recording 
observations in accordance with a pre-determined schedule and quantifying the 
resulting data. Lastly, is content analysis which involves the analysis of the 
communication content of media such as newspapers (Bryman: 1996, p12). In this 
study the main vehicle for the quantitative method focuses on analysing the 
collected data of official statistics from a wide variety of government agencies as 
well as the publications of the various institutions of the financial sector. 
The Themes of the Data: Taking into account the objectives of the study the 
main themes of the data collected focused on the following areas: 
y The relative strength of each financial intermediary and its contribution to 
the economy. 
y The overall policy environment that the sector operates within, especially 
in relation to the diversification policy. 
y The challenges of the larger role of the financial sector in the economy.    
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y The institutional and regulatory environment that the financial sector 
operates within and their appropriations to stimulating and strengthening 
economic diversification.   
Quantitative Measurements: There are several measures to assess the 
development and deepening of the financial sector. In this study the focus was on 
the following measures: 
y Data that assesses the development of each specific financial intermediary 
of Qatar: banking, non-banking, insurance, stock market etc. 
y Measuring the contribution of the financial sector to the value added to the 
GDP.  
y Measuring the contribution of the financial sector to employment.   
y Presentation of the data in graphs, tables, and charts as appropriate to 
illustrate the relationship between financial sector and real sector 
development.   
A variety of other secondary sources of data and information available in the 
public sphere in both Arabic and English, such as books, articles, reports websites, 
newspapers etc, were consulted as well as unpublished material including doctoral 
theses. The access to information in both languages facilitated the reach to a wide 
range of material that added value to the research and enhanced the quality of data 
analysis.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Study 
This study consists of seven chapters.  Chapter One introduces the research 
question, the main contention of the research, research objectives, research 
method, as well as the structure of the research. Chapter Two focuses on the 
literature review and conceptual frame of reference of the research. The purpose 
of this review is to describe the studies already undertaken regarding this problem 
and position this study within the literature on the subject matter.   
14 
 
In order to make a judgment on where the financial sector of Qatar sits within the 
policy of diversification and its contribution to the successful implementation of 
this policy, Chapters Three, Four and Five treat each component of the financial 
system separately in order to trace and delineate its major features and assess its 
role in the economy. In Chapter Three the banking sector is discussed in terms of 
its structure and the role it plays in supporting private investments and the private 
sector in general. Chapter Four investigates the development of the non-banking 
financial system which is a recent feature of the development of the sector and an 
important one in terms of fulfilling the government’s objective of expanding and 
consolidating the sector as part of its policy of diversifying the economy. This will 
include discussing the Doha stock market and bond market as well as the impact 
of the financial crisis on the activities of both markets, in addition to discussing 
the development of the private equity market. Chapter Five focuses on the 
insurance sector as well as the recent emergence of new financial institutions such 
as finance and investment companies and their impact on the economy. It will also 
include a detailed discussion of Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) as an essential 
component of reinvesting the oil and gas wealth, as this wealth has not moved into 
individual hands as much as it did for instance in Saudi Arabia. The government, 
through this fund, is ultimately the main investor and guarantor of the stability of 
the economy. Chapter Six rounds up the discussion by assessing the contribution 
of the financial sector as a whole to the economy and to the policy of economic 
diversification against three measures: contribution to GDP and lessening the 
concentration of the GDP in the hydrocarbon industry; employment generation 
and the expansion of the private sector. A discussion of the objectives and role of 
the Qatar Financial Centre is included as it is a fundamental part of the 
government’s vision of the financial sector and its economic diversification 
strategy. Chapter Seven presents the concluding remarks on the findings of the 
study. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarises and evaluates the relevant literature on the question of 
the role of the financial sector in economic development and focuses on 
identifying the core concepts of this issue.  Marshall and Rossman refer to the 
need to review the literature so that one can describe the studies about the problem 
to date and position one’s study and ground it within this literature.   There are 
two interrelated dimensions to this literature review; one that needs to look 
specifically at the literature relating to financial sector development and another 
that should focus on the literature on Qatar, particularly its pattern of 
development.  This allows for an in-depth and substantive approach to the 
discussion of the role of the financial system in the economy of Qatar.  The 
significance of elucidating the relationship between financial systems and 
economic development lies in its implication for development policy and policy 
options available to governments in order to shape and influence the direction of 
development.   In the case of Qatar, this is of importance in particular to the 
government policy of diversification of the economy and lessening its dependence 
on the oil industry as well as its focus on expanding the role of the private sector 
and the financial system. 
The review reveals the paucity of studies specifically relating to Qatar.  The Arab 
Gulf area has generated immense academic interest since its emergence into the 
centre of global economy due to the oil factor.  However, the interest has focused 
on bigger states such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq and to a lesser extent on Kuwait 
and the United Arab Emirates.  Also, the scope of the focus has been dominated 
by either the oil industry or regional politics.  This has exerted immense 
constraints on the attempt by this study to formulate a relevant conceptual basis 
for Qatar’s development and the impact of Qatar’s financial sector on the 
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economy.  On the other hand it was an opportunity to investigate and evaluate 
what has been published on Qatar and analyse their conceptual underpinnings.  In 
addition, this review will analyse the main aspects of the current thinking on 
financial sector development and pay particular attention to the issue of relating 
the literature to the specifics of the pattern of development of the Qatari economy.    
The chapter reviews, firstly, the material published on Qatar with the aim of 
establishing the present thinking on the development of the country.  Secondly, it 
deals with the most prominent theorization on the development of the Arab Gulf 
countries, namely the rentier approach and Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb’s influential 
proposition on the development of the area, in order to establish if there are any 
useful or relevant concepts that can be utilised in this study about the pattern of 
development of Qatar that directly impacts on the study of its financial system.  
This will be followed by a review of the literature on financial sector development 
and its implications for economic policy options as it is relevant to the study.  
Fourthly, the chapter traces some of the recent studies that deal particularly with 
the banking industry in Qatar and, lastly, it positions the study within all of the 
above and produces a working conceptual framework.   
  
2.2 The Literature on Qatar 
Very little material is available that deals specifically with Qatar, although it is 
well covered in books and other published material that deal with oil and the Arab 
Gulf states.  Also, the material published so far is relatively out of date and does 
not take into account the most recent substantial socio-economic changes, as the 
following discussion reveals.    
Among the few writers that have worked on Qatar is the historian Rosemarie Said 
Zahlan. In fact she wrote a number of books on the Arab Gulf states tracing their 
rise from tribal, subsistence existence to modern states amassing economic power 
and wealth, such as The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and 
Social History of the Trucial States, 1978 and The Making of Modern Gulf States, 
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Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, 1989.  The focus in 
this review is on her book, The Creation of Qatar, 1979, (reprinted 1989) which 
concentrates on analysing the political and economic development of Qatar from 
as early as 1760 until the mid 1970s.  She is concerned with the issue of social and 
political integration in a state that emerged from a society sparse in population 
and that accumulated massive wealth within a short period of time.  Zahlan is 
particularly successful in exploring the central role played by the tribal leader, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, as the focal point of the process of societal 
integration.  She gives a detailed record of the problems among Qatari inhabitants 
and their neighbours during the early formative years as well as an extensive 
treatment of the independence of Qatar and its emergence into a modern state in 
the wake of the development of its oil and the transformation of its economy.  
Zahlan acknowledges, at the end of the book, that the social and political changes 
brought about by oil income and the associated changes in the society and 
economy will help to enhance the role of Qataris vis-a-vis the central role played 
by the ruling family.   She also indicates that the changing role of Qatari women 
and the new opportunities open to them to engage in a variety of professions: 
doctors, teachers, scientists, will bring tension to a traditional society ruled by the 
powerful Al-Thani family.  She suggests that it will be crucial to the stability and 
prosperity of Qatar how the state and the ruling family adjust to these modern 
demands of democracy and equality.  One can safely say that the modernisation 
tendencies of the current ruler, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, have helped 
immensely in the past years to lessen these tensions and to create an environment 
that can be best described as non conflictual between the rule of Al-Thani family 
and the country’s citizens.    
The first work to be published that deals exclusively with Qatar and its economic 
development is Ragaei EL Mallakh’s book, Qatar: Development of an Oil 
Economy, 1979, reprinted in 1985 under a different title, Qatar: Energy and 
Development.  El Mallakh focuses on analysing, firstly, the main characteristic of 
Qatar prior to oil, before attending to the main focus of the book of discussing the 
impact of oil on the development of the country.  Although El Mallakh claims in 
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the reprinted edition that the book goes beyond the usual updating for a revised 
edition, the new book retains almost all of the information and analysis of the 
original book with very few additions in the sections relating to natural gas and 
international cooperation.  He takes into account, in these two sections, the new 
developments in utilising the North Gas Field which holds the largest 
nonassociated natural gas deposit discovered so far as well as the creation of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council whose aim is to actualise economic and other benefits 
of regionalism in the Gulf and expand activities and programmes for coordinated 
cooperation on a multitude of issues.   
In analysing the impact of oil on the rapid development of Qatar, he combines 
economic analysis with a generally descriptive style.  He focuses on the manner in 
which oil revenues have been utilized and points to some failures on the part of 
the state in terms of development of its human resources.  In his discussion of 
Qatar’s industrialization policy he points to the early awareness on the part of the 
Qatari government of its dependence on a depletable source of energy and the 
need to diversify its economy and adopt very prudent expenditure programmes.  
In the section relating to money and banking, El Mallakh traces the financial 
development of the sector pre-oil and post-oil, and points to a peculiar feature in 
the development of the monetary management of Qatar where the field of 
operation of the central money authority was restricted.  The Qatar National Bank 
(half owned by the government) acts as the principal channel through which 
government funds are disbursed and plays a pivotal role in Qatar’s financial 
system.  The reason El Mallakh gives for this unusual situation is lack of 
experience, and he indicates that in time the authority will perform all central 
banking duties.  That is exactly what happened in 1993 when Law No. 15 created 
a Central Bank and gave it the power to act as the bank of banks.   
The analysis of Qatar’s international links is wide-ranging: from the structure of 
Qatari international trade to the potential of regional cooperation and integration.  
El Mallakh indicates that Qatar from early on had a regional perspective and 
outward-looking attitude; a view shared by other Arab Gulf states that recognised 
that some degree of regional integration would serve their economic development 
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and their future.  The idea of a Gulf Common Market and common currency 
materialised later through the Gulf Cooperation Council.   
Also, Qatar was keen on regional cooperation that would go beyond the Arab 
Gulf, hence its support for the Arab Monetary Fund, as well as a host of other 
Arab league affiliates.  Foreign aid and development assistance to the region and 
beyond has been substantial in terms of a percentage of its GNP, in the form of 
contributions to regional entities, such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development, the Arab African Oil Assistance Fund, OPEC Special Fund and 
IMF Oil Facility, to name a few.  Also its country to country assistance has been 
substantial and mostly directed at Arab countries. In recent years Qatar has 
retained all those early signs of interest in cooperation between Gulf States and 
the region as a whole, and remains a firm contributor to a number of regional 
affiliations.  Also its awareness of the need to lessen its dependence on oil and its 
diversification policy has borne fruits over the years with the expansion in the 
development of its gas resource and other economic sectors.        
Zuhair Ahmed Nafi’s book, Economic and Social Development in Qatar, 1984, is 
similar in its treatment of Qatar to El Mallakh‘s with statistics and data that do not 
go beyond 1981.  The focus is on each economic sector separately providing a 
description of its development and illustrates how the oil revenues have been 
disbursed and utilised in order to advance the development of Qatar.  His 
discussion includes the oil sector, manufacturing and agriculture, social 
development (social services and infrastructure), foreign trade and the banking 
sector.  As in the case of the previous books, Nafi provides a very useful 
background on Qatar covering a wide range of economic issues but without 
advancing any substantial treatise on the type of development, its challenges and 
its impact on the social structure of the society.    
In comparison to the works discussed above, the work of Jill Crystal, Oil and 
Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, 1990, provides a 
different type of analysis and view.  As the title suggests the book offers analysis 
of the effects of oil on domestic politics in both Qatar and Kuwait. Crystal 
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provides, firstly, an overall analysis of the relationship between state formation 
and oil, and the impact of oil on power arrangements in both states.  Then she 
offers separate discussion for each state - we are primarily concerned here with 
the part related to Qatar.   
Crystal examines the shifting of power in Qatar due to the decline of the pearling 
industry and traditional merchant families and the rise of oil revenues in the hands 
of the ruling family of Al-Thani.  She explains how the weakness of the trade 
sector and consequently the merchant community of Qatar, especially in 
comparison to the merchants of Kuwait or Dubai, has benefited Al-Thani.  This 
made the ruling family - although riddled with internal differences and rivalries 
and some seriously-contested successions in 1949, 1960 and 1972 - the most 
important player in the formation, integration and modernization of the state.  
Crystal gives a clear and interesting depiction of the pre-oil social structure of 
Qatar and the interrelations among its major components: the ruler, his family, 
pearling merchants and pearling workforce.   This structure on the eve of oil was 
seriously weakened by the crash of the pearling industry which left only two 
powerful merchant families in Qatar, Al-Mani and Darwish, while a large part of 
the population migrated.  With such a weakened social structure, Al-Thani family 
were in a very strong position to take advantage of the oil wealth. 
This increased wealth of the state gave the ruling family the ability to broaden its 
base through state institutions and the distribution of benefits among rival families 
and clans to secure loyalties and internal stability.   The state used institutionalised 
arrangements to protect an enclave of non-oil private sector through protective 
nationality and commercial laws which restrict property and business ownership 
rights to nationals, in addition to giving grants of land, money and monopoly 
concessions.  The benefits of oil trickled down to all social strata through the 
distributive policies of the state covering health, education, housing and 
employment.  However, the ruler allowed ruling family members to infringe on 
the merchants’ economic territory with increasing frequency. 
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This economic power also led to the centralisation of political power.  The ruling 
family of Qatar depends on kinship for key positions in the state, thus politics and 
the political institutions are controlled through the family.  The closest relatives 
share the highest state posts.  Crystal touches on the shift in power arrangements 
and style of rule since Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad took control in a bloodless coup 
against his cousin.  He has been very successful in controlling the excesses of the 
family and widening benefits to Qataris.  Crystal points to the challenges that 
Qatar faces as a result of the fast pace of modernisation and increased wealth to 
Qataris, but fails to elaborate on these challenges and how the ruling family might 
respond.  Crystal’s theoretical basis of the study rests on the rentier approach 
which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. Suffice it to say 
here that her historical analysis of the impact of oil is much stronger than any 
previous work done on Qatar and provides an in-depth analysis of the relation 
between the economy and power relations in the society.     
In a recent article, Mehran Kamrava (2009) provides an insight into the current 
political situation in Qatar.  He postulates the basic position of rentierism by 
analysing how the rise in oil and gas revenues has deepened the state’s capacity in 
relation to society.  In particular, it allowed the Emir, Sheikh Hamad, to 
consolidate his rule and to ensure the co-option of ruling family members and 
Qatar elites, and the spreading of wealth among Qataris in general.   That ensured 
that civil society groups do not rise to mount a challenge to his benign rule, and 
most importantly, the factionalism of the ruling family had been contained.   The 
promise of political reform and liberalisation helped widen the appeal and the 
support the Emir needed, especially in the initial period after taking formal power 
in 1995.  Part of this appeal centred on the Emir’s promise of political reform and 
liberalisation.  The country held its first municipal council election in March 1999 
and in April 2002 the country inaugurated its permanent constitution for which the 
Emir held a referendum.  The draft constitution was approved by 96.6 percent of 
the 69000 votes cast.   
This increased wealth of the state, according to Kamrava, gave Sheikh Hamad the 
ability to embark on a very ambitious program of modernisation focusing on 
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widening the state’s institutions while concentrating the decision making process 
in the hands of the few.  The most significant of these institutions is Qatar 
Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development which was 
founded in 1995 as an umbrella organisation to push forward the state’s agenda on 
the following three levels; education, science and community development, 
allowing the state the ultimate control over these crucial areas, as well as 
enhancing its transformative abilities.  The community development has an 
international reach through its Reach Out to Asia organisation, in support of 
community and educational development in Asia.  This is very important in lieu 
of the large population in Qatar from Southeast Asia.  Sheikha Mozah has been 
the force behind this foundation giving it prominence and international 
recognition.  Another important institution is Qatar Charity.  It engages in 
domestic and international community service.   Although the Charity is a non-
governmental organisation, it had over the years developed a close relation with 
the overall policy objectives and agendas of the state.   
Through state institutions, the Emir has been able to control the relation with the 
three most important social actors: the members of ruling family itself, the notable 
families and the religious establishment.  Increasing access of ruling family 
members and Qatari notables to state’s massive wealth and placing them in 
prominent positions in state institutions augment their vested interests in the status 
quo, thus  giving the Emir enhanced political stability and power.   The ruling 
family has been the major source of instability because of family feuds, and 
contested power transitions in 1949, 1960 and 1972. Besides enhancing access to 
state’s wealth, Sheikh Hamad had taken two major institutional steps to alleviate 
the challenge from within the family and by doing so, consolidated his own rule.  
He firstly issued an Emiri decree changing the line of succession from “within the 
Al-Thani family to “male Descendants of Hamad bin Khalifa.”  Secondly, in 
2000, he established the Ruling Family Council under his chairmanship and 
whose members he appoints.  This council decides on the vacancy of the Emir 
post and thus have a very influential mediating role to play.  With the creation of 
new state institutions for the purpose of placing the Emir’s allies in positions of 
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power and by populating the cabinet with highest number of ruling family 
members among the GCC states, the Emir ensures a firm grip on the reign of 
power.   
Kamrava points out that, unlike other GCC states especially Saudi Arabia, the 
religious establishment of Qatar does not pose any real threat to Al-Thani family 
rule because, firstly, Qatar does not have an indigenous local clerics and religious 
leaders such as the case in Saudi Arabia or Egypt.  Most of the clerics used to 
come from Saudi Arabia, but since the 1990s and as a result of tension with Saudi 
Arabia these started coming from Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Iraq.  Given that they 
are on temporary resident permits, their political activism and radicalism is 
heavily curtailed.  Secondly, the number of Mosques and clerics in Qatar is 
relatively very small and the Ministry of Awqaf administer control on Mosques’ 
preaching by providing a list of the topics for discussion.  Nonetheless, the state 
maintains a sensible and cooperative approach with the religious community.   
Kamrava’s analysis emphases the link that has been suggested by the rentier 
concept between state’s access to massive oil and gas funds and its ability to 
determine the political and economic transformation of society  with the least 
possible interference from society’s different social groups.  This by itself 
undermines the emergence of autonomous civil organisation and the development 
of democracy.  This also explains how the Emir’s initial push for political reforms 
stalled and as of today Qatar is still without an elected parliament and the 
appointed Shura Council is mostly pro forma.  The real power lies with the Emiri 
Diwan and the Emir’s close circle.     
The discussion of this section clearly demonstrates the lack of studies that 
postulate a conceptual framework to the study of Qatar and its economy.  They all 
have two things in common: the centrality of oil and the centrality of the ruling 
Al-Thani family to the process of change and development but without providing 
any conceptual principles and tenets to help facilitate the study of Qatar and its 
economy.  Crystal touched on the concept of the rentier state as an underlying 
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theme for understanding Qatar’s economy and society, but as the following 
discussion will show, this concept is of a limited significance.    
 
2.3 Theorization on the Development of Arab Gulf States 
For such a crucial area to the world economy, it is of interest that the theorization 
on the development of the region, especially in comparison to other developing 
regions such as Latin America, has been very limited and restricted to a group of 
writers led by Luciani who propagated the concept of rentier development. 
Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb is of particular importance because he is from the region 
and is the only academic who attempted such a difficult task.  The following is an 
elaboration to these two approaches.  
 
2.3.1 Rentier Approach 
This is one of the most recent and most common conceptualisations of the 
development of the Arab Gulf following the consolidation of oil as the underlying 
economic element in the region. A group of writers, following Hussein Mahdavy's 
conceptualisation of Iran and his attribution of a 'rentier' pattern of development to 
its oil based economy, borrowed the theme and applied it to the Arab Gulf states.  
These include Luciani, Beblawi and others in their seminal book, The Arab State.   
According to these proponents, “rentier states” are defined as having economies 
predominantly relying on external rent, in this case oil revenues, which can 
sustain them without a strong productive domestic sector.  This affects the state 
and its relation to society in two ways.  Firstly, it creates allocative/distributive 
states in which the expenditure of the state sector is central to the functioning of 
the economy, stimulating services predominantly and creating various levels of 
rent-seekers rather than stimulating productive sectors.  The consequence of that 
is a state separated from society, since it is not dependent on the surplus produced 
within the private economy.  Gulf 'rentier' states have no taxation policy and 
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services are free.  Secondly and most crucially, the state is capable of maintaining 
legitimacy without democracy and traditional networks of tribe, family, and sect 
act as the most effective channels for the distribution of accumulated oil wealth.   
This concept applies to all Gulf States since Hydrocarbon industry underlines 
their economies.  For instance the dynamics of the socio-economic structure, the 
political forces and the distinguishing characteristics of the social relationship 
prevailing in Qatar and Abu Dhabi are comparable.  The historical role these two 
coastal mercantile cities have played and the pattern of their development, 
economic growth and the evolution of their political systems, especially the 
system of government, have been influenced and powerfully shaped by the 
discovery of oil. They both possess shared traits, such as a weak merchant class 
that helped to concentrate power in the hands of the ruling families, and thereby 
aided the formation of the state. Rentier economics has enabled the state to 
maintain a mutually beneficial corporatist arrangement with selected social 
groups, therefore lessening the possibility of demands for radical political change 
and, by extension, for democratisation (Cantori, 2000).  Their political and 
economic history, and their experience of over-dependence on the hydrocarbon 
sector to stimulate economic growth and diversification strategies is similar in that 
its effect on the development of the socioeconomic and the political institutions 
has been limited, even though there is considerable scope for progress and a 
higher degree of sectoral diversification.  
The Rentier concept, therefore, is useful on a descriptive level to account for the 
type of economy prevailing in these societies.  But it does not provide any 
conceptual and methodological tools for analysing these societies and does not 
account for the massive social changes as well as political ones that have been 
taking place in these states.   Also, the proposition about the relationship between 
state and society is problematic.  The ruling families of the Gulf are not 
completely independent of the society, and their rule is far from being absolute.   
Political and economic alliances are extremely important for maintaining the 
legitimacy of these states, through sharing in the economic opportunities created 
by the vast oil wealth and participating in their power structures.  They have also 
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encouraged and supported the expansion of private activities and a diversification 
of their economies which, over time, will increase the influence of their citizens.  
The relationship between the resource abundance of the hydrocarbon sector in 
both states and its direct effect on the limited size and role of the financial sector 
and the potential of the private sector to contribute more to the development of 
political participation, economic growth and diversification strategies results is 
also similar and limited.  
 
 
2.3.2 Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb 
The other recent conceptualisation of the development of the region is introduced 
in Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb’s influential book: Society and State in the Gulf and Arab 
Peninsula: a different perspective.  It warrants special attention since Al-Naqeeb 
claims to present an alternative thesis to that of the 'rentier' approach or as he puts 
it; “a more comprehensive and preferable tool” for analysing the Gulf States.  
However, he is unable to disassociate himself from the 'rentier' concept, and 
accordingly he attributes a more central role to 'rentier' states than in other 
capitalist societies because of the importance of public expenditure.  More 
importantly, he emphasises the authoritarian structure of Gulf States and blames 
their inability to produce an integrated development on that.  He defines the 
dimensions of this authoritarian structure as follows: 
 
 The modern, contemporary form of the despotic state...seeks to 
achieve an effective monopoly of the sources of power and authority 
in society for the benefits of the ruling class or élite.  [Firstly it]... 
achieves this monopoly by penetrating civil society and transforming 
its institutions into corporate organisations which act as an extension 
of state apparatus.  [Secondly]....it penetrates the economic system and 
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attaches it to the state either by nationalisation (as in the other 
countries of the Arab East) or by extending public sectors to complete 
state bureaucratic control of economic life.  [Thirdly]....the legitimacy 
of the system of government in it depends on the use of force (or 
naked power) and organised terror more than upon traditional 
legitimacy (Al-Naqeeb, 1990: p99-100).    
This definition, which is central to Al-Naqeeb's argument, is problematic for 
several reasons.  For one, democracy has not been the pre-requisite of capitalist 
development and historical evidence shows that capitalist development in Europe 
and other parts of the world took different routes.  Japan is a prime example of the 
state and its bureaucratic organisation facilitating capitalist development.  Gulf 
States are capitalist societies that are following state-led and oil-led development, 
in other words following their own route determined by the economic endowment.  
Also the use of force is not the only method of legitimatising rule in the Gulf 
States; economic benefits and a share in the massive oil wealth have been a much 
more important tool.  To claim that civil society in these states is an extension of 
state apparatus because of the disproportionate dependence of citizens on the state 
is an extreme position to take.  There is room for civil organisations and the 
private sector as well as citizens to press their demands, grievances and claims on 
the state.  Perhaps in comparison to developed countries, civil society is curtailed 
and it might take longer for it to develop and for democratic institutions to emerge 
appropriately, but to deny its presence is a distortion of the reality of these 
societies.   
The different stages that Al-Naqeeb attributes to the transformation of Gulf 
society are questionable.  He indicates that the Gulf has moved away from the 
'rentier' state, defined in particular as that period spanning the two decades of the 
1950s and 1960s, to the 'authoritarian' state starting in the 1970s.  But if one 
accepts the 'rentier' concept how can one suggest that the Gulf is no longer based 
on the production of oil and 'living off' rent?  On all accounts, Al-Naqeeb, is in the 
end, unsuccessful in undermining the 'rentier' concept and in providing an 
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alternative conceptual approach.  However, he does provide a thought-provoking 
thesis and opens the door to a wider debate on the development of the Gulf States   
As this section indicates there is little in terms of conceptual literature on the 
development of the Arab Gulf.  This has the effect of limiting the debate and 
stifling discussion on the challenges and the future of the region.  It also has 
significant implications for limiting the possibility of evaluating policy and reform 
strategies.  
2.4 Literature on Financial Sector Development 
As mentioned before, there are no specific theoretical or conceptual studies on the 
relationship between financial sector development and the economy in the Arab 
Gulf States.  Thus the focus will be on the general tendencies of the debate on the 
influence of the financial sector on production, employment and economic 
development.  The relationship between financial development and economic 
development has been well established and accepted in the field of economic 
development.   The recent upheaval in the international financial market is but 
evidence of the strong connection between the two and it is this connection that 
has forced the US government to provide an unprecedented bail-out to Wall 
Street, worth billions of dollars, in addition to the billions being extended to 
commercial banks by European central banks, in order to avoid further damage to 
the real economy.  This debacle will increase academic interest in the issue and 
intensify the need to understand the limits of liberalization and the limits of 
unbridled financial sector development.   
However, before this debacle, the particular issue that has been of major concern 
in the recent literature on financial sector development has been the direction of 
the relation between the sector’s development and the growth of the economy.  
The importance of that lies in its implications for development policy for 
developing countries. The debate centres on the crucial question that was posed 
by Patrick (1966) as to which sector - financial or real - leads in the dynamic 
process of economic development?    He acknowledges that the direction of the 
relationship changes over the course of development but emphasises supply-
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leading finance where financial development can induce real innovation-type 
investment before sustained economic growth takes place.  The encouragement of 
developing countries to deliberately establish and promote financial institutions 
reflects this belief in supply-leading relationships.  However, he observes that as 
growth occurs, supply-leading finance becomes less important and demand-
following financial responses become more dominant.  That is usually the case in 
highly-developed economies. 
A number of influential empirical works have been undertaken since Patrick’s 
proposition, giving substantial support to supply-leading finance and financial 
liberalisation.  The work of King and Levine (1993) is an example of that.  They 
developed an endogenous growth model featuring connections between finance 
entrepreneurship and economic growth, and stressing that the financial system is 
the lubricant for the main engine of growth; better financial services expand the 
scope and improve the efficiency of innovative activity and accelerate economic 
growth while financial repression slows economic growth. In other words 
substantiating that financial liberalization and non-government intervention in 
financial systems is necessary for economic growth.   
King and Levine construct four indicators of financial sector development to use 
in their model.  These include firstly, a measure of the overall size of the formal 
financial intermediary sector that equals the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP and 
called this measure DEPTH of financial sector.  Secondly, is the ratio of deposit 
money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus central 
bank domestic assets, and called that BANK; the higher the ratio the more 
financial services and higher levels of development of the sector.  The third and 
fourth measures relate to the levels of funds being provided to the private sector as 
opposed to the public sector or state owned enterprises and called that PRIVATE 
measure.  The ratio of credit issued to private enterprises to GDP is called the 
Private/Y measure.  Higher values in these two indicators indicate more credit 
going to the private sector.   
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At face value these two indicators seem to be very relevant and important but the 
assumption that more credit going to the private sector means more productivity 
enhancing financial services does not necessary follow in the context of 
developing countries.  A large proportion of private credit is utilized in 
consumption-related activities or what would be classified as non-productive 
activities.  So without specifying which private enterprises are gaining access to 
this credit it is difficult to assume that the credit is enhancing the productive 
capabilities of the economy.   
The four financial sector indicators are studied against the four constructed 
measures of growth: the growth rate of real per capita GDP (GYP), the growth  
rate of real per capita physical capital stock (GK), the growth rate of everything 
else (PROD) and the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP in order to  
measure physical capital accumulation (INV).  King and Levine studied the 
relationship between these measures for 77 countries averaged over the 1960-
1989 period and found evidence of strong correlation between financial sector 
indicators and growth indicators, that is to say that financial sector development 
causes growth, and concluded that financial development is strongly linked to 
economic growth.   
This model does not take into account the various development objectives that 
different countries might be pursuing.  It might be necessary for governments to 
intervene, and liberalisation might not be the most appropriate policy as was seen 
to be the case in some countries.  For instance the reforms that Argentina 
undertook during the 1980s had dire consequences, while the reforms in Korea 
during the same period caused an expansion in non-banking financial 
intermediaries rather than the banking sector.   Also, financial reforms do not 
always alter the flow of credit from the least efficient firms to the most efficient, 
especially in developing countries.  Credit in many of these countries is given 
based on criteria rather than efficiency; personal attributes and influence play a 
large part.  The fact that credit in some countries, after financial reforms, flowed 
to more efficient firms does not necessarily mean that this will happen in the 
context of all other countries.  The literature on developing countries clearly 
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demonstrates the huge differences within this group and how sensitive policies are 
to the specifics of each country.  Policies do not translate equally across cultures, 
institutions and economies.  The conclusion that a more developed financial 
system will foster improved productivity by choosing higher quality entrepreneurs 
and projects does not always correspond to the situation in developing countries.   
This might apply in developed countries where institutions are strong and firmly 
established and nepotism and favouritism and political influences do not carry the 
same weight as in a developing country.   
The work of Jung (1986) is another example of evidence of supply-following 
finance.  His empirical study was based on a time series of 56 countries of which 
19 were developed, and used two measures for financial sector development.  One 
is the currency ratio defined as the ratio of narrow money (M1) to demand 
deposits.  A decrease in the money ratio indicates more diversification of financial 
assets and liabilities and more transactions carried out in non-currency form.  The 
second measure is the ratio of broad money (M2) to nominal GNP (or GDP).  This 
monetization variable shows the real size of the financial sector of a growing 
economy; the ratio increases over time if financial sector development is faster 
than the real sector and decreases if it is slower.   Jung found evidence that 
supports supply-leading causality whereby financial sector development leads to 
economic growth in developing countries, while evidence pointed to the reverse 
causal relationship in developed countries.  It is important to make the point here 
that the flow of money in an oil economy, such as that of Qatar, depends to a large 
extent on how much the government decides to spend rather than on the amount 
credit banks and other financial institutions make available to private investors.   
The recent empirical work by Calderon and Liu (2003) is intended to improve on 
the existing literature by testing both the supply-leading and demand-following 
patterns of financial sector development by using data for 109 developing and 
industrial countries for the period 1960-1994.  They employed two measures for 
financial development: the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP; a higher ratio 
indicates greater financial intermediary development, and the ratio of private 
sector credit to GDP; a higher ratio of bank credit to the private sector indicates a 
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greater financial intermediary development.  The results supported previous works 
in that financial sector development enhances economic growth but they also 
found evidence that the causality is bi-directional supporting both the supply-
following and the demand-following patterns; financial development promotes 
growth and growth propels financial development.  Lastly, the study found that 
the longer the sample interval, the larger the effect on financial sector 
development.  In other words it takes time for the financial sector to impact on the 
real economy.   
It must be stressed here that the advocacy for financial sector liberalization in 
developing countries was underpinned by the process of financial innovation and 
deregulation in the US, United Kingdom, Japan and other developed countries 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  It is of interest, considering the present climate, to 
quote Merton H. Miller, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990, 
regarding the absolute belief in the free market as a way of organizing the 
financial sector with no interference from governments. He says: 
 
The regulatory apparatus designed to protect the banking system 
actually becomes counter-productive and leads to a credit freeze-up 
wherever any substantial number of banks go bad at the same time.  
The US, to its great benefit, has made itself much less vulnerable than 
in the past to credit crunches (and has substantially increased the 
efficiency of the capital allocation process) by substituting dispersed 
and decentralised financial markets for banking (Miller: 1998, p14). 
 
The current credit crisis will undoubtedly influence the position of the proponents 
of liberalization considering the unprecedented intervention that has been required 
on the part of central banks and governments in the US and Europe to stem the 
tide of the meltdown in the financial system.  If anything, the crisis exemplifies 
the utmost necessity of the wisdom of a balance in regulation and control by the 
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government over the excesses of the free market.  Neither the banking system nor 
the financial markets can operate in a deregulated environment without the 
supervision and control of governments.  The results could be catastrophic 
especially in a highly intertwined and globalised market.   
In contrast to the above works, some argue there is little to support the argument 
that finance is a leading sector in the process of economic development. They 
warn of the dangers of inferences based on cross-section country studies which 
treat different economies as homogenous entities and warn of the blanket policy 
bias that these studies imply for advocating financial liberalization and overall 
liberalization of the economy in order to achieve long-term economic growth.   
The work of Demetriades and Hussein (1996) falls into this category.    
They examined the causality relationship for 16 countries that were chosen 
according to specific criteria which included countries with rich experience in 
relation to both economic and financial development.  They used two measures as 
proxy to financial development.  The first is the ratio of bank deposit liabilities to 
nominal GDP, instead of broad money to GDP.  Their rationale is that the rising 
ratio of broad money may reflect extensive use of currency rate rather than a rise 
in bank deposits.  The second measure is the ratio of bank claims on the private 
sector to nominal GDP to assess the supply of money to the private sector which 
is ultimately, in the liberal economy model, responsible for quantity and quality of 
investment and in turn for economic growth.   
The result of this empirical work found little evidence to suggest that the financial 
sector is the leading sector of economic development and most of the evidence 
they found points to a bi-directional relation between development of the financial 
sector and economic growth.  This bi-directional relationship was mostly evident 
in countries where successful financial sector reforms were carried out.  In other 
words, reforms are able to contribute to the process of financial deepening and 
also to general economic development.  They emphasised the fact that the results 
were very much country specific and warned that ‘there can be, therefore, no 
“wholesale” acceptance of the view that “finance leads to growth” as there can be 
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no “wholesale” acceptance of the view that “finance follows growth’.    In other 
words the relationship between the financial sector and the economy is more 
dynamic and varied than the literature suggests. 
For developing countries there is also an important issue which is neglected in 
these empirical works and that is the relationship of financial sector development 
and poverty reduction.  Although this is not relevant to oil-rich Qatar, this aspect 
undermines the strength of the overall work conducted on the subject of financial 
development and economic development.  As evidenced by the problems and 
challenges facing large numbers in the developing world, economic growth alone 
is not a guarantee that benefits trickle down to all segments of the population, 
especially the poor.  So policies that can improve access of this large portion of 
the population are as important as the emphasis on reforms for the liberalisation of 
the financial system.  These reforms need to take into account the large bankable 
population that the financial system does not reach adequately.  Although semi-
formal channels such as microfinance institutions are provided for the poor, these 
are limited in access and scale of provision.  Thus a widening in the formal sector 
provision of services can have a beneficial impact on the whole economy. 
 
2.5 Literature on Qatar’s Banking Industry  
This section analyses some of the recent literature that specifically deals with 
Qatar’s banking industry.   Most of these reports are related either to the micro-
aspects of the banking system such as the competitiveness of banks in Qatar, 
penetration of technology in the banking system, customer satisfaction levels etc., 
or related to the state of Islamic banking in Qatar. The reason for the relative 
dearth of academic research on Qatar’s banking system could be the government’s 
dominance of the banking sector and the slow implementation of reforms related 
to the sector. This section also analyses some research literature related to the 
monetary affairs of the country as the monetary system and banking system are 
very closely related. 
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Al-Muharrami (2009), in his study of the banking system of Qatar concludes that 
the banking sector in Qatar is highly concentrated. He also advises that the 
country’s Central Bank should exercise great caution in allowing mergers between 
the existing banks and should take measures to induce the small banks to grow 
faster. The author arrives at this conclusion using the ‘H-Statistic’ (Panzar and 
Rosse, 1987) which studies the market structure of the industry using two popular 
measures – k-bank concentration ratio and Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  The 
high concentration of banks resembles a monopolistic structure.  This is an 
important observation which could have far-reaching implications on the 
economy as a whole as the monopolistic structure of the banking industry could 
lead to collusion between banks and could subsequently affect the dynamics of 
economic growth.  Al-Sowaidi and Darrat (2006) point to the fact that Qatar 
National Bank, the partly government-owned bank in Qatar, accounts for about 
half of the country’s total bank deposits. However the authors acknowledge that 
Qatar Central Bank openly encourages competition and has carried out a number 
of reforms in recent years to facilitate entry of private and foreign players into the 
industry. They also note that Qatar lags behind Bahrain in the 2006 Index of 
economic freedom published by the Wall Street Journal.  The authors attribute the 
sharp increase in total deposits to GDP ratio from the 1980s to the 1990s to the 
change in policy of the government regarding the reformation of the banking 
sector. 
Murjan and Ruza (2002) studied the Arab Middle Eastern banking industries 
during the period 1993-1997, using the same Rosse-Panzar test that Al-
Muharammi used later. The authors concluded that the entire region had been 
operating under conditions of monopolistic competition. Thus it could be stated 
that conditions of restricted competition are found not just in Qatar’s banking 
sector but are common in every Middle Eastern country.  More importantly, the 
research identified two economic spectrums in the Middle East and concluded that 
banks in oil-producing economies are significantly less competitive than those in 
non-oil countries.  As an economy which draws the majority of its revenues from 
oil-based businesses, Qatar can be deduced to have a banking system which is 
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inherently less competitive and less efficient than its counterparts in non-oil 
economies. The authors attribute this lack of competitiveness to very tight 
regulatory policies followed by the government and poor implementation of 
reforms. Ariss et al. (2007) conclude, on the basis of non-parametric frontier 
approach, that the banks in Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait are the most efficient in 
the Middle East region.  Qatar is found to be one of the least efficient with only 
Saudi Arabia having banks with even worse efficiency. 
Al-Sulaiti et al. (2001) point to the dearth of academic research in the subject 
matter in their research on levels of customer satisfaction in Qatar’s banking 
industry. The authors found through their primary research that, in spite of the 
implementation of reforms which have allowed foreign banks to open branches, 
the service quality in the banking sector in general is below expectation. The 
authors state that “the customers were less satisfied with all attributes related to 
pricing dimensions”.  Dissatisfaction was particularly rampant with respect to 
banks’ interest rate policies, commissions and fees. The dissatisfaction of 
customers with respect to the fees charged is a direct fallout of monopolistic 
competition.  Due to lack of competitive pressures, the fees for banking services 
have remained artificially high.  
The significant role played by the Government in the monetary and banking 
policies in Qatar is examined by Abdulrazag et al (2003). The authors use 
Johanssen procedure to study the reaction function of Qatar Central Bank. The 
authors conclude that “money supply, prices, real income, government 
expenditures and international reserves share at least one long-run relationship”. 
In the short run government spending is found to play a very important role in 
Qatar’s money supply fluctuations.  
Brown (2003), in his research on Islamic banks around the world, identifies that 
the Islamic bank concentration ratio in Qatar is higher than in most other countries 
with a value of 7.5 in 2001. The author shows that this ratio has declined only 
marginally since 1998 when it was 8.0. Two economies with a close resemblance 
to that of Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain, have an Islamic bank concentration ratio of 
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5.5 and 2.1 respectively. The report shows that there have been only two Islamic 
banks in the country and they hold average ranks in comparison to their 
counterparts in other countries with respect to structure, profitability, efficiency 
and liquidity. Qatar’s lagging performance in Islamic banking could be an 
important detrimental factor in future as Islamic banking is expected to gain a 
significant share of the banking business in the Middle East. 
Awad and Al-Sowaidi (2000) analyse the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
policies in Qatar’s economy using a reduced form equation. The research shows 
that fiscal policy variables are more closely associated with economic growth than 
monetary policy variables. The authors point to the fact that the reason for relative 
failure of monetary policy could be the delay in publication of monetary data.  
More specifically, data such as GDP and inflation used to be published with a lag 
of one year until about 2006 when Qatar finally decided to join IMF’s data 
initiative. The authors also believe that the role of monetary policy will become 
more important in future when strong financial institutions emerge. El-Mefleh and 
Shotar (2008) delineate the theoretical structure of factors that determine the 
economic growth of Qatar. According to their conclusion, monetary policy shocks 
have a very limited impact on the economic growth of Qatar even during the long 
term horizon. This conclusion appears to be in line with that of Awad and Al-
Sowaidi. 
 
2.6 The Conceptual Framework of the Study  
Considering the above discussion, any conceptual proposition regarding Qatar 
must take into account the centrality of the hydrocarbon industry and state 
revenues to the economic, social and political structures of the country.  That does 
not mean that the relationship between state and society is static as implied in the 
rentier approach or that the state is all-powerful as suggested by Khaldoun Al-
Naqeeb and the rentier approach.  It simply means a different relationship exists 
than that seen in many capitalist countries where state revenues are primarily 
extracted from private enterprises and used to provide national security, 
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infrastructure and social services, and where there is a clear line of accountability 
to the government through parliament.  It is beyond the objectives of this thesis to 
elucidate the dynamics between state and society in Qatar  but  suffice it to say 
here that financial sector development has occurred within a particular economic 
dimension dominated by the hydrocarbon industry and unprecedented levels of 
revenues concentrated in the hands of the government.  
In such an economy, development depends on government budgetary policies 
while the flow of money in the system depends on the extent to which the 
government decides to spend from its oil revenues.  This particular relationship 
has triggered little interest among those studying the Gulf and no particular work 
exists either on the Arab Gulf region or a specific state within the region to 
illustrate and analyse this.  The development of the Qatari economy and other 
Arab Gulf states, in no small measure, challenges the position extensively covered 
in the literature of financial sector development that the sector is the engine of 
growth and development in a modern society.  What has been the engine of 
growth in these states is the massive revenues accruing to the state that allowed it 
to become a major employer, investor and provider of infrastructure and social 
services, in addition to its control of the dominant economic sector: the 
hydrocarbon industry.  The growth of these economies has been staggering by any 
measure and the dominant role of the oil industry means the government, its 
enterprises and various institutions have a huge influence on the economy, leaving 
a small private sector in some countries such as Qatar.    
This study consequently takes the view, following Demetriades and Hussein, that 
any discussion has to be, foremost, country specific. This is because the type of 
economy and its institutions, public and private, impact directly on the 
development of the financial sector.  Thus the particularities of an oil economy 
have influenced and shaped the relation between public and private sectors and 
the role of financial institutions.  In addition to this, within this group of countries,  
individual countries exhibit different patterns and levels of development.  For 
instance Qatar’s financial system is a late developer compared with those of 
Dubai, Bahrain or Kuwait and the role of its financial system is not as extensive.   
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The bi-directional approach is the most appropriate way of looking at the 
relationship between the economy and the financial system.  In Qatar, state 
revenues, expenditures and the predominance of the oil industry have been the 
main impetus behind the development of its financial system.  This is the case for 
all the GCC countries.  They have created the most developed financial markets in 
the Arab world but this has been to a great extent a function of high oil prices and 
great wealth.  The unprecedented expansion and growth of the Qatari economy 
over a very short period of time created a demand for a variety of financial 
instruments and subsequently the banking and financial system witnessed 
substantial changes and development.  If the critical question of which sector, 
financial or real economy, led the process of economic development, the answer is 
undoubtedly the growth of the real economy led to changes in the financial system 
of Qatar, supported and encouraged by the government.   
However, this has implications for the strategy of economic diversification since, 
without the revenues of oil and gas, the non-oil economy is not strong enough to 
generate sufficient business to maintain the financial sector. In that lies the big 
challenge of diversification strategy of Qatar as well as other GCC countries.  
This study will demonstrate this situation clearly.  It will provide the evidence of 
financial sector development and growth in Qatar, yet its influence on the 
economy in terms of contribution to employment and GDP and thus to 
diversification policy is still very small.  The measures that the study utilises to 
assess the development of the financial system are defined on two levels, firstly, 
the economic indicators which include 1) the range of financial services that is 
available, 2) the diversity of institutions that are operating in the financial sector, 
3) the amount of money that is intermediated through the financial sector, 4) the 
amount allocated by financial institutions to private sector enterprises and more 
importantly to what type of private enterprises. The second measure relates to 
assessing the regulatory framework and stability of the financial sector.   This 
aspect has been given added significance as a result of the global international 
credit crunch and the substantial difficulties the financial sector is facing in the 
US and Europe and other parts of the world.   Although the Qatari government 
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does face similar difficulties, the crisis puts the policy of liberalization of the 
financial system under scrutiny.  It shows how the globalisation of capital and 
capital flows can have serious adverse effects if the regulatory frame is not 
sufficient.  This is quite a warning for newly-emerging financial centres such as 
Dubai, Shanghai, Bombay and Doha.  Also the crisis is showing how, with the 
absence of an overarching European regulatory framework, the piecemeal 
approach in Europe is putting more strain on the system.  That should give the 
GCC a push towards creating an overarching framework for their countries to 
avoid any such problems in the future.   
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Chapter Three 
The Structure and Role of the Banking System in Qatar 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Qatar has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the world during the last 
decade. The nominal growth rate in GDP in 2008 was 44 percent, preceded by 
25.1 percent and 33.7 percent in 2007 and 2006 respectively (Qatar National 
Bank: 2009).  The GDP per capita was USD $103,500 in 2008, making it one of 
the wealthiest countries in the world (Washington Post Global: 2010: 27 June). Its 
massive base of oil and gas has provided a solid basis for its economy and, unlike 
Dubai, it is less leveraged, has fewer special flows or mass tourism, hence is less 
integrated in the global economy, putting it in a stronger position in this current 
challenging financial environment.  However, this high dependency on revenues 
from the hydrocarbon industry has pushed the government to pursue a vigorous 
policy of diversification to alleviate the pressure of depending entirely on that one 
sector.  
An essential part of this policy has been to encourage and support the 
development of its banking system and use it as a channel through which liquidity 
is provided to the private sector and the emerging businesses in the country, away 
from the oil and gas sectors. Sectors that were barely on the horizon a few years 
ago, such as real estate and construction, have become major drivers of growth. 
The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain to what extent the banking sector has 
been successful in aiding the diversification of the economy, as well as to 
investigate the impact of the current global financial crisis on the sector. 
The chapter delves firstly into the development of the banking system by 
enquiring into its evolution and structure, the economic performance of the system 
and the relative positioning of the various participants as well as the challenges 
that are facing the system in light of recent government efforts to help the ailing 
banks. This is followed by a discussion of the impact of banking on the economy 
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and its ability to contribute to the diversification policy. The evolution and role of 
money exchange companies, which provide a significant service to the expatriate 
community, is also investigated. The analysis would not be complete without 
detailing the development and role of Qatar Central Bank as the ultimate 
institution responsible for the banking system and the financial system of the 
country in general.   
 
3.2 Development of the Banking System 
One needs to keep in mind that the development of banking and financial 
institutions in Qatar took place in the recent past from a low base, and was 
directly associated with political and economic events, namely the independence 
of Qatar and the catapulting of oil to a central factor in the economic development 
of the country. The first step taken by the Qatari government, after its 
independence from British influence, was its membership of the International 
Monetary Fund in 1972 and the approval given by the Ministry of Finance and 
Petroleum to the agreement between commercial banks operating in Qatar on 
regulating interbank operations and interest rates. That was very important in light 
of the absence of a national central monetary authority. Following that, events in 
the monetary regulatory environment and the growth of the banking system 
accelerated. The banking industry has evolved from being a conduit to public 
sector finance enterprises to a genuine provider of credit to private businesses and 
individuals. 
Qatar’s banking sector has evolved into a mixture of domestic and foreign banks, 
and has seen the emergence of Islamic banks during recent years. Being one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world, Qatar has attracted a significant inflow of 
immigrants from around the world, and from South Asia in particular. On one 
hand, these immigrants have contributed significantly to the economic growth of 
the country, as strong consumption expenditure amidst rising inflation has been 
one of the reasons for the rapid progress made, and on the other hand the 
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increasing population has stepped up the aggregate demand for banking services 
in the country. The government has responded to this demand by permitting the 
creation of a number of banks in recent years. At present there are 18 banks 
engaged in corporate and retail banking business. The government recently 
instituted Qatar Development Bank, a specialised developmental bank with the 
sole objective of providing credit to small and medium-sized enterprises. This is 
an area whose development will be significant in terms of income, employment 
and growth generation, and which constitutes part of the diversification effort of 
the government.   
Traditionally, two cross-sectional groups of entities have contributed largely to 
the economic output – the oil and gas sector and the public sector. The 
government’s policy to encourage the non oil and gas sector and the private sector 
to become significant contributors to economic development depended on the 
banks being at the forefront of implementation of this policy.  Accordingly, the 
banks have responded by expanding credit to private businesses and by 
encouraging non oil and gas businesses to emerge and grow through easy credit. 
However, despite significant development in this sector, its role in the economy 
remains limited and is primarily concerned with trade finance, consumer loans 
and real estate activities. One important private sector, real estate, saw declines in 
line with the global slowdown and caused major problems to the banks. The 
government responded by setting aside over USD six billion for recapitalising the 
ailing banks.   
The following is a detailed analysis of the major aspects of banking in Qatar. The 
section is organised into three parts: the first part discusses the evolution and the 
present structure of the banking system in Qatar. The second part throws light on 
the economic performance of the sector by looking specifically at banking sector 
assets, loans and advances, deposits and shareholders’ equity. Finally the 
challenges facing the banking system are discussed with a particular focus on the 
recent government bailout of banks as a result of the global financial crisis. 
 
44 
 
3.2.1 Evolution and Structure of Qatar’s Banking System  
The evolution of the banking system in Qatar is quite different from that of many 
other countries. The need for banking that rose from the exploration and export of 
oil in 1949 was serviced, until Qatar’s independence, by a mixture of foreign and 
Arab banks. Until 1954 the Eastern bank – known now as the Standards Chartered 
Bank - was the only bank operating in Qatar; it opened its first branch in 1950. 
The Qatari government felt the need to have more banks and so allowed the 
British Bank of the Middle East to open its first branch in the country. 
Subsequently another bank - the Othman Bank, which is now known as Grindlays 
Bank, opened its first branch in 1956. In 1957, The Arab Bank became the first 
Arab financial institution to begin operations in Qatar. Following this, the Qatari 
government encouraged other Arab banks to set up business in the country. In 
1960 another Arab bank - the Lebanese Bank, which is now known as the Al-
Mashrek Bank was given permission to open a branch. These banks served a fast-
expanding economy with particular focus on servicing government needs and the 
oil sector.   
During the mid-‘sixties Qatar realised that the entire economy was almost wholly 
dependent on foreign banking institutions and the need to create national 
institutions was recognised. Subsequently, it encouraged the creation of a number 
of domestic banks, thereby strengthening the nation’s economic assets.  The first 
locally-owned bank was the National Bank of Qatar (QNB) set up in 1965. Half 
of its capital was subscribed by the government and the other half by Qatari 
merchants. Since its inception the bank has taken the place originally occupied by 
Eastern Bank as banker to the government. Following the post-1973 oil price hike 
the government granted permission to create new banks on a periodic basis, which 
has seen the total number of banks in the country grow substantially. At present 
the number of banks operating in Qatar stands at 17, with a total of 210 branches, 
the majority of which (202) belong to national banks, leaving only 8 branches 
belonging to Arab and foreign banks (Qatar Central Bank, Annual Report, 2008). 
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Qatar’s banking system has gone through a process of evolution which has 
reflected the changes in the economy. In the initial stages the country lacked the 
means and the infrastructure for an indigenous banking sector to emerge, but with 
increased government wealth and increased awareness of the importance of 
creating an integrated national economy the dynamics of the banking industry has 
shifted in favour of domestic banks with an ever-increasing role in the economy. 
Thus the past few years have marked not only an expansion in the size of the 
banking sector, but also its activities, level of services and an increased 
involvement of the government through its Central Bank in the regulation, 
direction and control of the business in order to make it more efficient and 
competitive. At present, there are three types of banks operating in Qatar: 
commercial banks (national and foreign), Islamic banks and specialized banks. 
Table 3.1 shows the list of banks licensed and permitted to undertake banking 
operations in the country. 
Table  3.1  The Type of Banks Operating in Qatar 
Commercial Banks Islamic Banks Specialised Banks 
National  Foreign     
Qatar National Bank HSBC Qatar Islamic Bank Qatar Development Bank 
Commercial Bank BNP Paribas International Islamic  
Doha Bank Arab Bank Masraf Al Rayan  
Ahli Bank Mashreg Bank Barwa Bank  
International Bank of Qatar Standard Chartered   
Al Khaliji United Bank Ltd   
  Bank Saderat Iran     
Source: The Banking and Financial System in the State of Qatar 2006, Qatar Central  Bank 
Commercial Banks: Commercial banks are the dominant type of bank in Qatar in 
terms of numbers and activities. As seen from the previous table the number of 
commercial banks stands at 13, comprising both national and foreign banks. 
However, the Qatar National bank (QNB) dominates the banking sector, 
accounting for more than two-thirds of total bank deposits. It has also established 
two international branches, one in London and one in Paris. The QNB and Doha 
Bank includes members of prominent Qatari families on their boards of directors. 
According to Stuart Pearce, CEO and Director General of Qatar Financial Centre, 
(QFC) the, “retail banking sector is oversaturated and no intention to allow retail 
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banking activities to operate from Qatar Financial Centre”, (Interview July 2008). 
The strategy of growth of commercial banks is, henceforth, focused on outward 
expansion by buying banks in other countries. This is very difficult for some 
banks as indicated by the Managing Director of the International Bank of Qatar 
(IBQ), “Not all banks have the option to expand outside Qatar; our bank does not 
have either the capital or the expertise to pursue such a growth strategy.” 
(Interview July 2008). This is an area where government attention is needed to 
support local businesses in finding the best ways to remain competitive and to 
expand. Mergers and GCC integration is an important aspect in this regard.  
Islamic Banks: Islamic banking operates under Islamic law (Shariah), which 
prohibits interest (riba) and runs under a variety of financial instruments including 
Mudaraba, Musharaka, Murabaha, Qard Hassan, Ijara, Wadia and Takaful (Box 
3.1). The most used of these financial instruments are musharaka, murabaha and 
mudaraba - all have in common the basic principle of modern Islamic banking; 
interest is prohibited but profits are allowed. Although Islamic banking came to 
Qatar late in comparison with other states in the region, it quickly established 
itself as a player in the market. The first trialling of Islamic banking took place in 
Egypt in the early 1970s followed by Dubai and Kuwait. Qatar Islamic Bank was 
established in 1982 and has become the sixth largest Islamic commercial 
institution in the Gulf after the Kuwait Finance House. A second Islamic bank, 
Qatar Islamic International Bank was established in 1991 while a third, Masraf 
Al-Rayan was created in 2006. 
The objectives of Islamic banks in Qatar are similar to all Islamic banks and 
include the following: 
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Box 3.1 Financial Instruments of Islamic Banking 
Mudaraba: A unit trust agreement between a lender, the bank, and an entrepreneur, the mudarib. The lender agrees to 
finance the entrepreneur’s project on a profit or loss sharing basis. The mudarib undertakes to pay back the capital invested 
and a share of the profits. The management is in the hands of the mudarib 
 
Musharaka: A partnership for a specific business activity in which the bank and the partner create joint venture projects 
with the aim of making a profit.  The bank participates in the management.   
 
Murabaha: A resale contract where traditional lending is transformed into a sale and purchase agreement. The bank buys 
specific goods or commodities requested by the client and then resells them at a higher price agreed upon by both parties.  
 
Qard Hasan: A loan without interest. The borrower is obliged to repay the lender the principal sum borrowed on the loan.  
It is left to the borrower to pay any sum over and above the amount of the principal.  This instrument is usually used by the 
state and less wealthy member of society.   
 
Ijara: Renting, a contract of lease or hire. 
 
Wadia: An agreement to deposit an asset excluding land in the custody of another party who is not the owner such as a 
bank.   
 
Takaful: Mutual support which is an alternative to western insurance. A number of participants agree to pay instalments to 
a takaful fund managed by an Islamic bank.  The bank invests the funds in halal projects and pays the members benefits.   
Source: Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, Understanding the objectives of Islamic Banking. International Journal of Islamic & Middle East Finance & Management.  Vol.1, 
issue 2.  2008.  
1. To attract funds and employ these resources in financial instruments 
based on asset-backed trading contracts or equity finance with risk 
sharing. 
2. To develop a saving habit among Muslims and achieve a balance 
between profit maximization and social responsibility.  
3. To offer bank services that are profit/loss sharing rather than interest-
oriented according to Islamic Shariah (Dusuki: 2008) 
A most encouraging development for Islamic banking is the fact that while the 
international financial system has imploded this small but growing share of world 
capital has weathered the storm. This should be no surprise since the sector’s 
lending model operates on the principle of rejection of interest payments and 
deliberately avoids speculation and heavy borrowing. In other words, the sector 
forbids the excesses that brought the Western model of financial system to the 
verge of collapse.  
Not only has Islamic finance proved more prudent in light of the financial 
collapse, but its proponents say it provides a better way of linking the financial 
system to the real economy. Islamic banks maintain ownership of the asset until 
the loan is paid, so they have greater incentive to make sure borrowers do not 
exceed their abilities since the bank shares in the risks the entrepreneur takes. This 
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helps to tilt the banks towards facilitating productive investment and ensuring that 
savings are used for useful ends. A leading figure in Islamic banking, Amr-al 
Faisal, explained that, “Our dealings have to be tied to actual economic activity, 
like an asset or a service. You cannot make money off money. You have to have a 
building that was actually purchased or a service rendered, or a good that was 
actually sold” (Washington Post: 2008). 
The share of Islamic finance makes up only one percent of world finance 
suggesting tremendous room for growth. According to Majid Dawood, Chief 
Executive of Yasaar, a Dubai based Shariah finance consultancy, “We had 
expected to be at 12 percent of the global market by 2025, but now with this 
financial crisis, we expect to get there much faster” (ibid). Many Western banks 
have Shariah-compliant arms and laws are made to accommodate the different 
property transfers required for lending. Malaysia and London are growing as 
major centres of Islamic banking; however, the Gulf retains the biggest Islamic 
banks: Dubai Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House and Saudi Arabia‘s al-Rajhi 
Bank. Interest in Islamic finance is also growing among non-Muslims, because it 
is seen as more ethical. US Deputy Treasury Secretary, Robert M. Kimmet, noted 
that experts at his agency have been learning the features of Islamic banking 
(ibid).   
The Islamic model is not immune to problems and is not a replacement for the 
Western model, especially as there are areas in which Islamic banking is 
prohibited from dealing, such as alcohol, weapons, gambling, tobacco, pork and 
pornography. Nonetheless, it offers an alternative model that has shown resilience 
in times of severe financial crisis, and lessons can be learned from its prudent 
ways. One must remember that the 15 percent annual growth in the sector since 
the 1970s is fuelled both by the oil boom and by demand for this particular model. 
People’s anxiety over the Western model of finance will undoubtedly increase this 
demand further. 
Specialized Banks:  Qatar Industrial Development Bank (QIDB) was the only 
specialized bank operating in Qatar in support of the industry sector. The Bank 
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was accorded formal approval under Emiri Decree No. 14, 1997, to commence 
operations in the same year. Its capital was QR 200 million and its shares were 
divided equally between the Qatari government and private investors. Its board of 
directors consisted of four representatives of the government, one representative 
of the QNB which is half owned by the government and three representatives 
from the private sector.  
In 2007 a change in the legal status and principle activities of the bank took place 
by amending the bank’s articles of association and changing its name to Qatar 
Development Bank (QDB). The scope of the bank’s activities was widened to 
include a range of sectors: industry, tourism, education, healthcare, agriculture, 
animal resources and fisheries. The bank’s ownership is now totally in the hands 
of the Qatari government which has injected it with additional capital of QAR 10 
billion. To accommodate the new aims of the bank, new members with experience 
and expertise in the new sectors were incorporated onto its board.  
The creation of specialized financial institutions has been popular in other 
countries in the Gulf especially in Saudi Arabia. The country has three different 
specialised credit institutions; the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), the 
Agricultural Bank of Saudi Arabia and the Real Estate Bank. These institutions 
owned by the government provide medium- and long-term soft loans for private 
projects as well as administrative, financial, technical, and marketing consultancy 
services to help develop and enlarge the private sector and to diversify the 
economic base of the country.  Through these institutions Saudi Arabia was able 
to disburse billions of dollars to industry, agriculture and housing with the effect 
of increasing private sector participation in the economy as well as significantly 
increasing the activities of Saudi commercial banks. They opened letters of credit 
to import machinery and raw materials and supported the needs of these projects 
as well as contributing to the economic diversification the economy. In 
comparison the QDB is still in its infancy. However it shares similar objectives 
which are as follows: 
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1. To contribute to the diversification of the production base of the economy 
by financing projects in a wide range of sectors: industry, tourism, 
education, health and agriculture.  
2. To provide finance to small and medium-sized projects in the above-
mentioned sectors from domestic, GCC and international sources, and act 
as a guarantor for lenders and guarantee the exports of these projects. 
3. To establish companies on their own in partnership with companies in 
corresponding sectors who identify with the objectives of the bank. 
4. To provide technical assistance to investors and evaluation and monitoring 
of approved projects (QDB Annual Report: 2008). 
Table 3.2 shows the significant change in the size of the bank’s capital through 
the injection of the QAR 10 billion by the government to enhance its role in 
supporting small and medium-sized private enterprises in a variety of sectors. It 
also shows the increase in the bank’s profits from a mere QAR five million in 
1999 to QAR 144 million in 2008. 
Table 3.2 Shareholders Equity in Qatar Development Bank 1999-2008 (QAR million) 
Items 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Capital  150 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 1500 2900 
Additional Capital - - - - - - - - 10000 10000 
Legal reserves 2 3 5 7 9 11 11 14 18 40 
Other reserves 6 11 11 39 75 90 125 114 100 50 
Retained profits 5 6 8 16 25 31 31 45 61 144 
Total shareholder's Equity 164 220 224 262 309 331 337 373 11679 13133 
Source: Qatar Development Bank Annual  Report 2008 
 
Table 3.3 clearly indicates the expansion in credit facilities from a modest 13 
million in 1999 to more than three billion in 2008. In that year the bank gave 54 
capital loans and ten raw material loans. These loans were advanced for a variety 
of projects in the manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco; the manufacture of 
petroleum chemical, rubber and plastic products, the manufacture of non-metal 
products, machinery and equipment, fishery and animal industries as well as 
education.  
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Table 3.3  Qatar Development Bank's Balance Sheet 1999-2008 (QAR million) 
Items 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Financial assets portfolio 3 78 80 117 141 170 212 212 212 186 
Balances with banks & financial ints. 227 175 122 114 139 92 81 76 1 1 
Credit faculties 13 24 30 39 57 72 99 105 1428 3245 
Additional Financial Investments - - - - - - - - 10000 10000 
Other assets 3 3 9 21 26 28 53 41 51 86 
Total assets = Liabilities 246 280 241 290 364 362 444 433 11693 13518 
Due to Banks & financial ints. 74 48 2 14 19 16 51 37 8 8 
Customers’ deposits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Provisions 1 1 2 4 6 11 13 7 0 0 
Other liabilities 7 11 12 9 30 4 14 16 5 377 
Capital & reserves 164 220 224 262 309 331 367 373 11679 13133 
Source: Qatar Development Bank Annual Report 2008           
 
It is evident from this expansion of the bank and the change of its status that the 
government is taking a more active role in support of the expansion of the private 
sector, especially small and medium-sized businesses, as an essential component 
in its diversification policy. 
  
3.2.2 Economic Performance of Banks in Qatar 
This section will analyse the performance of the banking sector in Qatar by 
focusing on the growth and utilisation of banks’ assets, deposits and shareholders’ 
equity, as well as the positioning of the different banks in the banking system. 
 
A. Growth of Assets  
Table 3.4 shows the total assets in the balance sheet of each bank in Qatar and the 
year-on-year percentage growth in total assets in 2008.   
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Table 3.4 Total Assets on the Balance Sheet for each bank in Qatar (QAR million) 
Bank 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
QNB 39548 50060 71663 114361 151974 33% 
Doha Bank 10993 15230 21696 30058 39003 30% 
Commercial Bank 12940 22182 30358 45397 61302 35% 
Qatar Islamic Bank 7742 9552 14889 21336 33543 57% 
Ahli Bank 4286 6181 9556 15576 17799 14% 
International Islamic 4998 6336 8398 9951 12842 29% 
International Bank of Qatar 2009 4660 6698 10771 22411 108% 
Masraf Al Rayan   4324 10191 16769 65% 
Al Khaliji    5151 12501 143% 
Qatar Development Bank 352 432 392 1692 3518 108% 
HSBC 3078 5004 6982 10284 14433 40% 
Arab Bank 2130 2817 3895 4347 4988 15% 
BNP Paribas 1650 1920 2358 2668 2882 8% 
Standard Chartered 1392 1444 2287 4980 3716 -25% 
Mashreq Bank 1264 1878 2006 2615 3092 18% 
United Bank Limited 311 404 621 917 996 9% 
Bank Saderat Iran 265 270 309 383 441 15% 
Total 92958 128370 186432 290678 402210 38% 
Conventional Banks 70127 98745 140363 223007 308507 38% 
Islamic Banks 12740 15887 27611 41478 63155 52% 
Foreign Banks 10090 13738 18458 26193 30549 17% 
Source:  QNB Capital (2009) 
 
Displaying the data of the above table in Chart 3.1 shows that conventional banks 
account for about 77 percent of the total assets. Islamic banks occupy  
 
 
the second spot with about 16 percent of the total assets. Foreign banks, in spite of 
being the dominant group in terms of number of entities, actually account for only 
seven percent of the Qatari banking industry’s total assets. Chart 3.2 shows the 
bank-wise distribution of total assets in 2008 along with its corresponding growth 
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rate over 2007 figures. It is evident that QNB is the biggest bank in total assets 
and is way ahead of other banks in the country. QNB’s total asset base is about 
2.5 times the asset base of its closest rival, Commercial Bank. Even though 
conventional banks account for more than three quarters of the total assets of the 
industry, Islamic banks have been the fastest growing category. The three Islamic 
banks – Qatar Islamic Bank, International Islamic Bank and Masraf Al Rayan saw 
growth rates of 57.2 percent, 29.1percent and 64.5 percent respectively. Besides 
the emergence of Islamic banks, there are a couple of important observations to be 
made on the basis of total banks’ assets: 
 
- It is observed that among the long-established domestic banks, those with 
a smaller asset base are growing faster than those with a larger asset base. 
There is an apparent ‘size effect’ visible in the emerging structure. 
- The foreign banks have witnessed poor growth rates in spite of having 
small asset bases. Thus they have violated the size effect. The reason for 
this anomaly could be the restrictions placed on the foreign banks by the 
Central Bank of Qatar. In other words, the domestic banks, including 
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conventional and Islamic banks, are given legal and strategic advantages 
by the authorities and this has helped them to grow faster and stronger. 
B.  Loans and Advances 
The primary function of banks is to take deposits and provide credit to the 
economy; bank credit is one of most important ways of providing liquidity to the 
economy and stimulating private business. Hence, it is essential to analyse the 
banks on the basis of their ability to perform their role as credit facilitators in the 
economy. This is not only important to a country like Qatar where its 
diversification strategy depends on banks’ increased participation and the private 
sector in the economy but it is all-important in every economy. The following 
table (Table 3.5) shows the total amount of loans and advances lent by each bank 
and also the growth rate in their loans and advances in 2008 over 2007, while 
Chart 3.3 shows the distribution of loans and advances among the three categories 
of banks in Qatar. 
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Table 3.5 Loans & Advances Lent by each bank in Qatar (QAR million) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
QNB 26591 31478 46227 66064 100053 51% 
Doha Bank 5437 8295 13630 19140 23966 25% 
Commercial Bank 6714 10884 17360 25021 33898 36% 
Qatar Islamic Bank 4263 5973 7156 11679 18866 62% 
Ahli Bank 1445 3490 6294 10106 11547 14% 
International Islamic 2621 3397 3620 4389 8253 88% 
International Bank of Qatar 1009 2246 3754 6517 13177 102% 
Masraf Al Rayan 187 6738 13326 98% 
Al Khaliji 769 6980 808% 
Qatar Development Banl 64 88 99 140 276 97% 
HSBC 1614 2281 3111 5325 7137 34% 
Arab Bank 1087 1756 2329 2537 2597 2% 
BNP Paribas 672 931 774 1103 1067 -3% 
Standard Chartered 609 586 1154 1187 1487 25% 
Mashreq Bank 695 925 984 1843 1832 -1% 
United Bank Limited 144 253 372 606 685 13% 
Bank Saderat Iran 152 164 181 241 237 -2% 
Total 53117 72746 107230 163404 245383 50% 
Conventional Banks 41260 56481 87364 127757 189897 49% 
Islamic Banks 6884 9369 10962 22806 40444 77% 
Foreign Banks 4973 6896 8904 12842 15042 17% 
Source:  QNB Capital (2009) 
It can be observed in Chart 3.3 that conventional banks accounted for about 77 
percent of the total bank credit provided in 2008 while Islamic banks had 17 
percent of the total share of bank credit in the same year. Foreign banks accounted 
for just six percent. On the other hand, foreign banks with seven percent share of 
total assets took a six percent stake in the credit pie. This shows that the 
conventional banks have greater leverage in terms of their total asset base than the 
foreign banks.  
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On one hand this could be due to the more cautious approach exercised by the 
foreign banks or on the other hand it could be attributed to the rapid growth of 
Islamic banks which have eaten into the share of foreign banks. In 2007, foreign 
banks had a nine percent share in total assets and an eight percent share of total 
credit. In 2008 this shrank to eight percent of total assets and six percent of total 
credit. This could be seen as a positive development, giving the domestic banking 
system a greater role in the economy. The following chart (Chart 3.4) shows the 
total credit provided by each bank in 2008 along with the growth rate over 2007. 
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It can be seen that Al Khaliji bank had an extraordinary growth rate of 808 percent 
over the previous year, as 2008 was just the second year of operation for the bank. 
Qatar Development Bank also saw a rapid growth rate of 97 percent. International 
Bank of Qatar more than doubled its credit portfolio with a 102 percent growth 
over previous year. The dominance of Islamic banks is visible in credit too, with 
the three banks seeing an average growth rate of 77 percent. It can be seen that 
most of the foreign banks have witnessed much faster increases in total assets than 
credit. One of the reasons for this phenomenon could be the cautious approach 
undertaken by the foreign banks to consciously shrink their credit portfolio in 
response to their massive losses in their home countries. 
C. Deposits 
The prime source of funds for the banks is customer deposits. The following table 
(Table 3.6) shows the bank-wise break-up of total deposits collected from 
customers in 2008 and the growth rate in deposits over 2007. 
Table 3.6 Total Deposits for each bank in Qatar (QAR million) 
Bank 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
QNB 29614 36706 55767 79364 104253 31% 
Doha Bank 8068 11049 15190 20043 23277 16% 
Commercial Bank 8304 13235 17209 25796 32186 25% 
Qatar Islamic Bank 5817 6866 8786 12201 16592 36% 
Ahli Bank 2744 4530 6827 11494 12111 5% 
International Islamic 4360 5077 6696 7218 9139 27% 
International Bank of Qatar 1590 3586 4912 6952 11465 65% 
Masraf Al Rayan 223 4943 10898 121% 
Al Khaliji  4674 - 
HSBC 2387 3925 5517 7508 10279 37% 
Arab Bank 1700 2301 3275 3695 3718 1% 
BNP Paribas 1114 1318 1788 1779 2222 25% 
Standard Chartered 1039 1127 1863 1918 2232 16% 
Mashreq Bank 870 1417 1303 1772 1641 -7% 
United Bank Limited 247 317 513 736 829 13% 
Bank Saderat Iran 198 194 223 284 287 1% 
Total 67970 91648 130090 185703 245802 32% 
Conventional Banks 50239 69106 99905 143649 187965 31% 
Islamic Banks 10176 11943 15705 24362 36629 50% 
Foreign Banks 7555 10599 14480 17692 21208 20% 
       
Source:  QNB Capital (2009) 
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The following chart (Chart 3.5) shows the share of the three categories of banks in 
total deposits collected from customers in 2008.  Once again conventional banks 
have over two-thirds share in deposits. Islamic banks have a 15 percent 
 
 
share and foreign banks nine percent. Islamic banks, in spite of their 17 percent 
share in credit, have a 15 percent share in deposits. It could be that, because of 
their relatively recent foundation, the quality and range of services and products 
have not yet reached a level of competence to enable them to take a larger share of 
the market. Also, Islamic banking, because of its unique ways of functioning with 
respect to interest rates, appeals only to a particular type of customer. Foreign 
banks have a nine percent share in deposits to more than make up for their six 
percent share in advances. This once again shows the highly-cautious approach 
followed by the foreign banks in the wake of the global economics crisis. 
The data can be better observed from the following chart (Chart 3.6). Masraf Al 
Rayan Bank was the fastest growing in 2008 in terms of customer deposits. Its 
Islamic counterparts, Qatar Islamic bank and International Islamic Bank, grew by 
36 percent and 27 percent respectively during the same period. It can be observed 
that the domestic banks grew faster than their foreign rivals in 2008. This may be 
due to ‘safe-haven’ effect, i.e. customers preferring to park their funds in domestic 
and local banks during times of crisis (Dekle and Kletzer, 2001). 
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D.  Shareholders’ Equity 
For banks, their equity capital is the factor that decides the scope of their business. 
This is due to the capital adequacy requirements of central banks around the 
world. The recent global crisis due to a real estate sector meltdown has also 
affected Qatar, and the banks have been under severe financial stress due to write-
downs related to domestic real estate and construction sector exposures. The 
Qatari government’s recapitalisation of top listed banks in the country to the tune 
of over USD 5.3 billion in October 2008 managed to meet the decreases in capital 
due to write-downs. The following table shows the bank-wise shareholders’ 
equity in 2008 and the corresponding growth rate over 2007. 
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Table 3.7 Shareholders Equity for each bank in Qatar (QAR million) 
Bank 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 % 
QNB 6685 8709 8457 13858 16643 20% 
Doha Bank 1594 2401 2768 3619 4913 36% 
Commercial Bank 2620 5677 5631 6228 9978 60% 
Qatar Islamic Bank 1497 2096 4245 4629 7143 54% 
Ahli Bank 890 1075 1182 1524 1640 8% 
International Islamic 450 882 1425 2356 2780 18% 
International Bank of Qatar 392 902 1367 1928 2593 35% 
Masraf Al Rayan 4079 5159 5694 10% 
Al Khaliji 4561 4546 0% 
Qatar development bank 332 375 348 1679 3133 87% 
HSBC 318 440 621 799 1081 35% 
Arab Bank 178 239 355 448 567 27% 
BNP Paribas 115 143 207 250 288 16% 
Standard Chartered 156 190 165 191 377 98% 
Mashreq Bank 333 395 657 733 1188 62% 
United Bank Limited 61 78 95 120 127 6% 
Bank Saderate Iran 57 60 69 78 119 52% 
Total 15676 23662 31671 48160 62812 30% 
Conventional banks 12121 18237 18388 31469 40854 30% 
Islamic banks 1946 2978 9749 12144 15617 29% 
Foreign Banks 1218 1545 2168 2619 3748 43% 
Source:  QNB Capital (2009) 
 
The following chart (Chart 3.7) shows the break-down of shareholders’ equity in 
Qatari banks category-wise. 
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Once again conventional banks, including the specialised bank, lead the pack with 
a 68 percent share in the total bank capitalisation of Qatar. However it has to be 
noted that Islamic banks are in the most comfortable position when comparing 
their equity with loans and advances. While they hold a 26 percent share in 
capital-base, their loans and advances share in the total pie is just 17 percent. 
Foreign banks have a six percent share in the total capital of banks. The following 
chart (Chart 3.8) shows the capitalisation of banks in 2008 and their comparative 
performance over 2007 figures. 
 
 
 
One very important observation with respect to the capital infusion of banks in 
2008 is that some foreign banks saw dramatic increases in capital in 2008. This 
could be part of their fresh capital infusion seen globally. Standard Chartered 
almost doubled its capital in 2008 with a dramatic 98 percent increase.  Mashreq 
Bank also topped its capital up by 62 percent. It can be observed that Commercial 
Bank saw a 60 percent increase in capital which should place it in a better position 
to compete with its distant leader, Qatar National Bank. The Islamic banks also 
saw healthy doses of capital infusion in 2008. 
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The analysis of the structure of Qatar’s banking system shows that of the 17 banks 
that exist at present, Qatar National Bank, one of the six partly government-owned 
banks, is a clear leader with almost twice or three times the size of its closest rival 
in all measures. However, Islamic banks have been the fastest growing besides 
being the most capitalised vis-à-vis loans and advances. This shows that the 
Islamic banks have a huge potential for growth in the market. They have been 
steadily eating away at the market share from foreign banks which have been 
waiting for some impetus in the form of faster and better implementation of 
banking reforms (Al-Muharrami and Mathews: 2009). However, taking the 
present conditions into consideration, it appears that the Islamic banks will prove 
to be the winners in future, to the extent that there could be a change in the 
structure of the banking system in Qatar as it could become more dominated by 
Islamic banking practices. 
 
3.2.3   Challenges Faced by the Banking System in Qatar 
The global economic crisis which has affected all developed and developing 
economics has also had its adverse impact on the Qatari economy. The 
construction boom that lasted through the last decade came to a sudden halt in all 
Middle Eastern economies including Qatar. This exerted severe negative pressure 
on the banks in Qatar, particularly the partly government-owned top six banks in 
the country. As they prepared to write-off massive losses due to increasing 
defaults, particularly in construction and real estate related advances as well as 
investment losses on the portfolios of securities held by them due to the tumbling 
of Qatar’s stock market, the Qatari government announced an unprecedented 
move to recapitalise public sector banks by 10-20 percent. Below are the 
measures taken by the government and the Central Bank of Qatar to save the 
vulnerable banking sector (QNB Capital, 2009): 
- In October 2008, Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), the sovereign wealth 
fund of Qatar, announced that it would raise the capital base of Qatari 
63 
 
banks by 10-20 percent. The fund committed about US D5.3billion for this 
purpose. The first phase of infusion had already taken place, with the 
second phase scheduled to happen by the beginning of 2009. 
- In March 2009, in order to protect the banks from their investment losses, 
the Qatari government, through the Central Bank of Qatar, announced that 
it was willing to buy from banks, their entire portfolio of investments 
classified as ‘available for sale’. 
- In June 2009, the Qatari government stated that it was willing to purchase 
from banks, real estate exposure worth USD 4.1billion.  
The government bought the investment of portfolios of Qatar National Bank 
(QNB), Doha Bank, Qatar Islamic Bank, Qatar International Islamic Bank, Ahli 
Bank and Al Khalij Commercial Bank and Commercial Bank of Qatar. The 
selling price was set according to the book value of the investment portfolios 
stated by their original owners for sale at the prices of 28 Feb 2009. In accordance 
with the terms of the agreement the government paid the full value of the deals 
with Islamic banks while with conventional banks the deal was funded part in 
cash and the rest in the form of treasury bonds. The five year bonds will yield 
fixed returns at 5.5 percent. The agreement also provided Qatar Commercial Bank 
with the option to repurchase the entire portfolio, or any part of it, after a 12-
month period from the date of sale and within a maximum period of five years at 
the original sale price (Salem: 2009). 
These measures have had a positive impact on the country and its banks. As 
indicated by Haissam Arabi, Chief Executive of Gulfmena Alternative 
Investments, “By taking away the investment portfolios of the banks, the banks do 
not have to provide for any losses and can take it away from their books. It boosts 
their solvency and supports them.” (The New York Times: 2009). All major banks 
of Qatar, however, have been downgraded by the international rating agencies. In 
February 2009, Moody’s downgraded the entire Qatari banking industry to 
Negative Outlook. The Qatari government was doing what other governments 
around the world have been doing in order to prop up their ailing banks. The 
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difference is that Qatar is wealthy enough to undertake such a bail-out without 
causing a big dent in state finances. 
It is important to shed some light on the factors that led to the crisis situation in 
Qatar’s top banks only being averted by the government’s intervention. As 
mentioned before, Qatar’s economy has been heavily dependent on the oil and gas 
sectors and public sector expenditure has been a major contributor to the gross 
domestic product for many years.  The government, as part of its strategic 
development initiatives, has been encouraging the growth of non oil and gas 
industries in the economy. This is also in line with similar efforts undertaken by 
neighbouring economies such as the UAE and Bahrain. The government has also 
been encouraging credit to the private sector in order to increase its participation 
in economic growth and development. These factors had led to policy impetus by 
the banks to provide better credit facilities to private non-oil and gas sectors. 
Subsequently, since 2000 Qatari banks have embarked on a massive expansion of 
credit to the private sector. 
One sector that has shown a rapid increase is real estate. The banks increased their 
credit exposure to this sector, as can be observed from the graph shown below. 
Chart 3.9 shows the aggregate value of credit provided to the real estate sector as 
a percentage of total domestic credit.  
                                       Chart 3.9 Aggregate value of Credit Provided 
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As can be seen, the real estate exposure as a percentage of total domestic credit 
which was at just 12.82 percent in July 2007, reached a high of 18.04 percent in 
February 2009. As real estate prices tumbled in response to the worldwide decline 
in prices, the banks found themselves at the juncture of massive write-downs. 
Another major problem that contributed to this issue was the failure of deposits to 
keep up with the expansion of credit as demonstrated in Chart 3.10 below. 
 
 
                       Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
The Advances/Deposits ratio of the banking industry as a whole increased from 
0.78 in 2004 to 1.00 in 2008. As the advances grew by 362 percent between 2004 
and 2008, deposits lagged behind severely with a cumulative growth of 262 
percent during this period. The lack of equivalent growth in deposits forced the 
banks to lend out of their capital. The decline in deposit rate can be easily 
explained through a glance at the inflation that prevailed in the economy during 
this period. In 2008 the average interest rate on a one year deposit with 
commercial banks in Qatar was 2.97 percent. The Central Bank of Qatar had 
responded to every cut in interest rate by the Federal Reserve in order to keep the 
currency peg safe. However this had imported inflation and CPI growth was at 15 
percent in 2008. This made the real interest rates double-digit-negative. Therefore 
the investors in Qatar had no incentive to save their money with banks. Rather 
they were better off exposing themselves to as many loans from banks as possible.  
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In the wake of recapitalisation of top banks by the government the banks appear to 
have escaped the crisis situation that they were facing in the middle of 2008. It is 
noted, however, that the deposits continue to dwindle and this could be a serious 
problem for Qatari banks in future as the advance/deposits ratio has already hit the 
critical mark of 1. The commercial banks have a powerful way of creating money 
through a circular system of lending and borrowing. The money received as a 
deposit from a customer, after accounting for the statutory reserves set by the 
Central Bank, is lent to the monetary system which receives this money and lends 
once again after removing the reserve portion (Arnold, 2008). Thus money is 
created during the process which is known as money multiplier effect. In the case 
of Qatar banks, there are leakages in the form of foreign lending. It is seen that 
Qatari banks have an affinity to lend foreign credit for which the domestic 
deposits are made use of. Once the money is lent out of the country, it does not 
take part in the multiplier mechanism and thus hampers the circulation of credit. 
The following chart (Chart 3.11) shows the changes in net foreign assets and net 
domestic assets of all Qatar’s commercial banks combined. It shows that the 
foreign assets of banks have always exceeded foreign liabilities by a significant 
margin. In May 2007, foreign assets were 93 percent more than foreign liabilities. 
On the other hand, it also shows that domestic liabilities have always exceeded 
domestic assets. This has got to be the case with banks in all countries because of 
the reserve requirements. However, in the case of Qatari banks domestic liabilities 
were significantly more than domestic assets. Until September 2008, this 
condition prevailed. Between May 2007 and September 2008, banks’ foreign 
assets grew 81 percent while domestic assets increased by 77 percent. 
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Chart 3.11 Changes in Net Foreign Assets and Net Domestic Assets 
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Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
This diversion of domestic deposits for foreign lending created a continuous leak 
in money circulation in the country. There could be many reasons for this 
phenomenon. One of the observations that could be made is that the banks look 
for foreign investments not by choice but by compulsion. Qatar, with a population 
of just over 1.6 million, is one of the most over-banked countries in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. HSBC in a report states that “Qatar is relatively over-
banked with regard to the country’s population size” (HSBC, 2007). On one hand 
the rate of growth of domestic deposits were falling and on the other hand the 
domestic banks were finding it difficult to use all the domestic deposits for 
domestic credit. However this situation has changed since the country got into the 
global economic crisis. Since October 2008, net foreign assets have declined from 
QAR 40,542 million to QAR 503 million. In other words, the banks have reached 
a stage where foreign assets almost match foreign liabilities. This could be due to 
the credit crisis in the developed economies as well as the lack of growth 
opportunities in foreign countries owing to economic contraction. On the other 
hand, the domestic banks have now begun to utilise domestic deposits for deposits 
credit as is evident from the closing in the gap between these two in the graph 
given above. As of May 2009, domestic liabilities exceeded domestic assets by 
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just ten percent. This reversal, more due to compulsion than choice, if it persists in 
future, even after a recovery of world economies, would help to improve the 
multiplier effect in domestic economy and result in higher growth rates.  
The analysis of the structure of banks shows that the national banks, particularly 
the top three, dominate the industry with over 70 percent of the market share. 
However, Islamic banks are seen as the rising star, with rapid growth in all 
measures of performance, while foreign banks lag behind. An analysis of the 
recent recapitalisation of national banks by the government besides other 
measures shows that the banks were affected negatively by the developments in 
the real estate sector, due to their overexposure to the sector. Besides, the decline 
in the growth rate of deposits was a contributing factor and still continues to be a 
cause for concern. 
 
3.4 Impact of the Banking Sector on the Economy 
Banks play the all-important role of credit facilitators in any economy. For a rich 
country like Qatar where most projects are funded by oil and gas wealth, this 
might not appear as significant as in other countries where bank deposits are an 
essential part of the cycle of investment and growth. However, due to Qatar’s 
need to diversify and expand the private sector, rather than a need for capital, this 
role of banks as facilitators of credit is highly important. This section analyses the 
role played by bank credit in the economic diversification of Qatar. 
Banks in Qatar were traditionally providers of capital and facilities to public 
sector companies which were majority-owned by the government. As the top 
bank, QNB was also partially owned by the government, the credit risk or risk of 
default on the facilities provided to these companies was minimal. However, as 
the economy opened up and the government encouraged lending to the private 
sector, the banks faced a steep learning curve as they had to adhere to the 
prudential universally-followed credit norms while engaging in an act of provision 
of credit. So far, the banks in Qatar have been quite successful in adapting 
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themselves to this new role and have expanded credit to the private sector to a 
great extent. 
It can be observed from the chart below (Chart 3.12) that total credit expanded 
about 393 percent between 2003 and 2008. While credit to the public sector 
increased by 138 percent during this period, credit to the private sector saw a 
greater growth rate of 662 percent. This six-fold increase in credit to the private 
sector within a five year period saw the percentage share of private sector credit in 
total credit increase from 54 percent to 77 percent. This massive expansion in 
credit to the private sector has been one of the most important roles that the banks 
in Qatar have played in recent times. 
Chart 3.12 Expansion of Credit between 2003 and 2008 
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Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
Besides government spending, consumption expenditure has been an important 
contributor to economic growth in Qatar (Tsen, 2007). The banks have helped 
economic growth through the provision of credit for the purpose of consumption. 
Credit for consumption has been the single largest component of total credit for 
Qatari banks. Loans provided for consumption purposes have been even greater 
than credit made available to the public sector as a whole. The following chart 
(Chart 3.13) shows public sector credit and consumption credit combined. 
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Chart 3.13 Public Sector Credit and Consumption Credit 
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Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
This chart shows that credit for consumption purposes has steadily increased 
through the period. This has contributed directly to an increase in gross domestic 
product as consumption expenditure is a main component in the calculation of 
GDP by expenditure method (Frank et al., 2007). 
The Qatari Central Bank and the Qatari government have used the commercial 
banks as agents of monetary stimulus during the period of economic crisis that the 
economy has undergone. This is evident from Chart 3.14, below. By mid-2008, 
the decline in the real estate sector and Qatar’s external sector economy was 
evident and it was predicted that the economic growth of the country would be 
severely hit due to the global economic crisis and decline in oil and gas prices. 
The Qatari Central Bank then embarked on a massive monetary expansion. On 
one hand the interest rates were reduced to mirror the federal rates prevailing in 
the US. On the other hand, banks were encouraged to expand credit facilities to 
the private sector. The domestic banks were used as the catalysts to growth as the 
foreign banks, as a part of their global strategy and wide-spread capital erosion, 
curtailed their lending between June 2008 and May 2009. 
It can be observed from the charts given below that a massive monetary push was 
provided to the domestic private sector credit. The public sector deposits and 
credit declined by 17.4 percent and 4.2 percent respectively, while private sector 
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deposits increased marginally by 0.4 percent and private sector credit expanded by 
23.4 percent. Even though private sector deposit stagnated near QAR 135,150 
million, private sector credit expanded from QAR 146.516 million to QAR 
172,363 million. On a net basis, this amounts to a huge 702 percent increase 
during this period. This expansionary lending was supported by Qatar Central 
Bank as well as the re-capitalisation of major banks. The effectiveness of this 
activity of the Central Bank could take a while to realise due to the lag effect. 
 
Chart 3.14 Net Public Sector Deposit ‘v’ Net Private Sector Deposit 
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A comparison to a similar approach adopted by the US Federal Reserve may be 
appropriate here. Kahn (1991) states “Fed does not control the availability of bank 
loans. Unexpected changes in the desired mix of loans and securities in banks' 
portfolios may partly or completely offset Federal Reserve actions to restrain or 
stimulate the economy”. In a recent interview Dudley, the President and CEO of 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that “The facilities cannot address the 
fundamental problem — the shortage of capital in the banking system. 
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Chart 3.15 Credit Changes between June 2008 and May 2009 
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The facilities can slow down the deleveraging process, but until the banking 
system is viewed as being sufficiently well-capitalized and is able to expand its 
lending activity significantly, the limits on credit availability caused by an 
impaired banking system will make it more difficult to generate a sustainable 
economic recovery” (Dudley, 2009). While the Central Bank of Qatar, akin to its 
GCC counterparts, is not as vocal as the Federal Reserve is, it can be stated with 
reasonable certainty that it has better control over the lending habits of the 
domestic banks than the Federal Reserve has over the lending habits of US banks. 
The credit facilities provided by banks has contributed to the economic 
development of Qatar in two main ways: one, by aiding the emergence of private 
non-oil and gas sector which has diversified the economy, otherwise dependent 
heavily on public sector and two, by directly increasing the consumption 
expenditure of Qatar’s population through the provision of credit facilities 
intended for consumption purposes. Together these two important factors have 
contributed significantly to the development and growth of Qatar’s economy. 
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However, the current predicament of banks has exposed the difficulty in 
developing many profitable investment opportunities outside the limited scope of 
real estate, trade and stock market. This lack of business diversity coupled with 
excess liquidity have generated the real estate and stock market bubble, both of 
which turned into bust due to the stresses generated by the eruption of the global 
crisis. This means that in order for Qatar to be able to go forward with its strategy 
of diversification it needs to look at ways to strengthen the local banking system 
by focusing on GCC integration and cooperation, besides its current focus on 
opening up its economy, through QFC, to foreign capital as a means of 
diversifying revenues. 
 
3.5 The Evolution and Role of Money Exchange Companies 
Until the mid-‘fifties foreign currency and precious metals were purchased and 
sold by general merchants as part of their trading activities. Also mobile vendors 
who moved around the country used to carry out these transactions. As a 
consequence of the changes and development of the Qatari economy manifested 
by the increased importance of the oil economy and trading activities, the first 
specialised money exchange company was set up in 1955 with a capital of one 
million Indian rupees (the Indian rupee was in circulation then) followed by 
another company in 1969 with a capital of 130,000 Qatar-Dubai riyals. 
The money exchange business saw its biggest growth after the 1973 oil price hike 
and the resultant growth of the economy and the trade sector. As Table 3.8 shows, 
twelve of the sixteen money exchange companies were established after 1973. Al 
Fardan Exchange and Finance Company and the Habib Qatar International 
Finance and Investment Company stand out among money exchangers as most 
influential; moreover, Habib International has a branch in Zurich. In spite of the 
growth of retail banking, money exchangers were able to maintain their position 
in the economy and most currency dealings are conducted by them. This is largely 
due to the services they provide to the sizeable expatriate community 
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Table 3. 8  List of Money Exchange Companies Operating in Qatar 
Company Company 
Money and Exchange Middle East Exchange  
Qatar Emirates Exchange  Qatar International Exchange 
AL Fardan Exchange & Finance  Islamic Exchange 
Doha Exchange Eastern Exchange & Finance 
Trust Exchange   Al-Sadd Exchange 
Gulf Finance & Exchange  Al-Jazeera Exchange 
Habib Qatar international Finance & international  Al-Dar Exchange 
Al Zaman Exchange  Arabian Exchange 
Global Exchange  National Exchange 
City Exchange Lari Exchange 
Al Mana Exchange   
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009 
 
Money exchange companies were operating until 1982 without being subject to 
regulation. In order to regulate and control the business the Qatari government 
issued Law No.4 of 1982. This law defines the business as a trading activity in 
foreign currencies, traveller’s cheques, and precious metals, and issuance and 
acceptance of personal drafts in favour of correspondents abroad. The law also 
indicates that formal permission to set up a money exchange company must be 
obtained from the Ministry of Finance with due recommendation by the Qatar 
Monetary Authority, QMA, (at present Qatar Central Bank). The business is only 
open to Qatari nationals with indigenous capital. New branches or mergers or 
collaboration between companies is granted and supervised by the QMA. 
The agency is also required to undertake all that is necessary to implement the 
law. The law has provisions for the application of sanctions against those who 
violate the provisions of the law. Since its enactment the law has been amended 
once in Law No 9 of 1990. The amendment concerned article No 9. This article 
stipulates that the license granted for a money exchange company is restricted to 
the owner of the company. If a change of title to the company occurs, the new 
owner must apply for a new license. This stipulation was amended to allow the 
owner to have one or more partners provided he obtains approval from the QMA 
to be endorsed by the Ministry of Finance (Qatar Monetary Agency: 1985, pp 59-
62). 
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Money exchangers are an important segment of the financial system and play an 
important role in meeting the domestic needs of foreign currency for a variety of 
invisible economic transactions such as travelling abroad for purposes of tourism, 
education or health. More importantly they handle the remittance of funds by 
expatriates to their families and relatives in their home countries. Remittance 
abroad can take the form of cash, or travellers’ cheques as demand on draft drawn 
on correspondents: foreign banks, exchange houses or their branches abroad. 
Thus, money exchange companies constitute a major channel for the inflow and 
outflow of foreign currency. This increased importance led the government to 
tighten its control on the business in early 1990 and the monetary authority 
threatened to withdraw licenses if money exchangers did not abide by the law that 
organizes their operations and prohibits them from serving as depository 
institutions such as taking deposits or extending credit facilities to the public. The 
supervision and control of the operations of money exchangers have also 
increased through the periodical financial statements provided to QCB and on the 
spot inspections. 
The data in Table 3.9 indicates a heavy reliance of money exchange companies up 
until the year 2000 on external sources such as credit facilities extended by banks 
and money exchangers, in addition to discounted cheques and drafts of around 69 
percent, while only 30 percent of funds come from internal sources, i.e., capital 
and reserves. After that the data indicates a substantial increase in internal 
resources reversing the trend whereby these companies became 69 percent reliant 
on internal sources. The companies witnessed a substantial 
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Table 3. 9  Consolidated Balance Sheet of Money Exchange Companies 1997-2008    (QAR million) 
Description  1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cash 40 45.1 37.9 31.5 41.8 43.1 68.1 74.8 116 125.7 125 
Balances with Banks 81.4 92.6 88.4 90.6 70.7 77.4 78 278.7 249.3 262.5 266.6 
Balances with Money Exchangers 3.2 8.3 5.7 3.5 9.2 9.2 6.2 16 25.7 37.7 100.5 
Fixed Assets 7.7 9.7 7.1 6.9 5.9 5.3 19.7 12.3 28.5 37.8 41.4 
Other Assets 30.5 26 29.2 25.7 110 225 334 259.2 181.5 172.3 137.5 
Total Assets 163 182 168 158 238 356 506 641 601 636 671 
Capital and Reserves 50.8 57.1 58.6 65.3 140 262 404.2 479.8 447 493.7 464.5 
Bank Accounts 76.6 91 61.9 52.7 60 55.1 63.7 89.2 55.7 43.9 52.6 
Branches and Exchange Accounts 10.8 8.7 7.8 11.5 0 17.6 16.9 46.9 67.5 62.3 79.9 
Other Liabilities 24.6 24.9 40 28.7 37.6 21.7 21.2 24.9 30.8 35.6 73.9 
Total Liabilities 163 182 168 158 238 356 506 641 601 636 671 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2008 
increase in total assets as a result of expansion in investment in the domestic 
financial market. The largest portion of the increase can be attributed to two major 
factors; the first is the revaluation of the companies’ portfolio of domestic share 
due to the high rise (of about 70 percent) of the Doha Stock Market’s general 
price index throughout 2003 and the second is the augmentation of the companies’ 
investments in financial securities. The table also shows that more than half the 
money exchange companies’ assets are used in the form of credits in banks and 
money exchangers – primarily abroad - in order to finance payment orders written 
by the money exchangers to beneficiaries. This is an indication of the significant 
role the money exchangers play in servicing the expatriate community of Qatar. 
The rest of the funds were used in a variety of forms such as cash for daily 
transactions and investments. 
 
3.6 Role of Qatar’s Central Bank in Promoting Financial Stability  
The development of the Qatari economy has been accompanied by the evolution 
and strengthening of the role of the Central Bank of Qatar as an essential part of 
the evolving structure of the financial system. Like many other Gulf States, Qatar 
did not have its own national currency before 1973. The Indian rupee was the 
currency until the mid ‘fifties when it was replaced by the Gulf rupee until the 
mid ‘sixties. In 1965, a Gulf Currency Agreement was signed by the rulers of 
Qatar, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain in order to unify the currency of the region. 
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Due to a delay in implementing the agreement, Qatar and Dubai took measures to 
evolve their own currency and signed the Qatar-Dubai Agreement on 21 March 
1966 which was later amended during August of the same year. According to the 
agreement the currency came to be known as the Qatar-Dubai riyal and a board 
was set up to take charge of the issuance and redemption of bank notes and coins. 
The merger of Dubai with the United Arab Emirates and the creation by the new 
state of a national currency, namely the U.A.E Dirham, on the 19th May 1973 
resulted in the dissolution of the Qatar-Dubai Currency Board. The assets and 
liabilities of the Board were transferred to the Qatari government and 
subsequently the establishment of Qatar Monetary Agency, QMA, came about 
(Qatar Monetary Agency, 1985: pp23-28). 
The agency was established on the basis of law No 7, 1973 and was granted the 
powers of a central bank. Its establishment coincided with the huge influx of oil 
revenues due to the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973. This gave the agency 
position and prominence and enabled it to make use of the new economic 
situation effectively, develop methods and procedures to control the banking 
sector and align its development with the development of the economy. The 
objectives of the agency as stipulated by law are: 
1. To regulate the issuance, redemption and supply of currency; 
2. To safeguard the internal and external value of the currency and its 
convertibility into other currencies; 
3. To promote credit and create conditions conducive to the growth of the 
economy within the framework of monetary stability; 
4. To supervise the banks’ activities (ibid, p25) 
 
This original legal framework of managing the monetary issues of the country and 
the banking system has been replaced by law No 15, 1993, establishing Qatar 
Central Bank (QCB). One of the major reasons for this was to help achieve, “a 
much more effective role of Qatar Central Bank in enhancing the bases of stability 
78 
 
of the banking institutions and reinforcing the outstanding achievements that were 
accomplished by the banking sector” (Qatar Central Bank, 2002: p27) Three main 
objectives were specified in the new law that showed the need to link monetary 
issues to economic policies and strengthen the development of the economy. 
These were: 
1. To administer the monetary policies and banking insurance to accomplish 
the government’s economic policies. 
2.  To organise and supervise banks and financial institutions in accordance 
with the provisions of the law. 
3.  To act as the bank of banks operating in the country (ibid). 
Qatar Central Bank inherited all the responsibilities of the monetary authority 
with the additional function of overseeing the running of all financial institutions 
including banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses and money exchange 
houses and linking its activities to the country’s  economic policy. The pegging of 
the Qatari currency to the US dollar limited Qatar’s monetary policy; in fact its 
monetary policy mirrors the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve of the United 
States. In 1975, QMA pegged the value of the Qatar Riyal to the IMF’s Special 
Drawing Rights with a fluctuation margin of ±2.25 percent. QMA used the United 
States Dollar (USD) to determine the value of the Qatar Riyal on a daily basis 
(Qatar National Bank, 2006). 
A system was created in such a way that the value of the Qatari Riyal against the 
USD was determined on the basis of the value of the USD against the SDR. The 
Qatari Riyal’s value against other currencies was determined on the basis of the 
USD’s value against those currencies. The Qatari Riyal underwent a series of 
revaluations, the cumulative effect of which was an appreciation of 8.5 percent to 
compensate part of the 13.4 percent depreciation in the USD against the SDR 
during that period. Since 1980, Qatar has maintained its peg to the USD at QAR 
3.64 per USD. As the USD began its appreciation, the QAR has also appreciated 
against the currencies of almost all Qatar’s trade partners. However, because of 
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the currency peg, Qatar has imported significant inflationary pressures from 
abroad (Setser, 2008). Inflation is expected to level out because of the fall of 
global commodity prices, the drop in the cost of construction and the introduction 
of new housing stock into the Qatari market. However, following a further 
deterioration in the US economy, the dollar could be back on the decline again 
and imported inflation back on an upward trend. The Qatari government and QCB 
are limited in their power against such an eventuality as long as the Riyal is 
pegged to the US dollar (The Report Qatar, 2009: p43). 
Despite this linkage to the US dollar, which at times appeared unfavourable to 
Qatar, the  management of the country’s financial system proved over the years to 
be effective and helped maintain a steady and impressive growth of the economy, 
encouraging the expansion in private sector interests. It is worth mentioning some 
of these effective policies. The QMA focused on encouraging the development of 
national banks at a time when the sector was dominated by foreign banks. 
Consequently, it restricted the issuance of licenses to national banks only. This 
policy was essential for the creation of national economic institutions and for 
providing new opportunities for local businesses. 
The QMA also dealt effectively with the difficulties faced by banks as a result of 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and took measures that helped maintain confidence 
in the system during the 1990s. It gave banks the option to accept or reject the 
withdrawal of deposits before maturity dates as long as they operated within the 
legal requirement of liquidity status. It also imposed a restriction on all money 
exchangers to sell the USD at a rate not exceeding QAR 3.68. Those who violated 
the ceiling were warned about legal penalties. In 2000, QCB faced a serious 
problem with one of its national banks, Al Ahli Bank of Qatar. The bank was hit 
by a severe loan problem caused by the defaulting of one of its major customers. 
The level of exposure of the bank was around 40 percent of the total bank loan 
portfolio. The QCB rescued the bank by providing a 10-year guarantee with an 
amount equivalent to the bank’s defaulting loan (USD 28 million). The agency 
was also able to change the bank’s management and required significant bank 
restructuring. There is recognition in the Qatari government of the need to 
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improve the performance of top management as indicated by the Governor of 
Qatar Central Bank, Sheikh Abdullah bin Saud Al-Thani: 
One of the major challenges facing the Qatari banks is the competence of top 
management level. There is a need to increase its efficiency and 
effectiveness, especially in light of the fast pace of changes in the banking 
business. Top management must be ready and capable to absorb these 
changes and act in the best interest of its clients (Interview, July 2008). 
The general trend for tighter control and regulations of the banking sector 
continued until the mid 1990s by increasing the supervision of all banking 
activities, including the appointment of banks’ top management teams, tighter 
control on credit facilities and tighter control on money exchange companies. A 
change of policy took place, during this period, in 1995, when QCB started a 
series of steps to liberalize the Qatari market by freeing interest rate on credit. As 
was expected, rates were consequently raised. This was followed by partial 
freeing of interest rates on deposits of more than 15 months. The freeing of 
interest rates continued by abolishing restrictions on interest rates on saving 
accounts of more than 12 months while those less than 12 months were subjected 
to maximum limits set by the Central Bank. This helped to substantially increase 
long-term deposits, and hence gave banks access to medium-term finance 
resources. By 2000, the Central Bank freed interest rates on the Qatari riyal 
totally, giving banks the freedom to determine interest rates on deposits of various 
terms in line with market forces. The rate of reserves of all current accounts was 
also dropped in 2000 from the rate in use since 1995 of 19 percent to only 2.75 
percent. This was in line with the government’s strategy of opening up the 
economy and increasing its competitive edge. However, this had the effect of 
increasing lines of credit substantially and expanded the activities of the real 
estate sector significantly resulting in heightened speculative activities. This, 
coupled with speculative activities in the stock market, caused the current 
excessive exposure in these vulnerable sectors. 
From late 2007, QCB has been addressing some of the key issues underpinning 
the downturn in the banking system, such as reducing interest rates, increasing the 
mandatory reserve ratios, issuing certificates of deposit, granting special credit 
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facilities to Qatari banks with suitable interest rates, and canceling the deposit 
limit at QCB in accordance with the Qatari monetary market interest rate 
mechanism. QCB has also taken certain precautionary measures to limit exposure 
of banks to these two sectors, such as restraining credit for real estate financing 
and shares purchasing, although by IMF standards, credit expansion in Qatar in 
general, is still viewed as high. 
The dilemma facing the QCB was how it could strive to maintain a balance 
between the country’s development needs at this stage, and financial stability. 
Several instructions have been issued by QCB over the last few years to mitigate 
credit risks, with particular emphasis on the risks of financing the real estate 
sector and the purchase of shares. Also, corporate governance regulations were 
issued by the QCB in February 2008 which incorporated sound banking principles 
and guidelines. QCB has held many bilateral and multilateral meetings with the 
managements of banks to discuss the repercussions of the financial crisis. These 
meetings were very beneficial as they led to the scheme to rescue the banks. The 
QCB and the government pro active approach have averted a crash in Qatar’s 
financial system. 
The downturn of the banking sector has impacted directly on the government plan 
that was meant to come into effect in 2008 to create a unified regulatory body by 
merging banking supervision sections of Qatar Central Bank with Qatar Financial 
Centre Regulatory Authority (QFCRA) and Qatar Financial Markets Authority. 
Such a step would have meant taking away its regulatory and supervisory 
functions from the Central Bank. As indicated by Stuart Pearce, “The Central 
Bank will do what central banks do and that is to be responsible for the exchange 
rates and monetary policy (Interview, July 2008). This would have reduced the 
power of the Central Bank significantly. Commenting on the government decision 
to halt the plan , Phillip Thorpe , CEO of QFCRA, said, “The three regulators are 
getting on and doing our job separately, we have been in a holding pattern for 
some time now” (Qatar Today, April 2009:p22). 
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However, other factors also played a role. The current crisis in global financial 
markets and the experience of separating the function of the central bank and 
financial regulation in Britain, and its unsuccessful model of a unified regulatory 
body might have dampened the enthusiasm for such a move. Also, the Governor 
of QCB is not in favour of such a move. Elaborating his view on a unified 
regulatory body, he said,  
It is more effective and prudent to maintain the regulatory and supervision 
function in the hands of the central bank.  We do not see the British model of 
separation of central bank and financial regulation as an effective way of 
managing the financial system especially in times of crisis. In Britain, the 
central bank and the regulatory body are blaming each other for the current 
financial crisis. Such a situation undermines the financial system and 
investors’ confidence, something we should avoid here in Qatar. Our 
financial system is very young and unseasoned.  There is no need to speed 
up the process of integration and give up the regulatory function to QFC 
(Interview, July 2008).  
It is understandable, when the financial markets are in such turmoil and have been 
stabilised through massive injection of funds by governments worldwide, that the 
Qatari government should take a cautious approach towards changing its 
regulatory structure and opt to maintain the current one. Also the Qatari banking 
system might still require further support from the government, and need to adjust 
to the new challenging environment, as indicated by the Governor of QCB: 
Our banks and financial institutions are sound and fundamentally strong with 
the continuing support from the leadership and the Government of Qatar. We 
should continually be aware of which will surface in the coming months as a 
result of the ongoing financial crisis. Therefore, banks should revisit their 
credit and investment policies in the light of these challenges and carefully 
balance between their legitimate wishes to realize growth and development, 
and their abilities to face the potential risks (Interview, July 2008). 
 
The Central Bank, as the discussion showed, has been effective in carrying out its 
functions. This view is shared by the business community in Qatar. As indicated 
by Adel Mustafawi, CEO of Al-Rayan bank, “The management of the Central 
Bank of the financial system is strong and its supervision is sound and its 
regulations are very clear” (Interview, July 2008). Others express more vocal 
views about QFC, such as the Managing Director of International Bank of Qatar 
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who indicated that “The presence of the QFC will destroy our financial system; its 
rules and regulations are not clear and its supervision is lenient” (Interview, July 
2008). There is more confidence in the business community in the QCB vis-à-vis 
QFC, and the government has a long way to go in convincing the business 
community of the benefits associated with QFC and any regulatory body that 
might be connected with it. 
 
3.7   Conclusion 
The development of the banking system in Qatar has played an integral part in the 
country’s rapid economic growth in various ways. Some relate to building a solid 
infrastructure including the issuance of a national currency, the establishment of 
national banking institutions, the creation and development of a modern Central 
Bank, and the creation of a sound regulatory frame to influence and control the 
development of the banking system, while others contribute directly to the growth 
of the economy through providing credit to the private sector in non-oil and gas 
sectors as well as supporting consumer expenditure and higher standards of living. 
However, to a great extent this was the result of both government effort and 
protection of the sector from foreign competition as well as its need to redistribute 
some of the state’s massive wealth. 
The current financial crisis has revealed some weaknesses in the system such as 
its over-exposure to specific sectors, and the overall unseasoned nature of the 
nascent banking industry and it’s over-reliance on the government. The banking 
system has been propped up by government bailout and the strength of the system 
at the present is closely tied to the sound economic performance of the country 
and the support offered by the state. The future of banking is still reliant on the 
state as indicated by Qatar’s Prime Minister, “Qatar has set aside about USD 150 
billion for various projects over the next four years and stands ready to inject 
funds into local businesses”. These teething problems, some of which are 
structural such as its heavy exposure to particular sectors of the economy, while 
others are related to the global financial environment, put a question mark over 
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the ability of this sector to contribute to the government’s policy of diversification 
and increasing the role of the private sector. Some of the weakness inherent in the 
system, due to population and market size can be overcome through greater GCC 
economic integration.  
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Chapter Four 
The Expansion of Non-Banking Financial Services in Qatar 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Although Qatar follows the pattern seen in developing countries of a low profile 
for non-banking financial activities and the predominance of the banking system 
in the overall financial sector of the country, this is slowly changing and non-
banking financial activities have witnessed some rapid changes. The most 
significant of these have taken place in recent years and are manifested in the 
expansion of the equity market, facilitated by the creation of a stock market, while 
the debt market has seen an expansion in the issuance of corporate bonds, 
especially in sukuk, Islamic bonds, as well as a growth in the insurance business 
and investment and finance companies. The discussion of insurance businesses 
and investment and finance companies will be the focus of the following chapter. 
Suffice it to say here that, for a while, the dominant feature of the non-banking 
financial system in Qatar was the insurance sector, but with the emergence of a 
nascent equity and debt market, the sector is diversifying and impacting on the 
expansion of private sector interests in the Qatari economy. 
It is estimated that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) citizens own some USD 500 
billion in liquid financial assets (cash, stocks, mutual funds, etc.) held outside the 
GCC financial system (Bakheet: 1999). The GCC governments need to attract part 
of this private wealth back, in order to help in the process of diversifying the 
economy and minimizing the impact of the volatile oil price and its damaging 
aftershocks. The private sector can act as a safety net for the impact of oil price 
changes and the huge dependence of the GDP on that one sector. Furthermore, the 
recent volatility of the price of oil and the current financial global debacle makes 
it even more imperative to invest these surpluses in the region and increase the 
focus on the diversification of the economy. Achieving this is no small feat, 
considering the limited size of the Qatari economy, but with an outward-looking, 
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open economy, focusing on the opportunities in the GCC region, the Arab region 
and beyond, an expansion in the role of the private sector is possible. However, 
because of the massive size of the oil and gas revenues, the economy will tend to 
be skewed towards a prominent position of public sector investments and 
activities. 
The discussion in this chapter reveals three important points:  
Firstly, despite the Qatari government’s intervention and support of the 
development of non-banking activities, more needs to be done in order to spread 
the benefits of the equity and debt markets to the economy and to integrate these 
markets with the GCC member states. Most of the GCC countries have limited 
local markets, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, and any meaningful 
development and deepening of non-banking activities requires a more coordinated 
effort to capture their full potential. A standardized and well-regulated unified 
market can create a very dynamic and influential regional capital and debt markets 
that can service the region and compete globally.  There are immense difficulties 
in carrying out such a task as has been indicated by several of the interviewees. 
Saif al Mansoori of the Qatar Exchange points out the differences in the 
regulations and legislative framework of each of the GCC countries as the most 
significant obstacles towards such integration (Interview, July 2008). However, 
when there is a political will and a political decision is taken, such obstacles can 
be overcome, especially considering the similarities of economic challenges 
facing the GCC countries. 
Secondly, expanding the investor class and building an environment that 
encourages entrepreneurship in order to build a vibrant private sector will take 
time and effort. This has been identified by all interviewees as one of the key 
areas where knowledge and experience of investors, especially small and medium-
sized businesses, need to increase - as the boom and bust of the stock market 
showed. As poignantly pointed out by the Minister of Economy and Finance 
“Local investors had a painful lesson to learn that the markets aren’t a one-way 
ticket to wealth...No country or region can immunise itself against a recession. We 
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all need to question the easy assumptions we have made about how to do 
business” (Interview: July 2008). 
Thirdly, the global financial crisis should be seen as an opportunity for the GCC 
to develop its markets and establish a regional financial centre on a par with other 
financial centres in the world, rather than the present duplication of financial 
centres which weakens the ability of the region to do so. In order to realize this, a 
long term strategy of linkage between human capital development and economic 
strategies is paramount in order to reduce dependency on foreign labour and 
create job opportunities for GCC nationals. Although Qatar has expanded its 
education and has allocated a huge amount of resources to this sector, there is the 
challenge, as pointed out by Stuart Pearce, of not only creating educated and well-
trained people, but people who are innovative in their thought processes and who 
can contribute to the economy (Interview: July 2008). Moreover, this is a great 
opportunity to focus the minds of the political leadership in the GCC to actualise 
the integration of their economies for the benefit of their long-term stability and 
viability.   
The following analysis will concentrate, firstly, on discussing the Qatar Exchange 
and analysing its role in the economy. This will be followed by an investigation 
into the need to integrate the stock markets of the Gulf region.  Thirdly, the 
chapter will discuss the Qatari debt market by looking at the bond market, 
especially Islamic bonds, followed by an evaluation of the need to integrate the 
bond market in the GCC. Lastly, it will assess the recent changes in the private 
equity market and its impact on the expansion of private sector activities. 
 
4.2 Emergence and Growth of Qatar Exchange  
The decision to encourage the development of Qatar’s equity market by 
establishing the Doha Securities Market (DSM) in mid 1995 is part and parcel of 
the government’s strategy of strengthening the private sector and expanding 
domestic investment opportunities. One has to bear in mind that most of the GCC 
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stock markets are a recent feature of their financial systems. The oldest market in 
the Arab Gulf is in Kuwait. It started naturally, with private investors buying and 
selling on the kerb, and it was only regulated and developed into an official 
exchange in 1977, while Saudi Arabia, the largest market, does not have an 
official exchange but the Saudi Monetary Agency, the de facto central bank, 
sponsors a sophisticated computer-based stock trading system, the Electronic 
Securities Information System (ESIS). 
The operations of the Qatar Exchange started in 1997, with the trading of eighteen 
participant companies. Trading in that year was limited to a number of 
transactions and value of shares; it stood at 1317 transactions with a value of QAR 
196 million. (Qatar Central Bank Annual Report: 2005). From then onward the 
market witnessed a steady rise in its activities. The substantial growth of the 
market coincided with the hike in oil prices when oil income was beginning to 
boost investors’ portfolios. The resulting market was fast, lucrative and profitable 
for many individuals; however, this boom was followed by a bust and a correction 
of prices in 2006 with big losses to many people. 
In a bid to revitalise and enhance the profile of the market, the Qatari government 
changed the name of the Doha Securities Market to the Qatar Exchange. It also 
agreed the sale of a 20 percent stake for USD 200m to NYSE Euronext, operator 
of the New York Stock Exchange and Paris Bourse and other European centres, to 
facilitate the use of the latter's trading technology to launch  new products largely 
unavailable on its regional rivals’ markets. A spokesman for Qatar Holding, 
owner of the remaining 80 percent stake in the Qatar Exchange and part of the 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), noted that the purpose is to “Take the Qatar 
equity market to a new level. This project is going to reinforce our presence on the 
world map. It is a huge coup for the country, and reinforces our plans to expand 
globally” (Independent: 2009). This Partnership with NYSE will undoubtedly 
help develop the Qatar market into a multi-asset class exchange, which will 
include shares, ETFs (exchange-traded funds), ETCs (exchange-traded 
commodities), bonds, sukuks and index products. 
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The Qatar Exchange will install NYSE's Universal Trading Platform, which is 
being rolled out across NYSE cash and derivatives markets globally, to launch 
Qatar's own derivatives exchange. The initial types of product will be based on 
market demand, but will probably include single stock options and future and 
index options. The Bourse's focus on new products reflects the tough task it faces 
in securing regional rivals in terms of equity trading. Daily trading on Qatar's 
index averaged just 18 million shares during 2008, while volumes on the Dubai 
and Kuwait benchmarks were 598 million and 760 million respectively.  The 
Qatar Exchange is planning an initial public offering. The likely timescale, the 
size of the stake to be sold or how much the company would look to raise has not 
yet been decided. 
The following is a detailed analysis of the main characteristics of the securities 
market and its impact on the economy prior to this new development. It might 
also shed light on why such a bold step was needed to bolster the equity market, 
especially if the government is looking to compete on a par with Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi and to compete globally. As Qatar’s Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassem bin 
Jabr Al-Thani indicated, the opening of the Qatar Exchange “Paves the way for 
Qatar to take a prominent role in the world’s capital markets for the benefit of 
both the people of Qatar and the Middle East more generally” (Ibid.) 
 
4.2.1 Market Size 
Qatar’s stock market is very small both in comparison with other emerging 
markets and in absolute terms. However, that is a characteristic of all GCC stock 
markets with the exception of Saudi Arabia and even Saudi Arabia’s market, if 
compared to some emerging markets, is considered relatively small. As seen from 
Table 4.1 Doha is placed third in the region in terms of capitalisation and fifth in 
terms of value of traded stock. This is understandable considering the small size 
of the overall market in Qatar.   
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Table 4.1 Market Size of GCC Stock Markets - Dec 2008   
Market 
Value Traded 
(Million USD) 
Shares 
Traded 
(Million) 
Market 
Capitalization 
(Million USD) No of Contracts 
Turnover 
(%) 
Abu Dhabi Securities Market 61,279 48,347 61,887 1,090,143 99.0% 
Bahrain Stock Exchange 1,905 1,480 19,954 40,387 9.5% 
Doha Securities Market 41,250 3,400 76,657 1,865,516 53.8% 
Dubai Financial Market 69,880 66,066 65,218 1,849,953 107.1% 
Kuwait Stock Market 116,023 75,820 113,527 1,874,201 102.2% 
Muscat Securities Market 8,034 3,881 15,643 815,620 51.4% 
Saudi Stock Market 483,122 54,442 246,809 1,082,545 195.7% 
Source:  Arab Monetary Fund, available at http://ww.amf.org.ae/venglish/default.asp 
 
Nonetheless, the market has been an important vehicle in attracting the investment 
of private sector wealth in the domestic economy and in supporting the 
government’s policy of diversification of the economy. Obviously the size of the 
market and its development is highly dependent on the introduction of new 
listings, the number of which more than doubled following the establishment of 
DSM, increasing to 43 companies trading in the four main sectors of the economy 
as follows: banking (nine companies), insurance (five companies), industry (nine 
companies) and services (22 companies). This relatively small number of listed 
companies is common to all other Gulf stock markets. For instance Saudi Arabia, 
the largest in the region, has only 135 listed companies. Most family businesses 
are not listed on the stock market and there is a need to restructure these and 
transform them into public listed companies, and by doing so their longevity and 
the expansion of the size of the stock market will be ensured. This particular issue 
will be discussed further in section 4.3. However, in terms of growth, the market 
has grown significantly over a short period of time. The 17 companies the 
exchange began with grew to 43 listed companies and the total market 
capitalisation grew from a mere QAR six billion to QAR 279 billion by the end of 
2008. It dropped from its 2007 peak of total market capitalisation of around QAR 
348 billion. Not only is the size of the market small, but capital is concentrated in 
the hands of a few companies in each sector, as seen from the data in Table 4.2. 
For instance, the banking sector is dominated by the Masraf Al-Rayan and Al-
Khaliji Bank, while insurance is dominated by the Qatar Insurance Company. 
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Qatar Industries dominates the industrial sector, while Ezdan Real-Estate, Aamal 
Investment Company and Qatar Gas Transportation dominate the service sector. 
This reflects the concentration of economic power in the hands of the few and the 
need to transform family businesses into corporate enterprises. Despite these 
limitations, the presence of a stock market is a much-needed development to 
increase the interest of local capital in local and regional businesses and part of 
the process of increasing the significance and contribution of the financial system 
of Qatar in its economy. 
 
4.2.2 Market Trading 
The value of shares traded during the decade-long operation of the stock market 
has seen substantial increase from a the low level in 1998 of QAR 970 million to 
QAR 109 billion in 2007, representing a 100 percent annual growth rate which 
was experienced across the different sectors (see Table 4.3). Trading in the shares 
of the banking sector accounted for 40 percent of trade for 2007, followed by 
services with 35 percent, industry with 21 percent while insurance accounted for 
only four percent. This is an improvement in the distribution of the relative shares 
of the different sectors from its level at the start of trading in 1998 where the 
financial sector had the lion’s share of 66 percent, services 23 percent, industry 
only five percent and insurance six percent. However, these improvements in the 
performance of the services and industry sectors are due to the significant 
contribution of one company in each sector; Qatar Telecommunication (QTEL) 
and Qatar Industries. So the heavy market concentration remains a major 
characteristic which needs to be addressed. 
Despite this significant expansion in trade within a relatively short period of time, 
the market remains shallow; the turnover rate was around 54 percent for 2008, a 
much lower rate than those of Saudi Arabia (196 percent) Dubai (107 percent) and 
Kuwait (102 percent) as seen in Table 4.1. One of the reasons for that is that the 
government still holds a large share of listed firms that rarely trade and 
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Table 4.2  Capital of Companies Listed on the Qatar Exchange (QAR ‘000   
Sector Organisation 2007 2008 2009 
Banking Ahli Bank of Qatar 507,812 583,984 613,184 
 Commercial Bank Of Qatar 1,401,579 2,062,053 2,165,156 
 Doha Bank 1,248,175 1,722,481 1,808,606 
 Qatar National Bank 1,824,974 2,408,966 3,011,207 
 Qatar Islamic Bank 1,193,400 1,969,110 2,067,566 
 Qatar International Islamic Bank 700,781 1,261,406 1,324,476 
 Masraf Al Rayan 7,500,000 7,500,000 7,500,000 
 First Finance 352,634 511,319 639,149 
 Al Khalij Commercial Bank 7,200,000 7,200,000 3,600,000 
     
Insurance Qatar Islamic Insurance Co. 150,000 150,000 150,000 
 Qatar General Insurance & Reinsurance Co. 136,400 204,600 255,750 
 Qatar Insurance Co. 424,710 424,710 743,243 
 Al Khaleej Insurance and Reinsurance Co. 101,640 142,296 142,296 
 Doha Insurance Co. 127,240 180,000 180,000 
     
Industrial Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Co. 300,000 300,000 300,000 
 Qatar National Cement Co. 357,095 357,095 446,396 
 Zad Holding Co.(Qatar Flour Mills Co.) 72,600 76,230 91,476 
 United Development Co. 1,072,500 1,072,500 1,072,500 
 Qatar German Co. for Medical Devices 57,750 115,500 115,500 
 Industries Qatar (IQ) 5,000,000 5,500,000 5,500,000 
 Gulf Holding Co.(Gulf Cement Co.) 800,000 800,000 1,243,267 
     
Services Qatar Telecom (Q-Tel) 1,000,000 1,466,667 1,466,667 
 Qatar Cinema & Film Distribution Co. 21,449 23,594 25,954 
 Qatar Electricity & Water Co. 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 
 Qatar Fuel Co. 300,000 300,000 315,000 
 Qatar Gas Transportation Co. 5,600,000 5,600,000 5,600,000 
 Medicare Group (Ahli Hospital Co.) 281,441 281,441 281,441 
 National Leasing Co. 299,880 299,880 329,868 
 Qatar Navigation Co. 468,000 600,210 600,210 
 Qatar Real Estate Investment Co. 720,000 864,000 864,000 
 Qatar Shipping Co. 1,000,000 1,100,000 1,100,000 
 Qatar Technical Inspection Co. 40,000 40,000 40,000 
 Salam International 828,015 931,516 989,737 
 Qatar Meat & Livestock Co. 300,000 300,000 180,000 
 Gulf Warehousing Co. 250,000 250,000 250,000 
 Dlala holding 200,000 200,000 200,000 
 Barwa Real Estate Company 2,000,000 2,625,000 2,625,000 
 Mannai Corporation 120,000 144,000 158,400 
 Aamal ِ 3,450,000 3,795,000 3,795,000 
 Qatar & Oman Investment Co. 300,000 300,000 300,000 
 Ezdan Real Estate Company  4,569,000 4,569,000 
 Islamic Financial Securities Company  40,000 40,000 
 Gulf International Services  1,228,699 1,351,569 
     
Source:  Qatar Exchange, 2009 
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Table 4.3 Trading on the Qatar Exchange 1998-2008        
(Value in QAR millions; Quantity in 1000 Shares)        
Items 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
          
Banking sector          
Value of Shares           637           608           299 609        1,467         3,418         9,258               28,451   
Quantity of Shares        13,843      13,103        7,561 16,106      30,119       38,983       54,884               94,687 
Number of Deals        3,515        5,899        4,646 5,283        8,127       15,050  49,195 134,904 
Insurance Sector         
Value of Shares             62             58             35 65           165            344            921                 2,516   
Quantity of Shares             839           829           870 1,380        3,968         6,684         8,339        11,695 
Number of Deals           364           485           517 564        1,766         3,318  6,363 17,629 
Services Sector         
Value of Shares           220           458        4,741 767        1,348         3,968         8,028               44,552   
Quantity of Shares        13,779      4,735      20,850 30,649      38,313       72,373     143,485      696,435 
Number of Deals        2,942        5,688        5,814 8,473      16,057       56,424  152,713 760,721 
Industry Sector         
Value of Shares             51           114             61 63           235         3,992         4,888               27,323   
Quantity of Shares           2,767        16,,606        2,328 2,880        7,207       71,933       98,567      230,264 
Number of Deals           926        1,892        1,248 1,451        3,837       59,904  76,373 216,793 
Total          
Value of Shares           970        1,238        5,136 1,504        3,215       11,722       23,095             102,843   
Quantity of Shares        3,123      28,167      31,609 51,015      79,597     189,973     305,387   1,033,081,166  1
Number of Deals        7,748      13,964      12,225 15,771      29,787     134,696  284,644 1,130,047 
Source: Qatar Exchange, 2009 
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strategic shareholders, either major local families or foreign joint ventures, which limit 
the shares available for trading. One way of overcoming this is for the government to 
liquidate its holdings in order to encourage private investors. However, considering the 
current financial climate, this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future since the 
government’s focus is on maintaining the stability of the system and preventing the 
collapse of these listed companies. 
The current relative stability of the market is due largely to the government’s emergency 
plan that bought the investment portfolios listed on the Qatar exchange of local banks as 
discussed in Chapter Three. This measure, as well as boosting the banks’ solvency and 
stimulating liquidity in the market, removed the volatility in share trading and the main 
trading index advanced nine percent while the Qatar National, Qatar Islamic and Qatar 
Commercial banks all rose ten percent (The New York times: 2009). The Qatari 
government had the means and the political power to act in order to limit the impact of 
the global financial crisis because of its massive savings from the sale of its oil and gas. It 
was able to buy bank portfolios in order to provide liquidity to facilitate lending and to 
support the equity market. The main priority for the government is to sustain the 
confidence of investors after the severe fluctuation in the price of shares during 2002-
2005, and the continued fluctuations that the market has been facing since. 
The Qatari stock market went through two phases; the first during the period 2002-2004 
where an increase in share prices occurred as a result of strong economic fundamentals, 
the growth of the GDP and price of oil. However, in the second phase during the 
tremendous boost of prices in 2005 of all listed companies, some nearly doubling in 
value, especially in the banking sector, was not reflective of the economic fundamentals. 
Other factors, such as the process of privatization, played a detrimental role. The use of 
IPOs as the preferred method of privatization with the policy of pricing these offerings 
below their market value as a means of redistributing wealth among the population has an 
impact on prices. This factor alone, according to some sources, could explain two-thirds 
of the Qatari stock price index gains alone during 2003-5, while strong speculative 
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demand explains the severity of the correction of the price (Mansur & Delgado: 2009, p 
8). The speculative demand has risen due to structural weakness in the GCC equity 
market; there is a limited supply of stocks, sector concentration and lack of alternative 
domestic financial assets; the demand for small investors; lack of strong institutional 
investors (the market share of institutional investors in Qatar is two to three percent while 
the highest is only ten percent in Abu Dhabi, well below the average of emerging 
markets) and undeveloped cross holdings of listed companies (ibid, p19-20). Also the 
move away from investing in foreign assets by domestic investors increased demand on 
investments in the region. These have pushed up both real-estate and the stock market 
due to lack of other assets in which to invest. 
Subsequently, the bubble burst and a major correction took place in 2006 that wiped out 
all the gains accumulated in the previous three-year hike and, in 2007, prices settled at a 
level that was, for many companies, much lower than they were in 2004, as seen in Table 
4.4. The worst-affected companies were in the banking sector, where almost all 
experienced a very sharp decline in the share price from the high of 2005. It was the same 
in the insurance sector, with Qatar Islamic Insurance being hit the hardest. The decline in 
service sector companies’ share price was the least severe, with Qatar National 
Navigation and Transportation as well as Qatar Telecom being hit the hardest. 
Boom and bust cycles happened before in the GCC. The first was in Kuwait with the 
1982 bust of Souk Al-Mannak due to the lack of effective regulation for over the counter 
trade. The 1991 Saudi Arabia bubble was a result of the repatriation of funds after the 
invasion of Kuwait and the 1998 Omani bubble came after the market was opened to 
foreign investors. Little has been learned from these previous boom and bust cycles, 
especially that it is possible to prevent a bust if the authorities intervene to dampen the 
market. The signs of a boom in the GCC stock markets were all there but, as mentioned 
before, the QCB and the government did not, perhaps, intervene as they should have as a 
consequence of the difficulty to reach a balance between development needs and 
financial stability. Also, the fact that Qatar Exchange has been regulated by a number of  
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Table 4.4 Avg. Closing Prices of Shares of Listed Companies on Qatar Exchange (QAR)  
Sector Listed Companies Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 
         
Banks Qatar National Bank 82.8 126.9 199.7 377.1 237.8 217.3 171.2 
 Qatar Islamic Bank 44.0 104.5 219.8 361.9 129.2 156.9 82.8 
 Commercial Bank of Qatar 75.5 157.1 206.9 229.7 98.0 186.8 88.3 
 Doha Bank 44.0 168.2 223.1 315.2 99.4 85.7 42.0 
 Al-Ahli Bank of Qatar 36.0 79.6 89.3 115.0 84.4 87.0 43.5 
 International Islamic Bank 61.5 123.9 235.9 525.8 139.0 110.6 58.6 
 Rayan Bank - - - - 18.6 22.9 11.0 
 First Finance Company - - - - 36.6 43.6 24.7 
 
Al Khaleej Commercial 
Bank - - - - - 14.6 7.2 
Insurance Qatar Islamic Insurance Co. 42.0 131.0 260.0 422.7 115.8 82.3 37.0 
 Al Khaleej Insurance 50.0 76.9 200.0 191.5 80.4 101.6 37.6 
 Doha Insurance 24.0 41.5 65.7 65.7 35.6 58.0 20.6 
 Qatar General Insurance 100.0 165.3 300.0 311.5 152.5 110.6 114.1 
 Qatar Insurance 84.5 117.6 260.0 247.8 111.9 170.1 90.2 
Industry Qatar National Cement 134.0 185.5 225.0 260.3 129.4 164.0 99.7 
 Manufacturing Industries 32.0 41.5 39.3 104.3 49.5 49.3 36.7 
 Qatar German Medical 21.5 31.2 27.8 28.3 15.5 34.0 11.5 
 Zad(Qatar Flour Mills) 27.0 29.5 24.5 29.9 25.5 47.0 49.0 
 Qatar Industries - 59.1 61.1 150.0 84.3 154.1 100.6 
 United Development - 29.9 28.5 74.7 34.9 39.7 35.3 
 
Al-Khaleej Cement 
Company - - - - 15.4 26.5 17.4 
Services The Group for Medical Care 25.5 38.1 52.0 31.3 15.7 21.7 9.1 
 
Salem International 
Investment 12.1 9.9 12.5 29.7 15.4 18.0 11.0 
 Qatar Film Distribution 32.5 40.0 73.0 70.0 57.6 47.0 49.9 
 
Qatar Real Estate 
Investment 29.0 39.0 84.7 80.3 42.2 59.7 29.1 
 Qatar National Navigation 94.8 127.7 133.0 277.6 112.4 128.4 72.2 
 Qatar Shipping 24.7 62.5 113.9 107.1 60.5 65.8 37.5 
 Qatar Fuel 28.1 40.8 40.0 126.2 103.5 150.7 130.1 
 QTEL 108.5 158.4 229.8 239.9 225.2 228.1 109.5 
 Qatar Electricity and Water 30.9 46.1 55.7 77.4 71.9 106.7 111.5 
 National Leasing - 28.5 32.9 63.8 19.2 30.5 18.1 
 Qatar Technical Inspection - 84.2 66.2 48.9 29.0 41.5 22.2 
 Qatar Meat & Livestock - - 21.0 28.8 11.2 11.4 8.7 
 Gulf Warehousing - - 23.5 42.4 15.1 58.6 19.5 
 Dlala Investment Holding - - 10.0 121.1 28.7 32.7 20.5 
 
Qatar Gas Transport 
Company - - 5.0 48.7 13.2 31.0 21.6 
 Barwa - - - - 29.1 51.2 30.3 
 Mannai Corp QSC - - - - - 120.0 120.3 
 Aamal - - - - - 51.5 4.0 
 Qatur & Oman - - - - - 18.8 8.6 
 Ezdan - - - - - - 27.0 
 Islamic Securities - - - - - - 48.0 
  Gulf inter Services - - - - - - 22.5 
Source: Qatar exchange, 2008         
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institutions which created supervisory gaps in the legal and regulatory environment might 
also have contributed to the severity of the collapse in the market. 
4.2.3 Profitability of Listed Companies 
The trading companies on the QE show a steady rise in the profitability of the four main 
trading sectors with total profits increasing from QAR five million in 2003 to QAR 26.5 
million in 2007, more than a fivefold increase. The steady growth of profits is 
demonstrated clearly in Chart 4.1 for the services, financial and industry sectors, while 
 
Source: Based on previous table (Table 4.4). 
profits in insurance have been growing at a much slower pace. Profits in services peaked 
and overtook both the industry and financial sectors in 2006 but dropped significantly in 
2006 and 2007. Overall, the service sector accounts for an average share of 35 percent of 
total profits, followed by banks and financial institutions with an average share of 32 
percent, while industry accounts for an average share of 29 percent, leaving the insurance 
sector with a low share of four percent, as seen in Table 4.5. The data also shows a 
concentration of profits in one or two companies in each sector, which is a reflection of 
the market in Qatar being dominated with a few relatively large, well-established 
concerns. 
 
 Table 4.5 Net profit (losses) for listed Companies in the Qatar Exchange (QAR 000) 
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Sector Company 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Banks &  Qatar National Bank           641,123            814,997            1,536,812          2,004,553            2,507,508  3,652,545 
Financial   Commercial Bank         248,030  326,706                 749,518             891,400              1,390,715  1,702,442 
Instit. Doha Bank          214,636            365,625              789,867             743,969               926,464  946,502 
 Qatar Islamic Bank 
    
145,031            288,419                511,252          1,003,039             1,255,404  1,642,541 
 Ahli Bank             72,570               82,802                141,621              205,741               302,652  425,781 
 Int'l Islamic            64,370              83,878             465,624             401,474                479,995  501,158 
 Al Rayan                      -                          -                          -                 112,819                 192,451  917,040 
 First Finance                      -                          -                  41,887                80,797                103,859  144,564 
 Al Khaleej Bank                      -                          -                          -                          -    N/A  103,578 
Total       1,385,760       1,962,427         4,236,581        5,452,792           8,159,048  10,036,151 
Insurance Qatar Insurance            98,240            124,053             284,980             388,226               472,682  510,799 
 Qatar General Ins.            39,802            108,826              104,403                60,297                125,060  226,267 
 Al Khaleej 
    
12,516  
   
28,727                 77,625                35,568                   77,419  87,015 
 Qatar Islamic Ins,               9,925              27,091              123,293                 36,641                 44,400  68,505 
 Doha Insurance             14,296               27,631               42,204                28,883                   44,311  47,159 
Total           174,780           316,327            632,505           549,615              763,846  939,745 
Services Navigation 
    
181,377             163,079             286,225              260,379               437,939  569,361 
 Cinema              4,939                4,369                  7,009                  6,365                     5,995  9,527 
 Technical Ins.              2,928                 4,650                   5,109                  6,384                    10,178  7,756 
 Electricity and Water         384,944  
   
751,241              658,410                771,737                  613,611  756,676 
 Qatar Shipping           187,606           223,069               417,491             458,588                 610,616  517,866 
 Real Estate             53,190               56,241               112,520               137,573               299,686  311,433 
 Ahli Hospital               1,358               10,317                     59,002-                    46,973-                24,234-  19,239 
 Q-Tel        1,148,822  
   
1,457,159            1,190,447           1,700,440              1,674,310                2,277,212  
 Fuel 
    
71,118             105,956             238,462             447,228                616,264  1,205,602 
 Salam             23,725                       -                 75,069               129,767                 127,540  153,876 
 Meat and Livestock                      -                     768               22,640                   7,556                    8,286  39,331 
 Wareehousing                      -                   2,975                  11,742                      587                     1,398  16,530- 
 Ijrah                      -                   9,529                23,955               31,991                  54,842  55,117 
 Qatar Transport                      -                          -                 49,870               45,291                  128,811  129,062 
 Dlala Brokerage                       -                          -                      1,113                14,371                  25,053  50,494 
 Barwa                      -                          -                          -               452,533               529,693  309,960 
 Mannai Corp                      -                          -                          -                -                 100,517  146,520 
 Amal                      -                          -                          -              -               824,086  623,764 
 Qatar Oman Co.                      -                          -                          -                          -                    11,690  3,759 
 Azdan                      -                          -                          -            -                561,007  1,357,020 
 Islamic Fin. Securities                      -                          -                          -                   -                   10,533  18,434 
 Gulf International  - - - - 423,407 
Total       2,004,153        2,783,031        3,041,060  4,423.817         6,588,520  8,968,886 
Industry Cement           153,479  
   
170,759               173,763             200,062                 355,160  413,645 
 AL khaleej Cement                      -                          -                          -                  19,810                  31,483  34,128 
 Zad (Flour mills) 
    
12,171  
   
11,584              9,484                 10,219                   21,497  47,684 
 Industrial Manuf.             50,007           66,705              108,645              116,239                  115,635  188,378 
 German Medical              3,286              5,155-                    1,813                     4,433-                     1,107-  6,775 
 Industries Qatar        1,128,549        2,497,516           3,215,833           3,621,730            4,983,259  7,275,554 
 United Development 
    
9,755  
   
31,711              184,999               258,155               339,566  583,467 
Total       1,357,246       2,772,737        3,694,537         4,221,782          5,845,494  8,549,631 
Grand 
Total       4,921,940        7,834,524       11,604,683       14,648,006       21,356,908  28,494,413 
Source: Qatar Exchange, 2008 
Thus, the profits in services is dominated by QTEL, industry is dominated by Qatar 
Industries Company, while profits in insurance is concentrated in Qatar Insurance. The 
profits of the banking sector are concentrated in Qatar National Bank and Qatar Islamic 
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bank.  The other companies need to be encouraged to invest more in order to expand their 
businesses, either into new markets or new areas, in order to grow and contribute more to 
the economy.   
 
4.2.4 Market liberalisation 
All the stock markets of the GCC states are witnessing a gradual process of opening up to 
foreign investors and expatriates, with varying degrees of willingness. Allowing GCC 
citizens and the expatriate community to participate will attract greater levels of capital, 
make the Bourse’s liquidity levels deeper and increase trading levels. These benefits 
outweigh any risks associated with greater foreign ownership. 
Qatar used to allow only Qatari nationals to trade in shares, except for QTEL and Al-
Salam international Investment Company, in which non-nationals were allowed to 
participate in the subscription of their shares. A new law adopted by the Qatari 
government now allows foreigners to invest in the securities market, initially starting 
with GCC nationals and expatriates. It allows expatriates to trade in shares and own up to 
25 percent of equity in listed firms. In comparison, Bahrain allows non-GCC nationals to 
own up to 49 percent of a listed company’s capital, a sharp increase from the previous 24 
percent, with the exception of two companies that are subsidised by the government, 
while seven other companies are 100 percent open to foreigners. In Oman and the UAE, 
non-nationals are only allowed to invest in certain stocks. Since 2000 Saudi Arabia has 
had the most liberal reform by allowing non-GCC nationals to purchase shares with no 
restrictions on companies or number of shares. Kuwait allows foreign residents to 
purchase shares through mutual funds. 
Despite the growing openness, intra-regional capital market investors have to process the 
IPOs in person which makes the process very inefficient. As the IPOs of Dana Gas of the 
UAE showed, GCC nationals were interested and locked to the UAE to apply for the 
shares. One way of overcoming this inefficiency is through electronic linkages that are 
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expected to take place among the GCC stock markets. However, opening the market 
alone will not induce capital to flow in; a case in point is the openness of the Muscat 
Securities’ Market (MSM). The presence of non-Omani investors is negligible. This must 
be accompanied by the more lucrative, domestic investment opportunities, increasing 
transparency and disclosure in the market and regulatory frame that protects the ordinary 
investor. Also, because most promising firms are in the hands of the government; there is 
a need for more focus and expansion in privatization programmes, to increase the 
opportunities for investors to venture into these emerging markets. 
 
4.2.5 Market Regulation 
In order to overcome one of the obstacles for a stable and efficient stock market, in 2005 
the government established the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) as an 
independent and empowered regulatory authority, with the primary objective of 
implementing a modern regulatory framework to supervise, enhance the competitiveness 
of the market and attract more business replacing the market’s own regulatory system. 
The QFMA has recently approved the corporate governance code for the Doha stock 
market. The code is the result of a period of consultation and cooperation between the 
listed companies, the brokerage firms and the Qatar Exchange. These consultations were 
in recognition of the necessity of bringing on board the key players in the market as 
indicated by the deputy CEO of QFMA, Nasser Ahmad Al-Sahibi: 
The stock exchanges, with whom we are working very closely, the brokerage firms 
and the listed companies, are key players in the Qatari Capital market. They are, 
also, a key factor in the success of the reform and the implementation of the new 
market strategy. QFMA counts on the support and collaboration of the brokers and 
listed companies in order to achieve the ultimate goal of building a robust and a 
timely well informed capital markets that would provide the corporations with a 
solid and stable financing mean, and the investors with real investment opportunities 
based on transparency and market integrity (CPI Financial :2007).   
The code addresses the six main elements of companies’ governance in the light of 
international principles and standards. These include: setting an effective framework for 
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governance, shareholders' rights and main ownership functions; fair treatment of 
shareholders, and protection of minority shareholders; provisions in connection with 
related parties transactions in particular and to relevant stakeholders in general; 
disclosure and transparency, accounting and auditing, and Boards’ responsibilities (ibid). 
In light of the instability that the market has witnessed since 2005 and the global financial 
situation, these elements are taking on a new poignancy and immediacy to maintain 
stability and confidence in the market. However, the success and effectiveness of 
regulation and such codes depends highly on the availability of expertise and skilled 
manpower that can take on the responsibility of this supervision to ensure transparency 
and compliance of the code. Also, the legal structure needs to develop to be able to cope 
with the enforcement of the rules and regulations of the code. In other words, it is not 
enough to enact codes if the infrastructure that can support it and make a success of it 
does not exist. 
 
4.3 The Integration of GCC Stock Markets 
The expansion experienced by the Qatari stock market is in line with a similar 
development in the other GCC states. That growth has coincided with the higher oil 
prices that have been seen over the past few years. GCC capital has been held abroad in 
the past and the region’s markets were not seen as attractive to GCC nationals. The crash 
of Kuwait’s Souk Al-Manakh in 1982 had a negative impact on investment behaviour in 
the region. However, market capitalisation has increased substantially in recent years. In 
the period 2002-2004, total GCC market capitalization increased by 227 percent, from 
USD 163 billion in 2002 to USD 533.7 billion in 2004, the highest market growth of 
around 281 percent was experienced by Qatar from USD 10.6 billion to USD 40.4 billion 
(Arab Monetary Fund: 2006). This has reversed a trend of absorbing excess liquidity 
abroad rather than in the region. GCC investors have favoured equity-based investments 
which have outperformed other asset classes such as bonds. 
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The plunge of between 14 and 45 percent that GCC markets experienced in the first half 
of 2006 (Dubai’s market was hit hardest declining by 45 percent, followed by Abu Dhabi 
with a slump of 33 percent, Saudi Arabia fell by 27 percent, Qatar by 20 percent and 
Kuwait by 14 percent) is attributed in part to the lack of a proper regulatory frame that 
would have allowed some insider trading to occur without sufficient penalisation, lack of 
transparency and accurate company reporting, in addition to speculative behaviour (AMF 
Info: 2006). Consequently, many small investors were left in ruins. That explains the 
emphasis on improvements in compliance and a strengthening of regulations of the GCC 
stock market as essential elements to create a stable investment climate. One of the major 
objectives of the GCC common market is to establish a common supervisory and 
regulatory body to monitor the GCC markets; such a move would be instrumental in 
stabilising and developing the regional investment market. The former Qatari Minister of 
Business and Trade Sheikh Mohammed bin Ahmad bin Jassim Al-Thani, speaking at a 
conference on GCC stock markets said: 
Cooperation among the Gulf stock markets is essential to overcoming the present 
and future challenges to these markets. Common reforms are needed to develop a 
stable and integrated regional equity market with depth and breadth to attract 
regional and international capital (Akeel: 2005). 
However, the area of integrating the region’s markets through institutional and regulatory 
coordination has seen little progress with little contact or coordination across GCC stock 
exchanges. Substantial improvements in the flow of information to investors, proper 
auditing procedures, issuance of standardized financial statements and disclosure 
requirements will help increase confidence in the region’s capital market and might 
persuade Gulf nationals to repatriate some of their assets that are held abroad. In mid 
2005, a meeting was held in Riyadh for the GCC to consider steps towards establishing a 
joint stock market for the GCC countries and a joint bonds market. According to the 
director of the economic administration of the General Secretariat of the GCC “It was the 
first meeting for negotiating, exchanging opinions, and coordinating between the gulf 
market’s rules and regulations” (ibid). The goal is not to have one market but to unify the 
procedures and make the rules and regulations as comparable as possible, as well as to 
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ease the procedures for Gulf investors to enter the stock markets. This might be 
considered a first essential step towards the more desired goal of market integration in 
order to improve the chance of harnessing the full potential that exists within the GCC 
region. The acquisition by QTel in 2007 of a 51 percent stake in Kuwait’s second mobile 
telecoms operator Wataniya Telecom for USD 3.8 billion, which represents the largest 
ever-transaction of shares in a Kuwaiti listed company is an example of the need for the 
region to move towards mergers and acquisition to strengthen the economic future of the 
region (Arabian Business: 2007). 
 
4.4 The Bond Market 
Bond market development is associated with a number of benefits: expanding the range 
of financing opportunities for the private sector, offering an alternative to relying on bank 
loans and helping savings to be used domestically. All of these benefits are paramount for 
the success of economic diversification and expanding private sector interests in Qatar. 
This type of funding is expected to attract the attention of project sponsors, “As bank 
liquidity has diminished, the bond market has opened up another avenue for funding 
projects” (MEED, July 2009). It is also an area in which governments can intervene in 
order to stimulate and influence economic development. Classic examples of the success 
of governments in developing a bond market are Malaysia and Korea. The governments 
of these two countries played key roles as issuers, regulators and promoters of the bond 
market. The Qatari government has been involved in these aspects of promoting the 
market but the impact is still limited. Below is an analysis of the main features and 
contributions of this market to the Qatari economy. 
 
 
4.4.1 Growth of the Market 
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The limited size of the debt market in Qatar, as in other GCC countries, is understandable 
in economies where the private sector is small in comparison to the public sector and 
wealth is concentrated in the hands of the state. So the issuance of government securities 
has been limited in comparison to other global markets, and hence the market lacks a 
benchmark yield curve for pricing debt and other financial instruments. Although the 
majority of securities in the Qatari market have been in the form of sovereign bonds and 
notes, they have not yet had the impact needed to develop a local yield curve. There is a 
need to expand the volume and the range of maturities of government bonds to help 
develop a secondary market and a yield curve. Such a yield curve is essential for the 
development of corporate bonds. 
In recent years, the GCC region in general has witnessed a tremendous expansion in 
corporate bond issuance. In 2005, the total issuance was USD 13.5 billion, with corporate 
bonds accounting for USD 3.2 billion, rising to USD 47.8 billion in 2007, of which 
corporate bonds accounted for USD 23.7 billion (Reuters: 2007). That is quite a rapid 
increase in the share of corporate bonds rising from 24 percent to 50 percent which more 
than doubled within a very short time span. The enhanced popularity of this type of fixed 
income security was possibly caused by two major factors: excess liquidity and the recent 
volatility experienced by most GCC stock markets which “have raised investor awareness 
of fixed-income products as a means of steady return” (ibid).   
After a period of steady growth, the market saw a slowdown in 2007 and 2008. However, 
several recent regional deals have boosted confidence in the market including Qatar’s Ras 
Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Company which was eight times oversubscribed for its 
USD 2.23 billion bond to pay for the final part of the work on its liquefied natural gas 
trains (Kawach: 2009). Another deal is the Dolphin Energy project which will supply 
Qatari gas to the UAE and Oman via an undersea pipeline; the Dubai-based company 
launched a USD one billion bond to part-fund the total cost of the project of USD 3.5 
billion This was followed by two successful bond launches, the first for Aldar Properties 
which had orders of USD 4.8 billion for its USD 1.25 billion bond while Dubai Tourism 
and Development Investment Company attracted USD four billion in orders for its USD 
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one billion bond ( MEED: 2009, p 18). The size of the projects in Qatar and in the Gulf 
region makes it imperative for their sponsors to be able to access as many sources of 
funding as possible. Also, bond financing has the advantage of being offered at longer-
term finance than banks because institutional investors do not have to set aside equity 
when they lend, and because of the current state of banks, bonds are competing with 
banks on price and are able to offer roughly comparable prices (ibid: p20). 
 
4.4.2 Growth of Sukuk 
A distinguishing feature of the development of the bond market is the expansion in 
Islamic bonds known as sukuk. As shown in Chart 4.2, the global  
 
 
 
Source: UBS Investment Bank, The Soaring Sukuk Market, November 2008. 
 
expansion of sukuk issuance increased sevenfold between 2001 and 2007. Between 2004 
and 2007, growth rates were staggering, with a total issuance growing year on year by 
275 percent in 2005, 67 percent in 2006 and 36 percent in 2007. These results, though 
impressive, came at a time of when access to credit was easy and benefited from oil 
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prices that were at historical highs. This led to ever-increasing issuance, especially from 
the GCC. The market is less than a decade old; the first GCC issuance was in 2001 by the 
Bahrain Monetary Agency, for USD 100 million, growing to over USD 12 billion in 2006 
(Reuters: 2007). 
The Investment in sukuk is defined by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation of 
Islamic Financial Institute, AAOIFI, as: 
Certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible 
assets, usufruct and services or (in ownership of) the assets of particular projects or 
special investment activity, however, this is true after receipt of the value of the 
sukuk, the closing of subscription and the employment of the funds received for the 
purpose for which the sukuk were issued (Diab: 2004).  
In other words, these are investment certificates which represent an undivided beneficial 
ownership of an underlying asset that generate a Shari’ah-compliant source of income. It 
is important to make this distinction, as it is not an alternative to an interest-based 
security. This structure is recognised as enhancing the security of the investment and 
reduces a typical investor’s risk exposure as it is involved in the funding and/or the 
production of real assets (Chartered Financial Analyst, 2007, p 35). Of the 14 structures 
of sukuk defined in accordance with the classification of AAOIFI, only five are being 
used: Ijarah (leasing), Musharaka (partnership and joint stock ownership) Mudaraba 
(profit-and-loss sharing contracts), Murabaha (instalments) and Istisna’a (futures). Chart 
4.3 clearly shows that Ijarah is the most popular type with a share of 49 percent followed 
by Musharaka with a share of 30 percent of the total. 
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Source: Omer Daouk, Analysis of the Sukuk Market, April 25, 2007 SHUAA Capital, Dubai 
 
The GCC is becoming a centre of sukuk issuance and is starting to take a bigger share of 
the global market, as seen in Chart 4.4. It is also starting to develop secondary trading; a 
crucial element for the continued growth of this market. In 2007, the GCC market 
surpassed Malaysia with a total issuance of USD 13.2 billion, compared to USD 9.7 
billion. However, Malaysia is still dominant in terms of total sales; more than 60 percent 
of outstanding Islamic bonds were denominated in the same year by the Malaysian 
ringgit. 
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Source: Ibid. 
 
The market is also showing a diversification in issuance. The United Arab Emirates has 
dominated the market; however Qatar and Saudi Arabia are becoming more prominent 
issuers. Qatar alone has plans to raise up to USD 15 billion in 2009, out of a total 
estimated corporate bonds for the GCC of USD 50 billion (Zawya: 2008). Chart 4.5 
shows the relative share of some of the countries of the Gulf region; it is clear that the 
UAE led the way, followed by Saudi Arabia. 
 
Source: Opcit, UBS Investment Bank. 
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In 2003, Qatar issued what was then considered the largest sovereign sukuk of its kind, 
for USD 700 million. This issuance was accessible to GCC investors. The joint lead 
managers of the issue were HSBC Bank and the Qatar International Islamic Bank, with 
the co-managers from the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Gulf International Bank, Kuwait 
Finance House, Commerce International Merchant Bankers of Malaysia, the Islamic 
Development Bank and the Qatar Islamic Bank, with payments being made under an 
Ijarah agreement, with HSBC Bank acting as payments administrator (Adam & Thomas 
p13). A year later Dubai Civil Aviation surpassed that by issuing one billion US dollars 
of sukuk, followed in 2006 by USD 3.5 billion by real estate developer Nakheel 
Development, one of the biggest Islamic finance deals to take place in the Gulf (Reuters: 
2007). It is interesting to note that this sukuk is part of the request by Dubai Department 
of Finance for a standstill on all Dubai World’s debts. This bond is payable on December 
14. In fact, Nakheel has asked for all three of its Shariah-compliant bonds, worth USD 
5.25 billion to be suspended from trade “Until it is in a position to fully inform the 
market” (Kerr & Wigglesworth: 2009).  This latest development in the financial crisis 
that has gripped Dubai might have repercussions on the issuance of sukuk. 
The greatly-increased interest in sukuk can be attributed to the huge surplus of cash 
sitting in Islamic institutions, waiting to be tapped by new financial instruments. Assets 
of Islamic financial institutions, estimated at USD one trillion in 2007 and growing 
rapidly because of high oil prices, with over USD 300 billion invested in a Shariah-
compliant manner, with market capitalization of Dow Jones Islamic index of more than 
USD 20 trillion (Haron: 2008, p7). The widespread use of sukuk is contributing to the 
growth and development of an Islamic capital market and provides a new source of funds 
for vital infrastructure projects, as well as helping to keep funds working for the benefit 
of the local economy. 
An indication of the growth in importance of this particular type of bond issuance is the 
listing of the first sukuk, on 20 July 2006, on the London Stock Exchange with a value of 
USD 200 million by a special-purpose vehicle for National Central Cooling Company, 
Tabreed (Practical Law: 2006). According to Luma Saqqaf, head of Islamic finance 
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group at Linklaters (who advised Tabreed on the Issuance): “The issue is a landmark 
transaction that highlights the continued growth in the financial activity in the Middle 
East and the new popularity of London listings among Middle East issuers” (ibid.) Two 
months prior to that, in April 2006, the Dow Jones Citigroup Sukuk Index was published 
for the first time, with the stated objective of measuring the performance of global bonds 
complying with Islamic guidelines. It will provide a benchmark for investors, which is 
lacking in the capital market and which is essential in order to encourage global trading 
in sukuks. 
The first-ever Qatari corporate Islamic bond was issued in 2006, by Qatar Real Estate 
Investment Company (QREIC). The finance arrangement, valued at a total of USD 375 
million, is being led by Qatar National Bank and its subsidiary Qatar National Islamic 
Bank in alliance with Dubai Islamic Bank, Gulf International Bank and Standard 
Chartered Bank. The spread of risk among a number of banks is normal for such a large 
corporate funding. Commenting on the deal, Ali Shareef Al-Emadi, CEO of Qatar 
National Bank, said: 
We take pride in introducing the first corporate sukuk in Qatar. This is clearly a 
testimony of the market’s readiness for more sophisticated products that address the 
evolving financing needs of companies in Qatar. It also reflects Qatar National 
Bank’s commitment to providing Islamic finance solutions, thereby providing a new 
dimension to the Islamic banking sector in the region that holds much promise and 
growth for the future (AMF info: 2006) 
This is an indication of the growing importance of both the Islamic finance market and 
the real estate market in Qatar. The sukuk lends itself well to investments in the real 
estate market because it is asset based. Sheikh Khaild bin Khalifa bin Jasim Al-Thani, 
Managing Director of QREIC indicated that: 
The financing deal will play an instrumental role in our next phase of growth as we 
forge ahead in addressing the urban needs of Qatar. We are excited to raise funding 
through the first corporate sukuk issue from Qatar. We aim to continue being 
involved in the region’s rapidly growing Islamic Finance Market (ibid).  
Although the real estate market is slowing down and there are some delays in projects, 
not a single project has been suspended. This slowness is incomparable to the burst in the 
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real estate bubble that propelled the frenetic expansion of Dubai in recent years. More 
than 400 projects in the UAE, with a total value of USD 300 billion, have either been put 
on hold or cancelled (Estates Dubai: 2009). This perhaps attests to Qatar’s more prudent 
and conservative approach in its development and expenditure patterns. Such prudence 
will undoubtedly help in maintaining the growth and stability of the economy in a very 
difficult global market. 
Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB) has launched the Europe-based Global Sukuk Plus Fund 
through its London-based affiliate, European Finance House (EFH), designed to originate 
Shariah-compliant investment products. The QIB and EFH joint-fund will be invested in 
sukuk issued by sovereign, quasi-sovereign and corporate issuers and sourced globally. 
The investment range of this Sukuk Fund spans across six major Islamic financial 
markets and is easily accessed via each of QIB's affiliates in addition to EFH, including 
Arab Finance House (AFH) in Lebanon and Asian Finance Bank (AFB) in Malaysia. 
This move attests to the increased interest in sukuks and their potential massive market.  
According to Jean-Marc Riegel, QIB's General Manager, 
The growing interest in the Islamic financial market has demanded that we draw 
upon the innovation of the QIB network to develop investment products which will 
thrive within the current environment. The Global Sukuk Plus Fund is a very 
forward-looking product for the shariah-compliant market and a strong option for 
clients (AME info: 2009). 
The opportunities presented by the current situation in the global market for the GCC 
economies to capture are enormous. As eloquently put by Abdulrahman Ahmed Al-
Shaibi, director of finance at Qatar Petroleum and board member of Qatar Financial 
Centre (QFC) Authority, during his address to the FT “Rethinking the Future Finance” 
conference in Doha, September 2009: 
The Gulf is at the forefront of a new era in financial services that will see Islamic 
finance play a key role in shoring up the fragile world economy.  The global crisis 
had gifted the Gulf a greater stake in the world economy. We now own some of the 
world’s leading companies while we have been protected from the worst of the 
financial tsunami (Fraser: 2009).  
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He also pointed out that “Islamic finance is ripe for further development. With banks still 
reluctant to lend, the sukuk is a viable and reliable alternative. There is a lot of value in 
this, and the markets are not taking full advantage of it (ibid). No doubt the potential that 
exists due to the West’s frozen credit markets presents a prime opportunity for the more 
widespread use of Islamic finance. The tenets of Shariah compliance (prudent lending, 
shared risk and a ban on interest) would appeal to investors burnt by the global crisis. 
 
4.4.3 The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
As the GCC bond market in general remained strong even after the initial impact of the 
financial crisis in 2007 there were those who thought that Islamic finance could withstand 
this downturn intact, due to the nature and features of Islamic banking and finance, and 
therefore of the sukuk market. This led to some unreasonable expectations for the 
industry. Some thought that Islamic finance had successfully separated from conventional 
global credit markets, while others claimed that Islamic markets were now mature, 
independent markets, not related to the price of oil. Another view expressed was that 
lower leverage and emphasis on holding and selling real, tangible assets would save the 
industry from the full impact of the financial crisis and subsequent credit crunch (MENA 
Report: 2009). Essentially, all of the above emphasise the fundamentally different natures 
of Islamic finance and conventional finance.  
However, the GCC aggregate bond market, despite its initial robustness in the face of the 
global financial crises, plummeted in 2008 by 62.4 percent to USD 18.1 billion compared 
with the amount raised in 2007. The sukuk global total also showed no immunity from 
this global downturn and, in 2008, also witnessed a drop of 66 percent in total issuance 
compared to 2007. The impact was felt across the board, with GCC issuance dropping by 
51 percent to USD 9.06 billion while Asian issuance dropped more severely by 76 
percent with issuance falling to USD 6.57 billion (ibid). This slow-down is not only 
attributed to the impact of the global financial market, but also to the continued legal 
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uncertainty, lack of regulatory support and legislation and lack of transparency, in 
addition to the instability caused by the debate on whether to delink and to de-peg the 
GCC currencies from the weakened dollar. All these factors played a role. They made 
raising funds more challenging and reduced confidence in the markets and in borrowers’ 
ability to repay their debts. 
However, mainly due to the enormous currency reserves accumulated in GCC countries 
over the past few years, the severity of the crunch is not comparable to that experienced 
by Western credit markets. Also the GCC governments are very wealthy and can bail out 
financial institutions. As mentioned before, the Qatari government purchased the 
investment portfolios of seven Qatari banks in order to revive lending and support the 
stability of its financial system. Also, the expected growth rates in the GCC economies, 
especially in Qatar, will sustain the demand for bond issuance especially with the 
considerable amount of projects planned in the country and the region as a whole. 
 
4.4.4 SMEs and the Bond Market 
In order for the bond market to make an impact on the private sector, there is a need to 
find mechanisms where SMEs can have better access to funds which is usually restricted 
to such firms, especially in comparison to large business. The growth and expansion of 
these firms is essential for job creation and wealth redistribution; Qatar, like other GCC 
countries, suffers from a high concentration of wealth in the hands of a few firms and 
individuals. One innovative way that has been successfully used in China to overcome 
this major constraint on the development of SMEs is to issue bonds jointly. Twenty 
SMEs in Shenzhen jointly issued a bond during 2007 to raise funds from institutional 
investors. The five-year, fixed-rate bond, with a coupon rate of 5.7 percent and an AAA 
credit rating – the highest available – sold out on the first day of issuing. The 
Government acted as the managing underwriter of the collective bond and provided 
guarantees (China Daily, 07 Nov, 22).The Qatari government has the financial ability to 
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support a similar scheme; however, the management of such an innovative process might 
be a constraint. Nonetheless, it is an aspect of fund-raising that is worth pursuing 
especially as this type of “joint bond issuance will offer new options for SMEs to raise 
funds directly in the capital market and it can be a more convenient and economical 
financing channel than bank loans” (ibid). 
SMEs do not have the financial clout or business track records to issue bonds separately 
and in order to grow and compete they need to be able to raise the necessary funds. 
Issuing bonds jointly allows them to do just that.  
 
4.5 A Regional Bond Market 
The current state of global financial markets coupled with the potential that exists in the 
markets of the GCC makes for a very strong case for the creation of a regional bond 
market. Such a market could take better advantage of this prospect, in particular, in sukuk 
issuance. In that respect, the experiences of the Asian Bond Market Initiative and the 
European Monetary Union are of immense value and relevance.    
The Asian Bond Market Initiative resulted in the launching of the Asian Bond Funds (I 
and II) in order to promote bond market development in Asia. Similarly, the creation of 
the European Monetary Union significantly added momentum to the growth of the 
European bond markets. The Asian Bond Funds were created to respond to the need to 
encourage local financial intermediation and to invest the large Asian savings within the 
region; these two circumstances also exist in the GCC region, and a similar initiative can 
prove as successful. The European Monetary Union shows how the introduction of the 
single currency enhanced bond issuances in Europe; the advent of the Euro in January of 
1999 was accompanied by a doubling of private debt issuances – from USD 273 billion 
in 1998 to USD 679 billion in 1999 (Ong & Luengnaruenmitchai, 2006). This growth had 
a positive impact on broadening the range of bonds issued: while the European market 
was previously dominated by AAA and AA issuers, the amount of single A-rated paper 
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increased substantially after the advent of the single currency, thus widening participation 
of a variety of businesses (ibid).    
The monetary union agreement of the GCC region was planned for January 2010. In fact, 
efforts are already underway to harmonize several areas of the economy such as some 
financial regulations, tax codes, accounting conventions, as well as payment systems. 
Although these are important from the perspective of the monetary union, they are also 
beneficial for the creation of a regional bond market. Thus, similar developments to those 
that occurred after the European monetary union can take place in the region facilitating 
further the expansion and growth of the bond market. However, the monetary union 
agreement has been extended to 2015, despite the GCC Secretary General announcement 
in October 2007 that the January 2010 deadline would remain in place. Member states 
have been unable to meet the convergence criteria. These included maximum levels of 
budget deficit; public debt; current account deficit; interest rates and inflation (modelled 
on the EU’s convergence criteria, the two in fact are almost identical).   
A regional bond market can also be better equipped to overcome the challenges and 
constraints that exist at present in the bond market in a unified and coordinated fashion. 
These include, firstly, overcoming the dominance of Islamic banking. Despite the 
expansion of sukuks issuance, their share in total Shariah-compliant assets is only 14 
percent (of the USD 700 billion in total global Islamic assets for 2007) while Islamic 
banking accounted for a share of 79 percent. In such regional markets, governments and 
companies from across the region would be able to attract a wide pool of institutional 
investors, not only from neighbouring countries, but also from other parts of the world. 
This would also help alleviate some of the limitations imposed on most Gulf States, 
including Qatar, by the limited size of the local market. 
Secondly, a regional market can cope better with the decline in sukuk issuance induced 
by the global financial crisis, especially as the factors driving this market are common to 
all GCC countries. Most notable among them is the planned large-sized inward 
investments which require large-scale financing and cover a wide range of areas such as 
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infrastructural investments; tourism; hydrocarbon and ports. Also, GCC governments are 
very keen on sponsoring and supporting the creation of a liquid corporate bond market as 
part of the process of creating more diversified regional financial centres. 
Thirdly, a regional market is more suitable for taking the necessary measures that are 
immensely important for a well-functioning and competitive market such as the creation 
of a regional credit guarantee agency, a regional bond rating facility and clearing and 
settlement capacity. In this regard, the establishment in July 2005 of the Islamic 
International Rating Agency (IIRA), based in Bahrain, is a welcome development. The 
IIRA's stated mandate is to assist in the development of the regional financial markets by 
providing an assessment of the risk profile of Islamic entities and instruments, thus 
making the market more competitive (Raphaeli: 2007). Another factor that increases the 
competitive edge of a GCC regional bond market, especially in relation to the Asian 
market, is the issuance of sukuk, generally in dollars, gaining a global investor base with 
nearly 80 per cent of Islamic bond issuance acquired by foreign investors (ibid).  
However, this might change when and if the planned currency union takes place. 
Fourthly, although the sukuk market is considered one of the most innovative Islamic 
products that have come to the financial market, there is disquiet in some quarters about 
its level of compliance with Shariah law.  This questioning was brought about by Sheikh 
Muhammad Taqi Usmani at the Accounting and Auditing organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institution annual event in Bahrain in 2007, who claimed that most of the 
current structures do not comply with Islamic law (Thomas: 2007). Clarifying the Islamic 
legitimacy of the sukuk market is relevant to the future development of the market and is 
part and parcel of the structuring of this new market and coordinating and standardising 
practices in accordance with Shariah law. As the Sheikh indicated, the questioning was 
meant to assist the Islamic financial community to achieve conformity and compliance 
with Shariah law. He emphasised that the council’s obligation is  
To bring about mutual conformity or approximation between the conceptualisations 
and the practical applications of Shariah supervisory boards of Islamic financial 
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institutions so as to avoid inconsistencies and contradictions between fatwa and 
implementation of the institutions (ibid). 
This focuses attention on the need to develop a regional know-how in Islamic 
securitisation structuring and the necessary compliance of securitisation transaction with 
the Shariah. This is better served through a regional framework which can make the 
market more appealing and more competitive to global investors by standardising and 
increasing the confidence of the legitimacy of the sukuk in order to facilitate secondary 
trading. Sukuk, unlike conventional bonds, lack a strong secondary market and most 
buyers hold the asset to maturity. Transferring of ownership needs to keep occurring from 
buyer to seller to expand the market beyond sukuk going only to big financial players of 
high–net individuals, European Funds and Asian Funds - it has not yet gone to the retail 
market. Also, a strong secondary market will attract other important institutional 
investors such as pension funds as well as treasurers of banks in the Middle East, who are 
starting to show interest in the market. 
Fifthly, special attention needs to be given to the area of regulation. Qatar had plans to 
adopt a single, integrated financial regulatory body to supervise all banking, insurance, 
securities asset management and other financial services by merging banking supervision 
sections of Qatar’s Central Bank, the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority 
(QFCRA) and stock exchange regulator Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) into 
a single integrated regulator.  As indicated by Qatar Minister of Economy and Finance, 
Youssif Hussain Kamal:  
This initiative aimed at creating a best-practice legal and regulatory environment for 
Qatar’s entire financial sector, illustrates the government commitment to the 
development of a thriving financial services industry (Zawya: 2008, October). 
Whilst planning for a unified regulatory system, Qatar was following in the footsteps of 
other countries, primarily the UK. For many years, Britain adopted a hands-off approach 
to regulation of the financial services in the belief that the “City” fully understood that 
the government would intervene if the “City” did not voluntary adhere to prudential 
practise (Qatar Today: 2008). It was only in the mid 1980’s, after a series of financial 
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scandals, that the Financial Services Act of 1986 came about in an effort to bring 
systematic regulation to the market.  However, the Act was problematic; too vague, still 
pursuing a light touch regulation and the regulators lacked the resources and experience 
to effectively regulate (ibid). After the recession of the 1990s, the Financial Services and 
Markets Act of 2000 was produced as a comprehensive piece of legislation for the 
financial market. However, its apparent failure to regulate and prevent the collapse of 
Britain’s financial system is dampening the appeal of a unified regulatory body. 
One could argue that the apparent failure of the regulatory system in Britain does not 
necessarily mean that the system per se was at fault, rather the system was undermined 
by the lack of political will to scrutinise compliance.  Nonetheless, scepticism abounds at 
present, and the Qatari government has postponed its plan for a merger, citing the 
uncertainties of the global market and the need to reassess the validity of following 
international regulatory models as its main reasons. As indicated by the Chairman of the 
QFC, “The three regulators are getting on and doing our jobs separately, we have been in 
a holding pattern for some time now” (Qatar Today: 2009). He also emphasised that there 
is a “need to examine the relationship the single regulator will have with the Central 
Bank and Ministry of Finance, we’ve seen many regulators around the world struggling 
with these issues and it’s sensible to wait for some of the results of these inquiries 
presently” (ibid). There are also other factors that might have played a role in this u-turn, 
including the lack of manpower specialising in this highly complex practice as well as 
lack of readiness of the legal system to cope with complex financial activities and 
possible financial crimes. 
It is understandable, with the current state of the global financial system, that there will 
be a lot of discussion and uncertainty about regulatory models. However, a unified 
regulatory system is still paramount to implement stricter rules in terms of stronger 
prudential norms, tougher licensing requirements, enforcement powers, clear capital to 
risk requirement, enhancing accounting standards and greater scrutiny of unusual 
products. Also, with an integrated regulation system there is less likelihood for soloing 
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between the different regulators, so they can share information better, and there is less 
compartmentalisation of information, all of which is necessary for effective regulation. 
Finally, the GCC countries should also consider strengthening their ties with the other 
prosperous Islamic financial centres, such as Kuala Lumpur, Labuan, and Singapore. 
Some steps in this direction have already been taken by Bahrain with the listing of a 
Malaysian sovereign sukuk on the Bahrain Stock Exchange in September 2003. Islamic 
finance is a global trend supported by the large Muslim population in both Asia and the 
Middle East and global cooperation is essential. This cooperation will also help stimulate 
the secondary market, which is paramount for its continued growth and contribution to 
the economy. The launching of India’s Financial Technologies of a new bourse in 
Bahrain in 2010 called the Bahrain Financial Exchange to provide a secondary market for 
Islamic bonds is a great step forward for this market. 
 
4.6    The Private Equity Market in Qatar 
Private equity is not tradable and is defined as equity securities of unlisted companies 
characterised by being long-term investments and is far less liquid than publicly-traded 
stock. Its inclusion in the analysis is an indication of the widening of financial 
instruments available in the Qatari economy and for its importance in widening private 
sector involvement in the economy. 
The GCC region has, for a long time, been a source of capital for private equity firms but 
is now becoming a destination for private investments. This is due primarily to the 
billions governments are investing in infrastructure, much of it in transportation and 
financial services, as an essential part of their diversification strategy and the downturn in 
the global market making the region a very attractive alternative for local and 
international investors. Although this market accounts for a small proportion of the 
region’s economic activities, it is developing fast due to the combined influence of the 
above-mentioned factors and, more importantly, its potential growth is tremendous and 
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the benefits that such a market can bring to the local businesses are substantial. Thus we 
see the money raised in the MENA region through this market has been on the rise, 
especially of late. Between 1994 and 2005 USD 5.8 billion were raised, of which 41 
percent was raised in 2005, growing to USD ten billion for the GCC alone in 2006 
(Ithmar Capital: 2009). That figure represents half of all the funds raised in the region and 
less than a third of the total of USD 33.2 billion raised in emerging markets of Asia, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and the MENA region altogether: a sign that business and 
government are taking advantage of this market to meet their capital requirements, 
especially with the volatility of the stock market (ibid). Thus, in contrast to the global 
dwindling of private equity deals, as a result of the credit crunch, the MENA region 
private equity market has managed to achieve record growth.  
As for Qatar, this market is still small, but has potential for further growth. Recently, the 
Qatar Islamic Bank signed an agreement with Islamic investment bank QInvest and 
Silver Leaf Capital to establish a USD one billion private equity fund that will adhere in 
part to Islamic principles. Salah Jaidah, the CEO of Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB) describing 
the deal said,  
This is the first large-scale private equity fund ever in Qatar. Our objective is to 
invest in diverse sectors that will allow technology migration and transfer of know-
how to Qatar and we already have in the pipeline about USD 300 million of 
investment opportunities that DIA is evaluating (Arabian Business: 2008). 
QIB will be the anchor investor in the fund and will act as the lead distribution agent in 
Qatar and senior distribution agent outside the country using QIB's affiliates in the U.K., 
Lebanon and Malaysia. 
There are two particular benefits associated with this market that are of relevance and 
significance to the Qatari economy. These are, notably, the ability of private equity to 
facilitate the move away from the business structure that characterises the economy of 
family-owned and state-owned Qatari enterprises to open the market and stimulate the 
growth of business across an improved diversity of markets. Traditional family-owned 
businesses and agency-based enterprises account for over 86 percent of all commercial 
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activities in Qatar; this rate is slightly higher for the GCC region where over 90 percent 
of all commercial activities are family-owned (Kooky plan:2009). These firms hold 
combined assets of more than USD 500 billion and employ 70 percent of the workforce 
(ibid). However, because these firms mostly represent international brands and are more 
sellers and distributers, their engagement with R&D is very little and they are quite 
sensitive to changes abroad. Thus many of them will be influenced by the downturn in 
the global economy and their future is linked more to the future of these international 
brands and their ability to survive the crisis.    
Private equity, which has been the foundation for success for family firms all over the 
world, can be of great benefit to these firms. Family businesses in Europe which 
partnered with equity firms increased exposure to new markets by 60 percent and 
outperformed their competitors (Ithmar Capital: 2009). Also, private equity is well-suited 
to support investments in innovative sectors and entrepreneurship. One such market that 
Qatar is showing interest in is the blue chip. These are very weak in the GCC because of 
the bias towards the agency-based business model. Mikko Suonenlahti, General Manager 
at Qatar Capital Partners, a Doha-based venture capital provider, confirms the emergence 
of interest from technology firms. He says, “We have strong demand from Arab 
technology developers in the US and in Europe wanting to relocate back to the region. 
They have not previously had a chance of starting a tech company in the GCC countries” 
(Watts: 2007). In other words, private equity is most appropriate to support 
diversification of the economy by expansion in technology-related and innovative areas 
as well as to encourage a culture of entrepreneurship.  
However, for these opportunities to be captured, local businesses and the Qatari 
government need to work together to overcome the obstacles which are limiting this 
market’s realization of its full potential. In fact, these obstacles are common to all GCC 
countries, and the most effective way of addressing them is by working collectively to 
understand the possibilities that exist in the market for the region and its associated 
benefits, and cooperating with local businesses in order to determine the best ways to 
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reap these benefits. The most important of these obstacles are analysed in the following 
discussion:  
Diversification and Privatisation: Although privatization is attracting many investors to 
the region, there is a need to move these investors into new areas and not just invest in 
what was previously state-owned; the government needs to encourage investors to move 
away from this dominant interest which limits economic diversification and from public 
funding which accounted for more than 60 percent of new funds raised by regional equity 
firms in 2006 (Ithmar: 2009). This is not an easy task since the GCC identified assets for 
privatization valued at more than USD one trillion and infrastructure financing (due to 
the growing pressure on public resources as a result of population growth) will maintain 
private equity interest in these traditional sectors. However, the benefits of private equity 
would be best actualized if investors’ interest widened to include other sectors and new 
areas and that needs greater understanding of the tremendous possibilities and 
opportunities in the GCC economies. There is a clear knowledge gap among the business 
community which needs addressing if these economies are to fulfil their strategy of 
economic diversification. 
Restructuring Family Businesses: Private equity is the key to aiding the transformation of 
family-owned businesses into corporate concerns, and that transformation is necessary in 
order to deal with the three interrelated issues of ownership, management and succession. 
There is little separation in Qatar, as in other GCC countries, between ownership and 
management of firms, with succession passing down through the generations. This model 
is limiting the competitiveness of these firms and their exit strategies - two essential 
ingredients for the long-term survival of family businesses. In that sense, private equity 
can restructure a business in such a way that adds value, makes it more competitive by 
opening new markets or expanding into new areas and ensures the survival of the 
business. Most businesses in Qatar are in their second generation; data from developed 
countries indicates that only 30 percent of family businesses survive into the second 
generation and less than six per cent make a successful transition beyond the third 
generation (Ithmar Capital: 2009). Thus, strategies and structures of finance and 
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operation must be put in place to avoid that eventuality. Other benefits of restructuring 
firms include the positive impact on the stock market through listing these companies and 
new IPOs offers as well as decreasing the dependency of firms on banks and personal ties 
between owners and bankers where money is lent to companies with strong asset 
coverage and shareholder support rather than effective corporate governance process. But 
to fully realise these benefits, family businesses need to address these three issues of 
ownership, management and succession themselves. There is already a realisation of the 
need for internal controls and a better governance system, however, many of these 
businesses are unaware of the private equity industry and how to access it and benefit 
from it. So it is important for governments and private equity firms to highlight this 
market and for private equity firms to link with investors, especially within a culture 
where personal relationships are the key drivers of negotiations and deal making. 
Regulatory Environment: This has been identified by equity firms in the region as one of 
the main obstacles to the development of the market (Eid: 2006, p14). A change is much 
needed in the approach of businesses to regulatory compliance and transparency 
processes. Firms in Qatar are characterised by an informal decision-making process, lack 
of transparency, weak auditing and the lack of a formal corporate governance system, 
particularly when it comes to fraud prevention programs. About 70 percent of GCC 
businesses have no such programme in place, and investor relations are not a priority 
(ibid). GCC central banks have improved the governance requirement by requiring 
businesses to establish disclosure in financial statements and implement board-level audit 
and create risk management processes. However, the levels of transparency and 
regulation still need to be improved greatly to give confidence to private equity firms and 
increase investor interest and allow for better assessment of the potential of firms and exit 
processes. Also, overcoming very strong cultural factors, whether in the manner of 
running a business or in aversion to change, fear of loss of control of a business and in 
complying and adapting to stringent business regulations and rules, is a slow and difficult 
process. Private equity can change businesses from a one man show to an institution but 
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that requires some tremendous changes in the cultural environment as much as in the 
regulatory environment. 
Entrepreneur Skills: Management skills and entrepreneur culture is essential to grasp the 
benefit of private equity and is identified by equity firms as a priority for the 
development of the private equity sector. Governments need to link investments in 
human capital to the management skills needed in this market.  The availability of private 
equity may help foster a culture of entrepreneurship in the GCC region. 
Overcoming the constraints outlined above will undoubtedly increase the confidence of 
private equity firms to partner with local businesses. Qatar and the GCC, due to their 
economic outlook and government finance, are much better equipped than some other 
emerging markets to capture the untapped potential and benefits from what the market 
offers in terms of supporting their diversification policies and strengthening the private 
sector. A sign of this confidence in the market is the launching by Sarasin-Alpen and 
Partners Limited (an asset management company owned jointly by Bank Sarasin-Alpen 
and Sarasin & Partners LLP London) of Sarasin GCC Equity Fund to invest in the GCC 
equity markets. Commenting on the decision, the CEO of Bank Sarasin-Alpen said, “The 
GCC is a region full of opportunities and it is with this in mind that we chose to launch 
the Sarasin GCC Equity Opportunities Fund” (AME info: 2007). The bank has an 
established investment process, developed not just to cope with, but to prosper from, the 
unique characteristics of the region; it allows exposure to be increased when the market is 
trending upwards and reduced when it is trending downwards. It is a process well-suited 
to clients who are aware of opportunities as well as risks, and well-suited to the current 
climate where more assurance is needed in the market. There is now growing competition 
among Global private equity operators to invest in the GCC region, including blue-chip 
private equity names which should boost the region’s efforts to diversify its economies. 
According to Stuart Pearce, CEO and Director General of the Qatar Financial Centre 
Authority, “There’s no slowdown in sight, private equity funds raised in the GCC are set 
to grow at around 25 percent a year for the next three years” (Watts: 2007). While the real 
estate and construction sectors are attracting the lion’s share of these investments for the 
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time being, opportunities in private sector transportation, financial services, travel and 
tourism, energy, and other sectors are key areas of interest for these firms, as well as 
being essential for diversification. 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
It is ironic that the financial crisis that is gripping the world came at a time when Qatar 
and other GCC countries were focusing on developing their financial markets as an 
essential component of their diversification programmes. Nonetheless, this crisis should 
be seen as perhaps a reminder of the need to coordinate and cooperate more effectively 
within the GCC and to focus on the issue of integration of their capital and debt markets. 
The benefits that such integration would bring is immense in terms of overcoming the 
constraints imposed on these markets as well as capturing the opportunities associated 
with the emergence of an effective and well-regulated capital and equity market. More 
importantly, there is a benefit to be had, from the present opportunity, to learn from the 
mistakes that caused the collapse of the financial system of the advanced Western 
economies, and approach the issue of regulation of the system in a more coordinated 
fashion. Also, the difficult situation that the Western financial markets find themselves in 
is an opportunity for these emerging markets to consolidate their position globally and 
gain a bigger share of the market. 
The expansion of non-banking financial activities is not only important for financial 
sector development but also for its linkage to the real economy, especially in terms of 
expanding private sector investments and generating employment opportunities, both of 
which are vital for lessening the dependence on oil economy and oil revenues. Nothing 
demonstrates this linkage better than the present consequences on the real economy of 
Western countries of the collapse of their financial systems. The need to create 
employment opportunities for GCC nationals in general in the private sector is imperative 
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to lessen the dependency on state jobs and create a more dynamic job market as well as 
eliminate the mentality of entitlement that is widespread in the GCC. 
Although there are many obstacles to private sector development in the manner that is 
required for a successful diversification strategy, the potential is huge, especially if issues 
such as corporate governance and increased knowledge of the business class and tighter 
regulations and encouragement of small and medium sized companies are pursued by the 
government of Qatar as well as all GCC countries. Also, in order to achieve its national 
vision of creating a diversified economy Qatar will need to continue the privatisation 
programme for its dominant public sector entities. It will be quite a challenge for the 
government to relinquish control and interest over state enterprises to full private 
ownership given the size and the diverse activities of these entities. Full privatization is 
also challenging to the management of these enterprises, creating additional pressure on 
the issue of accountability and transparency and the creation of an effective corporate 
governance framework. 
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Chapter Five  
 Expansion of the Insurance Sector and Emergence of New Financial 
Services 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the insurance sector dominated non-banking 
financial services in Qatar for a long time.  However, with the recent development in the 
equity and debt markets, as well as the emergence of financial services offered by 
investment and finance companies, the shape and the quality of the Qatari financial 
system is changing rapidly.  Although many of these developments are still nascent and 
limited in their influence on the economy; nonetheless they are of significance from the 
point of view of widening the range of financial services and increasing the role of the 
financial sector in the economy.   
In general, the insurance market in the GCC region is recognised as underdeveloped, as it 
is characterized by the relatively low level of insurance penetration relative to the 
Western world, or even to Eastern Europe and Latin America.  Despite the significant 
growth of the insurance business worldwide and its coverage of many types of risk from 
life insurance, health insurance, insurance against accidents of fire, sea and land to non-
commercial risks such as insurance against political insecurity that may result in 
confiscation, nationalization and war etc., the region’s share in this expanding business 
accounts for only 0.25 percent of the world insurance industry (MENA Report: p31) This 
is even lower than that of Latin America and the Caribbean - whose market is considered 
extremely underdeveloped - of around 1.5 percent..  Also, most of their business is in the 
reinsurance of contracts abroad.  Local firms benefit through the commission margin on 
such contracts, as well as other benefits through business operations and activities, but 
lose out on the lucrative premiums.  Characteristically, much of the growth has been 
driven by compulsory lines of business, primarily in non-life insurance. Even in the 
United Arab Emirates, the largest insurance market in the Middle East, non-life insurance 
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accounts for most of the insurance business at roughly 85 percent of total premiums, with 
the focus on motor, marine, engineering, liability and health (ibid p32).   However, the 
GCC insurance market has a potential size of USD 20 billion (currently it is only USD 
4.5 billion) if the world average of USD 550 per capita is taken as a measure (ibid).   
The prospects of the sector lie precisely in capturing this huge market and subsequently 
creating employment opportunities for nationals and in diversifying revenue sources as 
well as seizing the immense benefits associated with such an increased role of insurance 
on both the growth side and the investment side of the economy.  On the growth side, the 
industry has the potential to broaden the range of investments, provide expertise in the 
identification and measurement of risk and to allocate resources to more productive uses 
as well as to encourage safety by taking measures to reduce the frequency or severity of 
losses in life and equipment.  On the investment side, the long-term nature of liabilities, 
sizeable reserves and predictable premiums allow insurance providers to serve as 
institutional investors providing capital for infrastructure and other long-term 
investments, as well as professional oversight of these investments.  However, these 
benefits are only fully realized if insurance providers invest a substantial proportion of 
their portfolios domestically.  This is why local insurance businesses need to move away 
from being brokers towards being international insurance companies and take the risks 
upon themselves in order to reap the benefits, and also expand and improve on local 
expertise.    
As they are aware of these immense benefits to their local economies, GGC countries 
have made the deepening of the insurance market a priority in their financial sector 
strategies. Usually, awareness of the role of insurance lags behind that of banking and 
capital markets, hence raising the visibility of the sector is important, and more 
importantly the insurance industry needs to improve on its ability to demonstrate the need 
for and benefits of insurance, especially in non-life insurance.  This focus has been 
helped by the steady, strong growth, since 2004, of the insurance market  strong premium 
growth of around 20 percent on average in non-life insurance.  The drivers behind this 
expansion (in both conventional and Islamic-compliant insurance) has been the rising per 
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capita GDP and increased stock of insurable assets, fixed assets such as property, 
vehicles, and infrastructure as well as savings and pension assets.  GCC governments are 
slowly encouraging their nationals to save for their own retirement; life and pension 
markets are beginning to develop as is compulsory medical insurance.  In addition to the 
support the Qatari government lends to the sector by enhancing its efficiency and 
sophistication through regulation and supervision as well as risk management, there is 
increased awareness among businesses and individuals of the benefits of insurance.    
The evolution in non-banking activities has extended in recent years to other financial 
services in the Qatari market, namely, investment and financial companies.  They are still 
limited in numbers and small in terms of assets and investment portfolios, especially in 
relation to other companies in the GCC region.  However, they are making progress and 
carving out a role for themselves in the domestic and regional markets.  The problem for 
Qatar is that its market of 1.6 million people is made up of unskilled workers who are not 
in a position to use the services of the financial sector and hence the growth of insurance 
and the financial sector as a whole will depend on serving the region and other countries.  
This has been an essential part of the strategy of QFC, according to Stuart Pearce, its 
CEO and Director General who said, “We can create an insurance industry and a 
financial system that can service other countries” (Interview, July 2009).  The problem is 
who will be doing the servicing; will it be international players who will use Qatar as a 
platform, or domestic companies?  
This chapter focuses, firstly, on tracing the changes in the insurance business with an 
emphasis on the prospects and challenges facing the industry together with a discussion 
of the expansion in Islamic insurance, takaful and the challenges it faces.  Secondly, it 
discusses the newly-formed financial investment and finance companies and their 
prospects.  Lastly, it deals with Qatar Investment Authority (QIA).  Although QIA is a 
government-owned entity, its role is exceedingly important since the ability of Qatar’s 
private sector to invest the surplus revenues of oil and gas is limited, making the 
government’s role of paramount importance for its economic diversification strategy.  In 
other words, for the foreseeable future diversification will mean diversifying the revenues 
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of the government and partnering the private sector rather than shrinking the role of the 
government for the benefit of expanding private interests.    
 
5.2    Evolution of the Insurance Market in Qatar  
The need for insurance in Qatar was first evident in the mid1950s, due to the growth in 
the oil economy.  That need was serviced by foreign insurance companies either through 
their agents or through setting up branch offices.  However, by the mid 1960s, the first 
national insurance company, the Qatar Insurance Company, was established on the basis 
of Law (No1) of 1964.  In order to organize and regulate the business, the government 
issued Ordinance No (1) of 1966 which set limits on the size of capital for both national 
and foreign companies and the need for foreign companies to obtain permission from the 
government to operate in Qatar.  The Ordinance gave a period of five years for the 
issuance of licenses for foreign companies.  Subsequently, one foreign company was 
licensed in 1962, two in 1966 and one in 1969, as seen in Table 5.1.  An amendment to 
Ordinance No (1) was issued by Law No (2) of 1971, barring the granting of permission 
for foreign companies.  The intention of the Qatari government was to encourage local 
capital to invest in this expanding sector and give it the opportunity to develop in a 
protected market environment.   
The demand for insurance services continued to grow as a result of several factors, the 
most important being: the rise in foreign trade; the rise in domestic investments; the 
increase in motor-vehicles of all types for a variety of uses; the substantial increase in 
public spending and the increase in population due to the influx of foreign labour.  This 
continued growth led to the establishment of four more national companies; Qatari 
General Insurance and Al Khaleej Insurance Company in 1978; Doha Insurance in 1999 
and, as a reflection of the expansion in Islamic finance in Qatar, an Islamic Insurance 
company was established in 1993, the Qatar Islamic Insurance Company as seen from 
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Table 5.1. The Qatari insurance market is dominated by these national companies, 
collectively known as the big five and they are all listed on the stock market.  
Table 5.1 Insurance Companies Operating in Qatar (QAR 000) 
Company  Country of Nationality Year of Establishment Capital 
National Companies      
Qatar Insurance CO. Qatar 1964 424,710  
    Qatar General insurance Qatar 1978 113,667  
Al Khaleej Qatar 1978 101,640  
Qatar Islamic Insurance Co. Qatar 1993 100,000 
Doha Insurance Co. Qatar 1999 12,724 
Foreign Companies    
American Insurance Co. USA 1963 *5,000 
Arabian Insurance Co. Lebanon 1966 *2,000  
Lebanon-Suisse Insurance Co. Lebanon 1966 *9,855  
The National Insurance Co. Of  Egypt Egypt 1969 *2,000  
   
Source: Qatar Statistics Authority, 2006 
* Value in year Est. 
 
With the establishment of QFC, these key players are facing a tough environment, since 
the sector at present functions under two systems - the old system which is more than 40 
years old and a new regulatory framework under the auspices of QFC.  The two operate 
in parallel to avoid disrupting the older system, and insurers in both systems are allowed 
to transact retail business.  Under the old system, the insurance sector is regulated by the 
1966 law and supervision is undertaken by the Ministry of Business and Trade.  The 
authorities have stopped licensing new insurance companies under this system.  As for 
the new system of insurance business, it is being developed by the QFC to tackle some of 
the weaknesses present in the insurance market; foremost among these is the regulatory 
environment. This is not particular to Qatar, but a weakness across the region especially 
in terms of capital requirements, transparency and corporate governance.  A strong 
regulatory environment is necessary for the development and competiveness of the 
insurance market.  The secretary general of the GCC Chambers of Commerce stressed the 
need to review insurance rules and regulations in order to keep pace with the global 
market.  He indicated that, “The regulations should be candid and transparent in terms of 
both principles and applications.  They should be able to deal with the basic issue of an 
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insurance company’s financial coverage and increase the minimum level of the capital of 
these companies”. 
In order to overcome this weakness, in 2006 the regulatory Authority of QFC, 
implemented a new prudential framework for insurers, including rules relating to the 
establishment and ongoing review of risk management, minimum capital requirements 
and,, the measurements of assets and liabilities and actuarial reporting requirements.  
There is a clear focus by the government on insurance as pointed out  by Stuart Pearce, 
CEO of QFC “We are focusing on insurance because there is a market of USD two 
trillion worth of projects in the Middle East, and they all need to be insured” (Interview: 
July 2008).  Also, in order to advance insurance services and to attract further insurance 
expertise, in 2008 the QFC established the Qatar Insurance Platform (QIP) a technology-
based insurance trade fulfilment platform.  It will provide an electronic trading service, 
facilitate transaction workflow, deliver trade documentation and effective management 
information and ultimately enable straight-through processing capabilities to international 
insurance, reinsurance and brokers who will be able to conduct their trading activities 
through the platform.  As indicated by Pearce, “This is completely unique, that will give 
Qatar a unique competitive advantage in the insurance market and will help us energise 
asset management, and with Qatar exchange, the potential to build the capital market is 
there for us to harness and it’s there for us to lose” (ibid).  
Whether the old elite of the local insurance industry will be able to conform to this new 
and more competitive environment is difficult to judge but it is in the interest of the 
government to support the expanding role of the local business under these new tougher 
circumstances in relation to its policy of diversifying the economy.  Local businesses 
should not be undermined by international competitors but need to develop in such a way 
as to be able to compete with the more advanced and sophisticated international players 
and capture a larger share of the local and regional insurance market.  There are dangers 
to local businesses from the two parallel systems and the focus needs to be on the 
integration of local businesses into the new and better-regulated frame, rather than 
leaving them to lag behind.   
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In the face of this new tough competition, insurers are planning to set up their own 
association which will liaise with the government and other agencies.  There is also a 
proposal to merge three major local insurance companies, namely Qatar Insurance, Doha 
Insurance and Al Khaleej Insurance. These are good signs that local business is taking on 
the challenge and enhancing their chances of success.  Qatar Insurance Company (QIC) 
has been a strong advocate of consolidating the insurance companies in Qatar because, as 
Ali al Fadal, from QIC, indicated, the “Qatari insurance market is small and saturated and 
local companies are small and it’s difficult to compete regionally or globally” (Interview 
July 2008).   He further stated that “The high risk insurance such as oil and gas projects is 
all reinsured while 100 percent retention applies only to the lower risk insurance such as 
motoring” (ibid).  There is a move among insurance companies to expand into medium-
risk insurance for one hundred percent retention such as medical insurance.  The 
government’s interest in encouraging medical insurance to companies’ staff and 
individuals will help to develop this untapped market.   
As a result of the active role of the QFC, major international insurers have shown 
increased interest in establishing a presence in Qatar.  Opening a branch office in Doha 
has become economically feasible and, for most companies, profitable. While there have 
been a few foreign insurers and reinsurers in Qatar for many years, they have not grabbed 
much of the market share.  New entrants into the market licensed by the QFC include 
AXA Insurance Gulf, the fastest growing international insurance company in the Middle 
East.  The company will offer its wide range of corporate products to businesses of all 
sizes, from large industrial and commercial complexes to small offices and retailers.  The 
range of products includes property, casualty and liability, office, motor, healthcare and 
marine insurance.  The National Manager said, “There are huge growth opportunities for 
insurance here in Qatar and, as a global leader in risk management, we intend to seize the 
enormous potential available to us. AXA’s leading position in international markets 
permits us to access an extensive network of expertise and we will use this to deliver to 
our clients professional service and diversity of products” (Arabian Business: 2006).  
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Fetooh Al-Zayani, the QFC Authority’s Managing Director of Business Development 
Insurance and Reinsurance says: 
The increasing attention being shown in the Middle East markets by such global 
insurers as AXA, AIG, Alico and Zurich suggests that a paradigm shift is taking 
place in the region’s appetite for insurance.  This is driven by developments in the 
international insurance industry, as well as the increasing maturity of the GCC’s 
economies and the improved business and legal environment being established in 
these markets (Al-Zayani: 2008).  
ALICO – AIG Life was granted licenses between February 2007 and January 2008 to 
conduct its group insurance operations from the QFC covering wholesale life insurance 
and retail life insurance in Qatar.  ALICO has a long-standing presence in Qatar dating 
back to 1963 and it is taking the opportunity to expand its operations and strengthen its 
presence and contribution to the economy of Qatar.  This was followed by AIG MEMSA 
and the Allied Insurance Group who were granted a license to establish a branch and 
operate from QFC in 2007.  The branch offers a full range of corporate and retail 
insurance in and from Qatar.  The increased interest and demand for insurance, especially 
Islamic insurance, has been the driving force behind the flow of these international firms.  
The QFC is trying to overcome another of the industry’s weaknesses, namely its lack of 
visibility.  This is being improved by the emphasis on the development of the sector 
though the work of QFC and the raising of awareness of the social and economic benefits 
of life and non-life insurance, individual and corporate.  Aware of the massive prospects 
of the insurance market, the QFC Authority hosted an international business event, in 
March 2008, for top representatives of major international insurance and reinsurance and 
brokerage firms who are already licensed by the QFC or looking at business prospects in 
Qatar and the region.  The event was an opportunity for representatives of Qatar’s and the 
region’s business and financial community to come into contact with their more powerful 
international competitors, and provided high visibility for the sector locally, regionally 
and internationally. 
Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether the insurance business, conducted under 
this more stringent regime, will compete with local insurers, especially as existing local 
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companies are hesitant about switching operations to the QFC because of the tougher 
regulatory requirements that they would have to meet.  This competition might push local 
companies to enhance their operations and become more competitive as indicated by their 
attempt to create mergers.  On the other hand it might make it tough to operate 
successfully and be able to compete with well-established international players in the 
field.  This might appear as contradicting the government’s focus on diversification and 
on expanding the private sector.  Subsequently, the encroachment of international players 
on local businesses must be approached carefully; there is still a need to protect local 
businesses that lack the expertise, the skills, and the know-how to grab the opportunities 
that are available in this expanding regional market.   
One must acknowledge that the Qatari government, by developing this new system, is 
addressing some of the obstacles and inadequacies of the insurance industry, which have 
been of concern to the financial community both regionally and internationally.  In his 
opening address to the International Arab Banking summit in Brussels in 2007, the 
Governor of the Bank of Belgium pointed to some reforms that were needed in order to 
stimulate financial sector development in the region.  These were primarily the deepening 
of financial markets through strengthening the regulation and supervision of securities 
markets, broadening the investor base and improving transparency, allowing greater 
autonomy to supervisory agencies and providing them with more resources to hire, train 
and retain qualified staff and bring financial institutions into line with international best 
practice by establishing commercial courts, strengthening corporate governance and 
fostering a sound credit culture (BIS Review: 2007).  By putting in place an appropriate 
regulatory framework, the government gives the sector stability and growth as well as 
making it more suited to benefiting from the massive investments anticipated in the GCC 
region. The size, complexity and technology of these projects is associated with soaring 
risk exposure - personal, physical, financial and political- and is creating a need to 
augment a culture of risk management throughout all businesses in the region.  Of the 
USD 1.6 trillion worth of projects, Qatar’s share exceeds USD 140 billion (Al-Zayani: 
2008).   
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However, there are very important gaps in dealing with corporate risk issues and risk 
management skills and training and these must be overcome in order to attract insurers.  
Lord Levene, Chairman of Lloyd's, in a speech on 28 June 2007 at the Second Annual 
City and Gulf Cooperation Council, addressing business leaders about the new global 
risks that threaten corporations stated:  
Insurers, to take on the growing exposures of present day environment, want to work 
with companies who are willing to develop risk management culture and implement 
risk management processes at every level of the organisation to understand and 
mitigate them..Risk management must be at the heart of business strategy, especially 
in the Middle East where risk exposures are soaring...Gulf states now have a 
growing need –and an unprecedented opportunity – to build an insurance sector 
which supports this growth , and interfaces efficiently with the wider global market.  
(LIoyds: 2007).   
The expertise of international insurers is of paramount importance to local and regional 
companies, but there needs to be a basis of cooperation at this nascent stage of the 
development of the insurance industry, so that both sides can reap the benefits of this 
growing market.  The objective of opening up Qatar to international firms is to enhance 
the competitive spirit and raise the standards practised by all insurance players in the 
market and bring new expertise and talent into the region.  That experience, nonetheless, 
can only be beneficial to local businesses if there is partnership between local businesses 
and international players.  Otherwise they represent a challenge and a threat for the 
expansion of a regional pool of highly-qualified and experienced people in the insurance 
sector.  
 
5.3 Growth and Challenges of the Insurance Industry  
Although the insurance industry in Qatar, as the data presented in this section will show, 
has been growing rapidly and is profitable, Qatar shares particular characteristics with the 
rest of the GCC insurance market that are hindering the growth of the industry and its 
contribution to the economy.  These can be summarised as low market penetration levels, 
fragmentation of insurance market and dominance of reinsurance.  The government needs 
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to focus on these obstacles in order to enhance the chances of local businesses to grasp 
the benefits of this expanding industry and compete with the international players.  These 
obstacles will be discussed separately as follows: 
 
5.3.1 Low Insurance Penetration level 
This is one of the major challenges facing the development of Qatar’s insurance industry.  
The insurance market of the GCC region represents a very small portion of the global 
business.  As seen from Table 5.2, the insurance business in the region (UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman) accounts for less than one percent of world premiums 
with low penetration levels (premiums/GDP) of 1.44 percent compared to the 
international ratio of 7.5 percent.  Despite these very low shares, the market has 
witnessed high levels of growth in the past few years, around 20 percent for the region 
and 25 percent for Qatar, thus making the potential for insurance value enormous. 
Table 5.2 Qatar’s Comparative Market Share of the Insurance Industry 
Country Total premium volume 
USD 2006 (mn) 
Life premiums 
USD (mn) 
Non-Life premiums 
USD (mn) 
Insurance penetration 
(%GDP) 2006 
UAE 2,726 418 2,308 1.7 
Saudi Arabia 1,590 19 1,571 0.5 
Lebanon 656 209 447 3 
Kuwait 628 113 515 0.7 
Qatar 573 26 548 1.1 
Jordan 347 36 311 2.4 
Oman 349 37 312 1.1 
World 3,723,412 2,209,317 1,514,094 7.5 
- as % World 0.20 0 0.4                                       1.44 
Source: Moody's Global Insurance - February 2008 
This rapid expansion in Qatar was driven by the spectacular growth of the economy 
coupled with an increased awareness of the necessity and benefits of insurance services.  
This had an impact on the insurance companies’ growth in activities across the different 
types of insurance that are prevalent in Qatar.  Over the period 1978-2005, insurance 
activities expanded substantially and that is reflected in the rise in the total value of 
premiums realised by the insurance companies. These increased from a total of QAR 204 
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million in 1985 to QAR 2.5 billion in 2006, more than seventeen-fold, as seen in Table 
5.3.  It is also noticeable from the table that national companies dominate the business 
with an average share of 93.3 percent.  This is helped by the decision of the government, 
whereby all government agencies are obliged to handle their insurance requirements only 
through national insurance companies.  The opening up of opportunities to international 
insurance companies to take a bigger role in the region through Qatar Financial Centre 
will undoubtedly have an impact on the potential growth of local business and its ability 
to compete.   
Table 5.3 Total Premiums Collected by Insurance Companies (QAR mn) 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Items QAR % QAR % QAR % QAR % QAR % QAR % 
Vehicle Insurance 53 26 80 27 177 33 151 36 345 22 554 22 
Marine Insurance 53 26 157 52 135 25 99 23 228 15 280 11 
Fire Insurance 18 9 43 14 129 24 85 20 151 10 216 9 
Accident Insurance 79 39 24 8 97 18 87 21 813 53 1,415 57 
Total   204 100 304 100 538 100 422 100 1,537 100 2,466 100 
National Companies  179 88 280 92 506 94 383 91 1,482 96 2,358 96 
Foreign Companies  25 12 24 8 32 6 39 9 55 4 108 4 
Source: Ministry of Business and Trade, 07 
                    
Most of insurance companies’ business, up until 2000, came from motor-vehicles and 
marine insurance. The steady increase in the share of marine insurance reflects the 
political instability of the region which forced national insurance companies to reinsure 
abroad to lessen the burden of growing risks.  In this respect, Qatar follows many 
developing countries, where risky and voluminous insurance is reinsured abroad, thus 
rendering local insurance companies as mere brokers.  On average, local companies in 
Qatar reinsure 62 percent of their total premiums abroad, which is an indication of the 
large volume of business involved in high-risk insurance policies.  Accident insurance 
has seen a steady rise since 2000 surpassing both marine and vehicle insurance to account 
for more than 57 percent of the business by 2006.   
The relative share of claims paid to total premiums collected during the period 1978-2006 
stood between a low of 39.6 percent in 2006 and a high of 79.7 percent in 1999, while the 
average for the period did not exceed 58 percent, as seen in Table 5.4.  This is evidence 
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of the profitability of the business and how well companies have performed.  In addition 
to the gross profit, local companies achieve a fairly good margin of commission on 
reinsurance, as well as benefits from business operations and activities, thus making their 
final profit figure much higher.  Despite the growth of the insurance business, the product 
range is limited, with more than half of non-life insurance going to property and 
miscellaneous accident cover and motor insurance.  Motor insurance is increasingly 
becoming challenging to insurers.  The government has capped the compulsory third 
party vehicle liability tariff since 1994.  The levels were set at rates ranging between 
QAR 250 (USD 69) and QAR 500 (USD 138). Subsequently, a committee under the 
Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry was formed to lobby the government to 
increase motor premiums that have not been revised for years despite the increase in 
prices of automobiles and spare parts and the overall surge in the cost of living.  Claims 
to premiums  
Ratios are high and insurers are facing rising losses; car accidents in Qatar have soared in 
recent years.  The government, nonetheless, is aware that at present, raising the cap 
would undoubtedly affect the lower-earning segments of society at a time of rising living 
costs.  The public transport system needs to attract more passengers before it is able to 
increase fares.  In the meantime, some insurers are selling retail motor insurance as a loss 
leader to serve as a starting point to sell other more profitable lines.   
The share of insurance premiums of total savings, which provides an important indicator 
of the development of the insurance market and its possible positive impact on private 
sector growth, is still low.  It is noticeable across the GCC that insurance premiums 
account for a very low share of the savings, although the GCC has a high rate of savings - 
47 percent compared with the world average of 22 percent.  The share of premiums of 
these savings is only two percent as compared to 28 percent worldwide (The Review: 
2008, p11).  This reflects the lack of enthusiasm for insurance, especially life insurance; 
the share of life insurance for the world is 58 percent while in the GCC it is only 11 
percent, while the non-life insurance in the world is 42 percent; in the GCC it is 89 
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Table 5.4 Net Claims Paid by Local Insurance Companies (QAR 000) 
      Net Claims 
Year Net Claims* Net Premiums** To Net Premiums % 
    
1978               35,406               55,830 63.42% 
1979               27,731               56,241 49.31% 
1980               31,586               72,198 43.75% 
1981               45,520               96,996 46.93% 
1982               60,571             122,747 49.35% 
1983               71,463             113,758 62.82% 
1984               52,846               99,779 52.96% 
1985                              56,278                               97,630  57.64% 
1986                              54,197                              97,161 55.78% 
1987                              52,049                              97,528 53.37% 
1988                              54,625                            105,931 51.57% 
1989                              64,833                            106,603 60.82% 
1990                              85,883                            120,612 71.21% 
1991 114,827 212,258 54.10% 
1992 120,514 189,539 63.58% 
1993 136,983 216,454 63.29% 
1994 97,136 176,481 55.04% 
1995 114,827 212,258 54.10% 
1996 N/A N/A N/A 
1997 136,983 216,454 63.29% 
1998 158,261 220,781 71.68% 
1999 156,917 196,887 79.70% 
2000 136,056 201,939 67.37% 
2001 131,355 227,916 57.63% 
2002 165,176 274,056 60.27% 
2003 189,430 284,224 66.65% 
2004 183,297 341,320 53.70% 
2005 321,048 546,602 58.74% 
2006 363,459 917,768 39.60% 
   Average               58 % 
* Net Claims represents total claims minus those paid by re-insurance Companies   
** Net premium represents total premiums minus re-insurance premiums of re-insurance Companies.  
Source: Qatar Central Bank Annual reports, 1978-2006  
   
 
percent (ibid).    Cultural and religious factors have been the main reason behind the lack 
of uptake of life-insurance in the region; however, the expansion of Islamic insurance, 
takaful, is set to change that in the future, as is revealed in the discussion in Section 3.  
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Although Qatar and the other GCC countries are rich in capital, insurance premiums can 
act as a stimulus to the private sector and can support its expansion - a much-desired 
objective in these economies, in order to reduce the disproportionate share of the public 
sector due to the dominance of the hydrocarbon industry.   
However, unlike Western insurance companies that have the advantage of being able to 
invest their funds in a wide and liquid pool of assets ranging from cash to bank deposits, 
fixed income securities (corporate and government issued), equities, real estate and 
alternative assets, Qatari companies’ asset selection is challenging.  This is due not only 
to the current climate, but to limited asset diversification on the domestic capital market, 
the small number of securities listed on the domestic stock market, and low levels of local 
currency denominated fixed income securities.  This explains the large portions of 
invested assets in bank deposits while the volatility of the stock market represents a credit 
challenge to many insurers.  The continued growth in capital markets and the Shariah-
compliant capital market should lead to wider asset choice and reduced asset volatility 
over time, with increased asset-matching skills.   
 
5.3.2 Insurance Market Fragmentation 
Another major challenge for the insurance market in Qatar, which is typical of the GCC 
market in general, is market fragmentation.  In 2007 there were 57 companies serving a 
population of 34.8 million people, collecting a premium of USD 2.9 billion.  In 
comparison, India had 28 companies serving a population of 1.2 billion collecting a 
premium of USD 17.3 billion - quite a staggering difference.   The very small market in 
Qatar is shared between nine companies with a high concentration in the top five local 
groups who have a market share of 84 percent: In 2006 Qatar Insurance Company wrote 
gross premiums of USD 196 million: Qatar General Insurance Company USD 96 million; 
Al-Khaleej Insurance Company USD 42 million, Doha Insurance Company USD 35 
million and the Qatar Islamic insurance USD 29.7 million.  Even these top five are quite 
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small and that is a reason why mergers are the way forward and not only mergers inside 
Qatar but also mergers within the GCC countries. These mergers are challenging because 
most of the companies are family-owned and run and investors’ experience is modest and 
has not matured enough to capture all the potential benefits of the insurance market.   
The financial position of these national insurance companies is strong, which is reflected 
by their balance sheets, but if they are to capture any of the benefits of the pipeline of 
projects earmarked for the region, there is a need for a restructuring of the companies 
through mergers and through increasing the pool of skills and knowledge.  The data in 
Table 5.5 indicates a substantial increase in their total assets, growing over the period 
1980-2008 nearly fortyfold, from a total of QAR 177m to around QAR 9.9bn.  The 
increase of assets is mostly attributed to a substantial growth in investments from a mere 
QAR two million in 1980, peaking to around QAR 5.7 billion in 2007 and then dropping 
slightly to QAR 5.4bn in 2008.  Recent investment portfolios show that insurance 
companies took advantage of the building boom during the period 2004-2006, and 
doubled their real estate investments.  One particular area that has seen increased 
penetration is property insurance, due to the property boom that Qatar is experiencing, 
that has pushed up demand for all types of property insurance.  Developments in the field 
of health insurance, in light of the prospect of a new legislation making health insurance 
compulsory for construction workers to cover accident liabilities, is another  potential 
area of growth.   
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5  Consolidated Balance Sheet of National Insurance Companies (QAR mn) 
Items 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cash and deposit balances 112 212 207 222 257 490 905 978 1,627 1,930 
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Other receivables 39 98 99 197 215 252 326 1,001 1,541 1,727 
Reinsurance Contracts 13 28 54 56 89 412 619 334 514 576 
Investments 2 71 214 479 522 2,616 5,158 4,564 5,672 5,436 
Other assets 10 38 49 52 157 121 169 80 190 212 
Assets=Liabilities 177 447 623 1,006 1,240 3,890 7,176 6,957 9,543 9,879 
Borrowing from banks 16 47 45 87 83 37 135 189 521 723 
Insurance contracts 12 29 57 96 81 669 949 948 1,995 2,498 
Provisions 32 61 84 164 166 325 403 744 939 1,301 
Shareholder's equity 113 290 405 584 850 2,791 5,532 4,543 5,810 4,970 
Other Liabilities 4 20 32 75 60 67 158 533 278 386 
Source: Qatar Central Bank  Annual Reports, 1980-2008  
It is evident from the data that shareholders’ equity is the main source of funds which 
finance their activities, representing on average 65 percent of total liabilities for the 
period 1980-2008.  It is typical for insurance companies in the GCC region to have a high 
percentage of equities in their investment portfolios. Improved capital and risk 
management requires further development, especially in terms of the quantification of 
these risks, in order to ensure earnings over time.  Many insurers rely on strong links with 
the ruling family, including board membership, such that some companies could have 
some expectation of support from the government.   
Despite the many challenges and weak structure of the insurance industry, local insurance 
companies are presented with an unprecedented opportunity in the GCC to capture an 
expanding market and to develop a common market for insurance in the region through 
consolidation and a common regulatory frame, which will lead to better opportunities and 
greater potential for growth.  Another advantage the GCC can utilise is the fact that 60 
percent of listed insurance companies in the Arab region are listed in the GCC, which 
only accounts for around 13 percent of the total population of the Arab region.  It could 
become a centre which would serve the whole region.  Another untapped source of 
growth for the sector is the expatriate community.  In mid 2008, Dubai Islamic Insurance 
and Re-Insurance Company (Aman) agreed to allow expatriates to own around a 15 
percent share of the company’s shares, leading to an increase of shares and benefits to the 
market.  Managing Director of Aman, Hussein Mohammad Al-Meeza said, “This 
decision will have a positive impact.  It will bring diversification and inject capital 
investment in the market.  This is simply due to the fact that there are so many UAE 
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residents that are willing to invest locally.  We, at Aman, are giving them the opportunity 
to invest and bring shared benefits to the parties involve” (UAE Interact: 2008).  Qatar 
and other GCC countries can follow suit and exploit this large dormant market.    
5.3.3   Growth of the Reinsurance Market 
Reinsurance is a way of transferring or ceding some of the financial risks one insurance 
company assumes to another insurance company.  Primary insurers and reinsurers can 
share both the premiums and losses or reinsurers may assume the primary company’s 
losses above a certain limit in return for a fee.  Qatar’s insurance market, like its 
counterparts in the GCC region, is over-reliant on reinsurance. This over-reliance usually 
suggests limited capitalization/risk-bearing capacity or over-reliance on reinsurance 
technical assistance, neither of which are regarded as credit positives, and both of which 
represent a challenge for the development of the insurance industry.  The average ratio of 
reinsurance in the region is 52 percent of all instalments, which is higher than the rate in 
the current international market.  A more staggering figure is that 95 percent of 
reinsurance business in the GCC region goes to international companies outside the 
region.  There is a need for a large reinsurance company in the region to stop the flow of 
capital to foreign companies.   
A step in this direction has been taken by the GCC countries through Gulf Investment 
Corporation (GIC).  The corporation was established in 1983 and is equally owned by the 
GCC member states.  A joint venture between GIC and Arch Capital Group established 
Gulf Re in May 2008 in Dubai International Financial Centre.  Gulf Re’s initial capital 
was USD 200 million with an additional USD 200 million to be funded depending on the 
business needs (GIC: 2008).  Arch capital is a global company, with a capital of over 
USD 4 billion, providing insurance and reinsurance through its wholly-owned 
subsidiaries.  Gulf Re will focus on reinsurance of high-value oil, gas, power and water 
desalination projects in the six member states.  The reinsurance business of these projects 
accounts for USD 1.8 billion of which 95 percent goes to international companies.  Gulf 
Re is targeting a considerable portion of this business, around USD 1.3 billion (ibid). 
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Arch capital has substantial experience in assessing and managing risk and will focus on 
risk management and on assisting clients in understanding risks and ways of managing 
them.  The specialist expertise of Arch Capital will also be beneficial in addressing the 
shortage of insurance and reinsurance specialists in the region, offering its training 
programmes to clients and to insurance companies.  According to the CEO of GIC, 
Hisham Al-Razzuqi: 
Gulf Re will meet the need for a Gulf-based reinsurer with significant financial 
resources and specialist expertise...The company will add depth to the GCC 
insurance sector and support the growth of GCC insurers.  Gulf Re will benefit from 
the technical expertise and support of Arch Capital...This is a strategic long-term 
investment for GIC, in line with our mission to develop financial services in the 
GCC (ibid). 
Qatar and the GCC region in general are set to experience a massive surge in demand for 
reinsurance products over the coming years.  The dramatic increase in investments and 
subsequent asset creation is providing a huge potential for reinsurance.  This type of joint 
venture is a good example of how to build local expertise and how to join forces with 
internationally-recognised and renowned insurers to create local capacity for reinsurance 
that can meet the demand of the expected high volume of business.  Considering that 95 
percent of reinsurance business in the GCC region currently goes to international 
companies outside the region, the necessity to retain a portion of that business in the 
region becomes apparent (Zawya: 2008, January 14). 
 
5.4 Growth of the Takaful Market 
As mentioned earlier, one significant development that will help overcome the lack of 
demand for insurance in the region, especially in life insurance and personal lines 
insurance, is the expansion of Islamic insurance, takaful.  The world’s first takaful 
company, the Sudanese Islamic Insurance Company was established in 1979. Since then, 
there has been an explosion in the growth of takaful operators, with a number of major 
insurers entering the market, including Allianz, AIG, Munich Re and Hannover Re.  
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Takaful is not a new concept; the idea of a cooperative risk sharing is the oldest form of 
insurance.  However, the Grand Council of Islamic Scholars only approved takaful as a 
Shariah-acceptable alternative to conventional insurance in 1985, basing it on the 
principle of mutuality with emphasis on co-operation, inter-responsibility and assistance 
between groups of participants.  The following is a detailed analysis of this market.  
5.4.1 The Current Position of Takaful 
At present takaful makes up a small part of the Qatari insurance market with three active 
companies (Qatar Islamic Insurance, Al-Khaleej Insurance operating one takaful branch 
under the name Qatar Takaful and Doha Insurance subsidiary Doha Solidarity) 
accounting for 17 percent of the total insurance.  As noted by QNB, General Manager, 
Mr. Ali Shareef Al-Emadi “The growth of Islamic banking have had an effect on 
stimulating the Qatari takaful market from customers needing insurance in connection 
with bank loans that have to be insured the Shariah-compliant way” (Interview, July 
2008).   
The premium growth of the takaful market has been staggering with some players 
reporting growth of fifty percent or more over the last few years.  The opportunity is 
substantial enough to reach that large segment of the population that conventional 
insurance is not attracting, by providing religiously-acceptable takaful for non-life 
insurance and family takaful for life insurance, see box 5.1.    
BOX 5.1:  DEFINITIONS OF ISLAMIC INSURANCE 
Insurance v Takaful:  Takaful is the Islamic alternative to conventional insurance products.  It is based on the principle of mutuality 
with an emphasis (particularly for life) on co-operation, inter-responsibility and assistance between groups of participants.  In essence 
the economic structure of a Takaful company can be seen as a hybrid between that of mutual insurers and conventional insurers.  
Life Insurance v Family Takaful:  While life insurance was seen to be problematic initially, scholars looked at Islamic principles of 
mutual insurance and providing a social safety net.  This eventually matured into the concept of family Takaful, which provided 
insurance for the loss f family members. 
Reinsurance v Retakaful:  Just as a primary Islamic insurer can accept primary business from both an Islamic and a conventional 
customer, a Retakaful company can reinsure both an Islamic and a conventional insurer.  The main difference lies in the management 
of its investment portfolio: a Retakaful insurer must ensure that it makes only Shariah-compliant investments.  
Source: EFG-Hermes, GCC Insurance Primer, October 2007. 
Cultural and religious factors played a role in the underdevelopment of the insurance 
market in the GCC region, especially life insurance.  As seen from Chart 5.1, the share of 
life premiums in Qatar is around five percent of the total insurance market.  Even in the 
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UAE – the biggest insurance market in the GCC - the share is around 15 percent 
compared to 70 percent in France.  Takaful could be a key to increasing insurance 
awareness and to overcoming these cultural and religious obstacles.   
The GCC is emerging as the heart of the global takaful market, with accepted 
contributions in excess of USD 1 billion as compared to global contributions of USD 2 
billion in 2006.  Of the world total of 133 takaful operators, 59 are within the GCC (EFG-
Hermes: 2007).  It is forecasted that the global takaful business will rise from the 2006 
level of USD two billion to USD 7.4 billion by 2015 (Moody’s: 2006).   
 
 
Source: Moody's Global Insurance - February 2008 
 
The market is growing at a rate of 40 percent, and this growth is spurred not only by 
personal lines but also by commercial lines.  According to Sameer Abdi, head of Ernest 
and Young Islamic Finance Services Group:  
Assets held and financed by the Islamic financial services industry are increasingly 
motivated to use Takaful to underwrite risk.  Existing Takaful capacity is slowly 
replacing conventional insurance in the industry.  The challenge for Takaful 
operators lies not only in tapping demand but also in developing their capacity and 
expertise to provide a competitive alternative to conventional insurance (Ernest & 
Young: 2008, p44). 
148 
 
 
At the recent World Takaful Conference held in Dubai in April 2009, it was reported that 
by 2012 total takaful contributions could reach USD 7.7billion per year (ibid)).  Even 
higher projected growth had previously been reported. HSBC, for example, estimated that 
the global takaful market would be worth USD 14.4billion by 2010. This growth is 
spectacular when one considers that takaful contributions (premiums) were reported as 
being USD 1.4million per year in 2004 rising to an estimated USD 3.4billion in 2007, the 
majority of those contributions coming from within the GCC with South East Asia 
following behind (Opcit, p13).  One must keep in mind that global takaful contributions 
are less than one percent of the total insurance premium spent annually, despite the fact 
that Muslims represent a quarter of the total global population; there are around 1.5 
billion Muslims around the world being underserved by the insurance sector (Swiss Re 
Sigma Report: 2008, p 4).   
This is a huge market, even if it remains to be determined what proportion of this 
population is accessible to insurers.  The fact is in key markets, such as the Arab region, 
insurance penetration remains very low, and the potential to attract new insurers is 
massive.  In addition, takaful  can be also attractive to those who are concerned with all 
forms of ethical finance or attracted by the possibility of a return of surplus generated on 
the contribution they provide in order to receive insurance protection. 
Naturally, the global financial crisis had an impact on this nascent industry, and it has 
seen an erosion of profit margins as a consequence of its dependence on equities and real 
estate and the shortage of long-term liquid investments.  Growth forecasts in global 
markets worldwide have been affected, and major takaful markets are no exception. 
“Figures published by Ernst & Young in their latest report suggest that in taking a sample 
of GCC and Malaysian takaful operators, the average return on equity in terms of 
percentage has dipped significantly in 2008 (especially in respect of GCC companies) 
and is expected to rebound during the course of 2009” (Ernest & Young : 2008, p26).  
However those takaful operators that are able to successfully manage their business 
during this challenging economic environment will be well placed to take advantage of 
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opportunities that arise when markets begin to pick up. Also, takaful may be perceived as 
being more attractive to consumers as it offers a more conservative method of running a 
risk carrying entity especially after the current global financial crisis undermined 
investors’ confidence in conventional investment products.   
Accompanying the growth of takaful has been an expansion in the re-takaful market. A 
re-takaful can reinsure both an Islamic and a conventional insurer but only in Shariah-
compliant investments.  Dubai is the first GCC country to take advantage of this market 
by joining hands with Malaysia to create the largest re-takaful firm, Dubai Banking 
Group and Khazanah National and Asian Capital Reinsurance created ACR Re-Takaful 
Holdings in mid 2008.  Similar reasons exist for the large potential of growth of the re-
takaful industry in the region as with takaful: the low rate of Islamic insurance market 
penetration, the ongoing infrastructural and trade activities in the Gulf combined with the 
growth of the sukuk market which could be a key supporting factor in the growth of re-
takaful.  
 
5.4.2   Challenges Facing the Takaful Industry 
The appropriate tapping into of the takaful market depends on addressing a number of 
critical factors and challenges.  The market needs to demonstrate similar, if not better, 
service quality than the conventional sector to persuade the uninsured market to use the 
facilities of takaful and increase awareness of the need for and benefit of insurance, 
especially in markets where cultural and religious barriers have obstructed the growth of 
this market.  Also, because the essence of takaful is cooperative risk and community 
well-being rather than the optimization of profit, it is imperative that policy holders’ 
funds are managed properly with improved transparency and corporate governance.  The 
following discussion delves into the specific factors that need addressing by providers of 
takaful and by concerned governments.  The World Takaful report of 2009 included a full 
discussion of the obstacles confronting this nascent industry.  The following is a 
summary of the most significant ones; they include availability of Shariah-compliant 
150 
 
investments, authentic and accurate Shariah compliance, demographic considerations and 
distribution channels. 
Shariah-Compliant Investments: Finding suitable assets to invest the revenues generated 
by contributions is a key challenge to takaful operators.  This lack of diversification in 
investments limits the flexibility afforded to them to manage their investments as 
efficiently as possible. Since the recent economic crisis, this challenge has intensified in 
its scope.  Development of suitable products is essential to move away from the apparent 
dependency on real estate and equity markets, which in the current climate have exposed 
these investments and undermined the credibility of the market.    
Shariah Compliance:  Another important factor to maintain credibility is the necessity 
for the takaful industry to ensure that the mechanisms by which takaful works are 
Shariah compliant.  Investor confidence in an area driven by ethical considerations 
inevitably plays a big part in choosing this market over the conventional market or in 
persuading Muslims to even enter the market of insurance at all.  One example of this is 
in respect of the doctrine of tabarru (donation) which governs the payment and receipt of 
contributions by participants to the takaful operator.  The legal status of these 
contributions has not been determined.  The doctrine of tabarru is traditionally 
considered to make takaful contracts a form of a unilateral contract with the takaful 
operator However in practice many contracts issued by takaful operators appear 
substantially similar to those provided by their conventional counterparts and take the 
form of a bilateral contract.   
Another example concerns the distribution of surplus to participants.  This return of 
surplus is a cornerstone of takaful and is essential in order to avoid traditional Islamic 
criticism of conventional insurance.  However, by retaining funds takaful operators are 
exposing themselves to questions as to what the difference is between the takaful model 
and conventional insurance.  The use of conventional policy wordings by takaful 
operators has also led to questions about the Shariah compliance of certain products.  It is 
possible for takaful operators to use conventional wordings as a useful template or 
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starting point from which to develop takaful wordings, but it is imperative that they arrive 
at their own Shariah-compliant wordings.   
Distribution Channels:  There is a need to develop distribution channels, particularly if 
the takaful industry is to succeed in penetrating personal lines such as family takaful.  
Bancassurance, which simply means an amalgamation of insurance and banking business 
through the selling of insurance products via a bank's established distribution channels,  
is widely recognised as an important platform from which takaful operators can reach out 
to potential consumers through their chosen banking provider.  Also this synergy between 
banks and insurance is beneficial for both; bancassurance has the potential to contribute a 
high share to banks’ fee-based income.   
Speaking at the first Middle East conference on Bancassurance, George Oommen, 
Executive Director of Insurance and Reinsurance at Dubai International Financial Centre, 
indicated that, “There is huge growth potential for insurance in the region.  Years of 
misunderstanding and misconception have created mental blocks against insurance in 
Muslim cultures. Takaful is the way forward.  However, distribution holds the key.  With 
Bancassurance gaining ground, there is huge potential for growth in the region” (Gulf 
News: 2007).  “However, regulatory hurdles and a lack of the regulation necessary for the 
protection of consumers and the industry present the major hurdle to the growth of 
Bancassurance” (ibid).  In Qatar this huge opportunity of convergence of banking and 
insurance was seen by Doha Bank in 2002.  The bank launched its bancassurance 
division in 2004, leading to the establishment of 100 percent owned insurance subsidiary, 
Doha Bank Assurance Company in 2007.  This gives the company a competitive edge 
and the possibility of capturing some of the benefits associated with this market.   
Shariah Scholars: One common theme for the Islamic finance sector as a whole is the 
need for Shariah scholars to assist the growing Islamic finance and takaful industry.  A 
current challenge for the takaful industry to overcome is to ensure that Shariah scholars 
fully appreciate and comprehend the commercial purpose of products on offer in order to 
be able to advise in respect of the Shariah compliance aspects in a way that both allows 
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takaful operators to undertake their business with certainty, and ensures the Shariah 
compliance and credibility of the product.  The chronic shortfall of scholars for the 
Islamic finance industry is compounded in takaful, where there are few scholars with any 
genuine depth of understanding of the insurance market.  In addition another persistent 
problem faced by the Islamic finance industry is the lack of qualified staff and sales 
people who actually appreciate and understand the product sufficiently to explain it to 
consumers.  These are not easy problems to overcome, and some of them can only be 
alleviated by accumulating further experience within the market. 
Demographic Consideration:  Finally, in contrast to the aging populations of the West 
where the focus may be on providing adequately for retirement, the demographic within 
Muslim countries, and especially the Arab region, is a youthful population. The challenge 
will be to ensure that takaful products appeal to this new generation and appear relevant 
to them.  Family takaful (or the takaful equivalent of life insurance) is a particular area in 
which further growth is expected as it currently remains very underdeveloped.  In other 
words this industry needs to be very sensitive to its target customers with an in-depth 
understanding of their needs and characteristics.  Addressing these challenges is not an 
easy task and needs to be approached collectively by the key players in the market.  GCC 
governments can play a determining role in supporting and encouraging the resolution of 
these issues which will be much more beneficial to the growth of industry.    
 
 
 
5.5 Investment Companies 
Investment companies are an important type of financial intermediary that are either 
publicly-held corporations or trusts and are in the business of investing, reinvesting, 
owning, holding or trading in securities.  They invest the pooled funds of retail investors 
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into specific investments (in line with the objectives of the investor).  They offer 
individual investors more diversification, liquidity and professional services than would 
be available to them as individuals.  This type of company has been among the largest 
investors in Western financial markets and they hold a significant portion of outstanding 
shares of issued stocks, bonds and money market securities.   
In Qatar, the establishment and development of investment companies is a very recent 
trend, although the legal frameeork of organizing, supervising and monitoring this type of 
business was established by the Qatari government as early as 1979 when it issued Law 
No (15) of 1979 on organizing the activities of investment companies.  The law stipulates 
the main business domains of investment companies covering investment banking, asset 
management, structured finance and private equity. The activities of these companies are 
allowed to follow either a conventional or an Islamic basis. 
The expansion of this type of financial service is limited to four national companies: 
Amwal, established in 1999, the Investment House, established in 2000, the first Investor, 
established in 2006, and Qatar first investment, established in 2008. The Kuwaiti 
investment company, The International Investor, a fast-growing company concentrating 
on Shariah-compliant financing and loyalty programmes, opened a branch in Qatar in 
2000 as part of its strategy to expand in the region.  It is the only regional company 
operating in Qatar.  This market is nascent and its size and scope is still very limited.  
Among these three, Amwal appears to have made the biggest impact on the Qatari 
market.  
Amwal has had an interesting journey in its development.  It started off as the Qatar 
Ladies Investment Company offering advice to Qatari women on how to save for the 
future.  The driving force behind it was Sheikha Hanadi bint Nasser bin Khaled Al-Thani 
who was a pioneer in a sector previously dominated by men, encouraging Qatari women 
to venture into areas outside the traditional accepted domains.  This happened after the 
current Emir took formal power and which moved Qatar from a very conservative and 
secluded era into an open and very ambitious era.  Many new opportunities were opened 
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to motivated and determined Qataris with innovative and ambitious ideas.  This woman-
led company was still novel for Qatar and Sheikha Hanadi describes her start in the 
business as such, “I remember, in my first meetings everyone looked at me, and thought I 
was a political statement.  But it was more that I was in the right place at the right time 
and had the right background” (Profile: 2006).  
Less than a decade later the firm was rebranded into Amwal which means ”money” and it 
began carving a leading investment role for itself, serving both men and women, rich as 
well as the modestly endowed and expatriates as well as Qataris.  Amwal was the first 
investment company to be licensed by the Central Bank of Qatar operating in two lines of 
business, investment banking and asset management.  The firm enjoys a strong 
shareholder base comprising of Shuua Capital, Qatar foundation, Qatar National Bank, 
Qatar navigation and prominent individual Qatari shareholders.   
Amwal has adopted a very ambitious strategy for its development and growth.  It has 
seen a shift of emphasis in its target customers and operations, away from retail towards 
targeting institutions, corporations and high net worth individuals.  The appointment of a 
new CEO, Laurent Lavigne du Cadet, was made to facilitate this strategic shift. In his 
own words: 
I come from the world of investments, and it is not a coincidence that I am here.  We 
want to reorient Amwal.  And my mandate is to make Amwal a leading regional 
investment banking and asset management firm (Qatar Today: 2007, p 62). 
There is acknowledgment that the company is small and will not be able to compete with 
international institutions, but will focus on its biggest asset which is the quality of access 
to decision-makers in the country and the region and knowledge of the region in order to 
join hands with larger companies.  In that respect, the company has signed several 
mandates with international banks.  Also aware of the big companies, Amwal’s strategy 
is to focus on fewer products that are sophisticated and specific; they cannot provide 150 
products such as Merrill Lynch or JP Morgan but can create a niche market that is 
differentiated and highly specialized.  Accompanying this strategy is a focus on staff; 
Amwal has one of the largest investment teams in Qatar employing a growing team of 
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professionals.  The aim is to have the expertise in Qatar to serve the country and the 
region as opposed to bringing it in from abroad.  It links its growth plans to the huge 
anticipated projects that are planned in the region that will demand the participation not 
only of international banks but also investment firms.  Among the projects in which the 
firm has invested is a petrochemicals plant set up by the state-owned Qatar Petroleum.  
This was the first time that individuals had been able to invest in the petrochemicals and 
energy sector. The company manages several investment funds among them and, for the 
first time, one that serves expatriates working in Qatar.   
It is branching into heavy investment in the fast-growing real estate market and through 
providing corporate finance services to clients where the financial advisor to the project 
owners is acting as the middle party between the project owners and debt lenders/equity 
investors.  Amwal’s experience in the real estate market includes being financial advisor 
to one of Qatar’s largest privately-owned estate projects, Al-Waab City. This is worth 
over USD 2.5 billion and consists of a variety of components: villas, apartments, 
commercial offices, a five star hotel and a European style piazza (AME Info, 26 June, 
2008).  It is also bringing to the market new ways of securing exposure to high-return 
income-generating securities by identifying the growing market for high-return Shariah-
compliant securities in the real estate sector. The firm has created a family of funds co-
sponsored by Shuaa Capital and Kaupthing Bank, most important among them being the 
Shariah-compliant fund to facilitate the Al Waab City project.  The CEO of Amwal 
explains: 
Through this structure, we have also widened the range of financing options we are 
able to provide to certain professional real estate developers by adding an important 
element which enables them to bridge efficiently with a larger pool of financing 
(AME Info, 25 March, 2008) 
These new funds will also attract larger institutions and high net value individuals.  It is a 
sign of confidence that opportunities are identified locally in which to invest the surplus, 
rather than abroad.  Another encouraging sign that private investors are being supported 
is Amwal’s involvement in raising the equity for the first Chlorine plant of around 30 
percent of the total cost of the project, with an anticipated high return to equity investors 
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of up to 25 percent.   Qatar is heavily dependent on imports to fill the growing needs of 
this important product, in the gas and oil industry. According to the sponsor of the 
project, Sheikh Mohamed bin Ahmed Al-Thani: 
Qatar Chlorine is an illustrious project in the medium-size hydrocarbon industry 
further boosting the role of the private sector.  It is a promising step which enhances 
the industrial activity in the country and will attract foreign investment.  Qatar 
Chlorine is poised to promote the private sector’s economic participation and to 
reduce reliance on imports (AME Info, 29 June, 2008) 
Amwal is also exploiting the potential in the insurance sector.  The firm signed an 
agreement for mutual cooperation with Doha Insurance Company in order to expand into 
the niche market of corporate medical and life insurance which is a fast-growing segment 
in the Qatari market.  This agreement will allow them to share expertise and capabilities, 
improve the efficiency of customer services, set quality standards and after sales services 
and expand the product range for both international and local coverage.   
Following in the strength of Amwal is the Investment House. It is one of the fastest-
growing investment companies in the GCC and focuses on a variety of economic sectors: 
financial services, real estate, construction, manufacturing and services.  Together with 
the Kuwaiti Global Investment House – the largest asset management business in the 
region by reference to assets under management – it established Mazaya Qatar, a real 
estate company, in compliance with Islamic Shariah, with a capital of QAR 500 million, 
to take advantage of the boom in the real estate market in Qatar.    
 
5.6 Finance Companies 
As Law No (16) of 1979 on organizing the activities of financing companies stipulates, 
the business of a finance company is restricted to granting loans for different categories 
of customer, whether individuals, institutions or companies.  The activities of these 
companies are allowed to follow either a conventional or an Islamic basis.  Qatar has only 
one operating financial company; the First Finance Company (FFC), licensed in 2000 by 
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Qatar Central Bank.  First Finance is an Islamic finance company which aims to provide 
comprehensive Islamic financial services: the provision of all types of consumer finance 
to individuals, companies and corporates and the expansion of its investment portfolio 
inside Qatar and in the region.   
The company promotes itself as a pioneer in the field of Islamic financial services and 
has a Shariah panel of four Islamic scholars with experience in working on similar 
panels.  They supervise the transactions and services offered by the company and their 
compliance to Shariah.  In particular the panel reports annually on: the compatibility of 
all operations and transactions with the principles and basis of Islamic Shariah, the 
compatibility of the process of profit distribution and loss debiting to investment accounts 
with the principles adopted by the panel and based on the fundamentals of Islamic 
Shariah law and the calculation of Zakat imposed in accordance with the principles of 
Shariah law (First Finance Annual Report: 2002).  In addition, the company has a 
rapporteur and a Shariah supervisor to oversee and follow up the implementation of 
transactions.  The Shariah panel is also important because it is imperative for the stability 
of the market to enjoy clearly defined principles and guidelines in a comprehensive 
framework that provides a level of certainty and choice to investors.     
The company is very keen to  ensure quality and adopting international standards, and in 
2003 acquired ISO 9001:2000 certification, while its credit ratings were raised in 2004 
from B+ to BB- in the international credit facilities ratings (First Finance Annual Report: 
2004).  In accordance with the adoption of Shariah principles, the headquarters have a 
separate section for women to provide them with all finance and privileges that the 
company offers.  The section is staffed by an all-female professional team. 
All this is an indication of the ambition and vision of the company.  Aware of the 
immense developments in the financial sector combined with the effects of globalization 
it perceives the necessity of establishing alliances and mergers capable of providing high-
quality specialised services in all fields of finance as well as enhancing the provision of 
innovative Islamic finance services in order to stimulate economic and social 
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development in Qatar in particular and the Arab Gulf States in general.  Some of the 
regional partners that share similar views and coordinate activities include: First 
Investment, Investment Dar and Gulf Investment House and Burgan Bank in Kuwait, 
Dubai Islamic bank, and Arab Banking Corporation Islamic bank of Bahrain. 
The company’s data reveals its strong financial position: expanding assets, growing 
shareholders’ equity and increasing profits, establishing itself as one of Qatar’s big 
financial institutions.  The company started with a capital of QAR 50 million and 
increased to QAR 353 million in 2007, which is more than a sevenfold increase over a 
period of seven years (Table 5.6). This indicates strong shareholders’ assurance about the 
prospects of the company.  Other financial indicators, such as earnings per share, indicate 
the huge profits for shareholders since it increased 27 fold from QAR 0.11 to QAR 2.95.  
Although total revenues suffered a serious dip in 2005, they picked up by 2006 and for 
the period 2001-2007 revenues increased nine fold. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 5.6 Financial Performance Indicators for the First Finance Company 2001-2007 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
Revenue (QAR x 1000) 12,193 35,233 60,156 60,777 42,143 69,164  114,114  
Total Assets (QAR x 1000) 282,920 419,949 552,157 563,854 724,935 1,205,955  1,690,515  
Shareholders’ Equity (QAR x 1000) 101,184 111,440 141,172 173,956 206,050 521,131  572,157  
Net Profit (QAR x 1000) 1,098 10,499 19,198 22,775 41,887 80,797  103,859  
Return on Net Assets (%) 0.39% 2.50% 3.48% 4.04% 5.78% 6.70% 6.14% 
Return on Equity (%) 1.09% 9.42% 13.60% 13.09% 20.33% 15.50% 18.15% 
Return on Capital (%) 1.10% 10.50% 16.00% 15.77% 25.67% 22.91% 29.45% 
Dividend / Shares (x 1000) - 9,000 14,400 18,772    
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Share Capital (x 1000) 100,000 100,000 120,000 144,400 163,172 352,634  352,634  
Earnings per Share (QAR) 0.11 1.05 1.43 1.61 2.14 2.58  2.95  
Nominal Value  per Share (QAR) 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00  10.00  
Book Value per Share (QAR) 10.12 11.14 11.76 12.05 12.63 14.78  16.23  
        
Source: First Finance Company Annual Reports , 2005, 2006 & 2007. 
          
 
The company has achieved an impressive increase of its net profit from a mere one 
million in 2001 to more than 103 million in 2007 - more than one hundred times increase. 
 
5.7 Qatar Investment Authority 
The creation by the Qatari government of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in 2005, Qatari 
Investment Authority (QIA) whose assets are estimated conservatively at USD 60 billion 
is part of the strategy of economic diversification.  With the exception of Saudi Arabia, 
where wealth has largely moved into the private sector - individuals hold about USD 280 
billion to USD 340 billion outside the region - most Gulf wealth is in government hands 
(Kerr: 2008). QIA’s prime objective is to achieve revenue diversification and to minimize 
risk from Qatar's reliance on energy prices.  Investing the massive surpluses of oil and 
gas revenue in a manner that supports the long-term prospects of the economy of Qatar 
has become a priority for the government.  As indicated by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-
Thani, Chief Executive and Vice Chairman of the QIA, and also Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister:  
Our energy sector won’t last forever - so we need to secure a good life so they 
[future generations] can continue the same standard of living…We will have lots 
more money over the next few years.  The challenge is where to invest it (FT, 23 Oct 
2007). 
Qatar follows in the footsteps of other sovereign wealth funds from Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Singapore and China.  Kuwait was the first state to come up with the idea, in the 
1970s, of diversifying the economy by investing surplus oil revenues into global asset 
classes to create a fund to guarantee national income once oil revenues tail off.  The 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) through its future generations’ fund takes 10 percent 
160 
 
of oil revenues and invests in international and regional firms.  In 2006 Kuwait revealed 
the size of its assets at around USD 213 billion (Kerr: 2007b).  Abu Dhabi followed suit 
quickly and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is among the wealthiest 
sovereign funds in the world with estimated assets between USD 250 billion and USD 
875 billion (ibid.).  Dubai’s government owns Istithmar, which makes it a sovereign 
wealth fund too.  However, Istithmar funds investment through real estate sales rather 
than from oil revenues.   
The establishment of QIA is a reflection of Qatar’s strategic view of how to shape its 
economic future as well as its emerging capacity to operate in the global financial 
markets.  Although it is the youngest investment fund in the GCC, it is quickly making a 
name for itself with some high-profile acquisitions and diversified asset classes.  This 
appetite for acquisitions is motivated by the need to invest its oil wealth to guarantee 
future economic sustainability.   Expressing this need, the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamed bin Jasim Al-Thani, stated that: 
If we invest in Treasuries and get four percent or five percent, inflation will eat 
it...We need high returns. We need to find a way to break through the cycle of the 
dollar and interest rates. We are taking the lead in investing in new instruments 
(Wall Street Journal: 2007). 
In contrast with other funds in the region the Qatari fund wishes to be principled and do 
deals directly rather than allocate their capital to the first-rank private equity funds such 
as Blackstone groups or more specialized ones like Providence Equity Partners.  So the 
authority is making small investments in the funds themselves and asks for huge co-
investment opportunities.  The following is a detailed analysis of the investment activities 
of the fund and the challenges it faces.  
 
5.7.1   Investment Portfolio of the Qatar Investment Authority    
The strategy of the QIA is to invest its surplus funds in a mixture of asset classes in a 
variety of places.  Since its establishment the Authority has been very active and 
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successful in acquiring assets abroad, especially in Britain.  This can be attributed to the 
historical ties with Britain (up until 1971 Qatar was a British protectorate); the largest 
European expatriate community in Qatar is British; a disproportionate number of 
executives were hired from Britain to build the country’s financial services and good 
trade relations.  Qatar’s asset acquisition in Britain ranged from the Four Seasons, the 
nursing home operator, to Chelsea Barracks, Harrods department store, London Bridge 
Quarter and One Hyde Park, London’s’ most expensive apartment block to its 
unsuccessful bid for Sainsbury.  Qatar is already the biggest shareholder in Sainsbury (25 
percent) alongside other big shareholders such as the Sainsbury family and the Iranian 
property tycoon Robert Tchenguiz.  
It is also showing growing interest in the European stock exchange and competing with 
the United Arab Emirates for the control of shares and access to the technology and 
infrastructure needed to develop a financial market (Kerr: 2007a).  Both states have 
purchased large stakes in the London Stock Exchange PLC.  Qatar purchased a 9.98 
percent stake in OMX-AB, the Nordic stock market operator which operates stock 
exchanges in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Iceland.  It built 
up a 23.5 percent holding in the London Stock Exchange (LSE), after buying a further 3.5 
percent of NASDAQ’s shares to add to its existing 20 percent stake.  It was a co-investor 
in Dubai International Capital’s purchase of a 3.12 percent stake in EADS, the European 
Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company (ibid). 
Prior to the current global financial crisis, the Authority planned to invest USD 15 billion 
in global banks in the US and European banks as indicated by Qatar’s Prime Minster and 
Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al-Thani, after the World Economic Forum 
Davos.  The stake QIA bought in Credit Swisse, of just under two percent with a cost of 
USD 500 million, is part of this plan (Sender: 2008).   However, the drive to invest in 
international banks has slowed down as a result of the deepening of the banks’ crisis and 
losses.  It is estimated that foreign assets held by GCC SWFs fell by around USD 100 
billion in 2008 through exposure to foreign assets. (Arabian Business: 2009).  The QIA 
investment of USD 4.52 billion into Barclays, taking a 7.99 percent stake, has lost USD 
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1.74 billion in value as the bank's shares tumbled.  At the start of the crisis, firms in the 
City and on Wall Street turned to sovereign wealth funds to shore up battered balance 
sheets and cover subprime losses.  Initially, these investors were happy to take the 
opportunity of gaining holdings in major institutions such as Barclays, Citigroup, Morgan 
Stanley and UBS.  However, with banks in deep trouble and sovereign wealth funds 
seeing the value of their investments shrinking, the flow of investment has slowed 
significantly.    
The appetite to invest globally, however, has extended beyond Western markets.  The 
authority has invested heavily in Asia especially in real estate projects.  It took a stake in 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China at the time of its initial offerings in October 
2006 by investing USD 205 million.  Executive board member of the QIA, Dr. Hussain 
Al-Abdulla, commenting on these investments said they “represent a natural extension of 
our strategy to increasingly focus investments in Asia” (Wall street Journal, Dec 2007).  
In December 2007 the authority signed a joint venture agreement with the Indonesian 
government to set up an investment holding company for projects in Indonesia across a 
broad range of sectors. The Qataris will own 85 percent of the holding company while the 
other 15 percent will be held by the Indonesian government (ibid).  QIA will be the first 
partner in a Singapore consortium led by Keppel Corporation to build the Sino-Singapore 
Tianjin Eco-city in China.  Qatar’s interest in investing in sustainable development 
moves the State into a new focus on green communities.  Keppel Seghers – a subsidy of 
Keppel Corporation is undertaking a project in Qatar to transform the area surrounding 
Doha North Sewage Treatment Works into an eco-park.  Keppel Seghers’ CEO indicated 
that the park will be the first of its kind to adopt remarkable ideas of sustainable 
development, while the treated water from the Doha North facility will irrigate the eco-
park to provide a green space in which the local community can learn, work and play 
(Gulf Times, 31 January 2008). 
QIA recently purchased a 20-25 percent stake in Porsche for seven billion Euros (USD 
9.8 billion) with the additional advantage of access to Volkswagen share options held by 
Porsche which would enable it to control about 20 percent of Volkswagen at a very 
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attractive price.  The deal enabled Porsche to get out from under a debt of nine billion 
Euros that it accrued while attempting to take over Volkswagen in 2008.  The authority is 
also expanding domestically and regionally.  In real estate, QIA established Qatari Diar 
Real Estate Investment Company as a platform from which to handle several significant 
investments in local as well as regional markets, including Morocco, Egypt, Oman and 
Syria.  QIA also directly owns 100 percent of Qatar National Hotels Company.  In private 
equity, QIA has direct stakes in several Qatari blue chip companies like QTel and co-
invests alongside them. QIA's private equity also looks after local private equity and 
venture capital initiatives such as the Qatar Foundation.  This very wide range of places 
and asset classes will help SWFs such as QIA to withstand the current financial  climate, 
and the losses already endured as a result of loss in investment in the US and Europe, 
whether in stock markets or banks.   
The investment portfolio of QIA will increase substantially in coming years as natural 
gas contributes more to its revenues.  The growth of the economy has been very strong in 
the past few years with GDP increasing almost tenfold, from USD eight billion in 2000 to 
USD 80 billion in 2008 and is expected to reach USD 106 billion. Massive wealth needs 
to be invested for the long-term future of the country, and hence the challenge the country 
faces is how and where to invest.  The Qatari private sector cannot accommodate such a 
challenge and wealth will continue to be concentrated in the hands of the government and 
its public sector. In line with its expanded role, the QIA is expanding its staff, adding 40 
more members to its current staff of 110 and it will also open overseas offices given its 
acquisition targets (Kerr: 2007c).  Head of strategic and private equity of QIA, Kenneth 
Shen, said that, “The QIA - while building on its dollar holdings - planned to diversify by 
focusing investment on several Asian hotspots, such as China” (ibid). The authority’s 
board defines fresh markets and opportunities and then identifies and works with partners 
in these markets, in contrast to the more established Gulf funds that generally rely on vast 
internal resources.  
Another indication of the economic imperative of investing oil surpluses is the 
acquisition fund, set up by QIA and the Abu Dhabi government, International Petroleum 
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Investment Company (IPIC), with each side contributing one billion USD, as an initial 
investment.  An official from IPIC commented that, “We will look at any opportunities 
where we can make money and add value.  That could be anywhere – the Middle East, 
Asia, Africa, Europe and the United States (Reuters, 25 March, 2008.  He added, “The 
fund will be conservative with the first investments and build carefully...You cannot be 
aggressive from day one” (ibid). However, due to the growth of the role and wealth of 
these Sovereign funds they have drawn heavy criticism from some quarters.   
5.7.2   Scrutiny of SWFs    
As a result of this growing global influence, intense scrutiny has fallen on these funds and 
they were the talking point at the World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2008.  
There are fears that their financial power could turn into political leverage.  US Treasury 
officials held intensive talks during Davos with representatives from these funds pressing 
them to be more accountable and transparent.  The view of the US was expressed by the 
Undersecretary of the Treasury, David McCormick; 
To date we have seen sovereign wealth funds which have largely been long-term, 
stable, commercially driven investors…However the growth of these funds and 
increased levels of their investment does raise legitimate questions about how we 
can ensure that that investment continues to be commercially driven (Kerr: 2008). 
In response, CEO of the National Bank of Kuwait, Ibrahim Dabdoub, emphasised that, 
“SWF’s are not political players, they are financial players” (ibid).  Other Western 
countries shared the US stance and called for more rigorous levels of openness and 
transparency into the activities of these funds, thus provoking protectionist sentiments.  
This defies Western countries’ sacred tenet of free movement of capital and no barriers to 
investments.  The developed world seeks free entry into the markets of the developing 
world but appears fearful when the developing world want the same in return.  The 
pressure for transparency by critics of wealth funds did not make it clear what precisely 
that means.  Executives of these funds have argued that even large pension funds are not 
expected to announce their investments in advance and the fact that these funds have 
made such big investment disclosures would have an impact on markets and put these 
165 
 
groups at a disadvantage (Tett: 2008a).  Omar bin Sulaiman, Governor of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre said that “this backlash could encourage regional houses to 
turn their backs on Western markets and seek more buying opportunities in Asia, where 
they face little or no such backlash” (Kerr: 2007b).  Underpinning all Gulf investment 
overseas is the need to reinvest oil income in order to diversify their economic base.  
Also, this new attention on Gulf SWFs and the new scrutiny of the asset classes they are 
investing in is making Gulf officials resentful of the attention and see themselves “To be 
victims of crossfire between developed nations such as the US and Germany and 
emerging sovereign wealth  giants China and Russia”  (ibid). 
To steer clear from protectionist policies, the International Monetary Fund has 
recommended voluntary transparency from sovereign wealth funds in an aim to placate 
Western fears and to avoid Western states’ imposition of compulsory disclosure.  A code 
for SWFs investments is expected to be drafted.  Despite these fears, and as a result of the 
situation in the global capital markets, ,the liquidity crunch on one side of the world and 
abundant liquidity on the other, international bankers are obliged to court investors in the 
Gulf in order to find new buyers for their distressed assets.   For instance, Citigroup 
raised USD 7.5 billion in new capital from the Abu Dubai Investment Authority (Tett: 
2008b). 
Gulf investors are moving away from their traditional approach of quietly investing in 
stock markets and treasury bonds and becoming bolder and sharper in their approach 
venturing into commodities market, private equity, real estate and hedge funds, thus 
increasing the link of their economies to global markets.  Dubai Ports paid almost USD 
four billion for the shipping and ports company P&O in 2006 while Saudi Arabia paid 
USD 11.6 billion for General Electric’s plastic business, the largest foreign acquisitions 
ever announced by a Gulf Arab investor (ibid).  The strategic shift in the asset classes and 
the development of the financial industry of Gulf SWFs is a result of a gradual shift in 
priorities. Gulf States “Used the liquidity boom firstly in pay down debt, clean up balance 
sheets and spend on basic infrastructure, now it is about long term investment.  The 
cumulative account balance of the GCC since 2003 is to reach $US 900 billion in 2008” 
166 
 
(Kerr: 2007b).  Another important development is the growing sophistication of Gulf 
investors, who are now happy to deal with complex financial products and are more 
efficient in the use of their capital.    
Sovereign Wealth Funds are expected to be worth USD 17,500 billion in ten years time, 
jumping from the current estimate of USD 2,500 billion. Global financial assets are 
expected to double from USD 100,000 billion making sovereign wealth funds share 
quadruple from 2.5 percent to nine percent.    Although that is a doubling of its current 
share it still represents a small percentage of the global market.  So the alarm in some 
Western quarters is exaggerated.  Kito de Boer, McKinsey’s Managing Director for the 
Middle East, suggests that of an oil surplus of around USD 3,000 billion over the period 
2005-2020, around half will firstly be invested in the region with approximately USD 750 
billion going to investment in the wider Middle East and North Africa, while the rest will 
go into wealth funds and portfolio investments (ibid).    Commenting on the effects of the 
soaring oil prices and the accumulated staggering wealth of Gulf States, he indicated that: 
This is only the second page of the first chapter of the coming of petro-giants.  If oil 
prices remain at a level over $50 a barrel, then this will become a structural shift of 
global capital flows on a material scale. Naturally the overseas investment levels will 
depend on the amount Gulf governments commit to domestic economies: they must 
consider the job creation and other services for their growing population 40 percent 
of whom are below 15 years old (Kerr: 2008). 
Talk in the financial global market is about a shift in economic power; however what is 
happening is that Gulf wealth funds and Asian wealth funds are increasing their shares in 
the market in accordance with the size of their assets and taking advantage of global 
opportunities.  In fact, the more these states are linked to the international global market, 
the more entrenched are their vested interests in the system.  This should be a welcome 
development for the West, rather than the cause for suspicion that surrounds some of the 
SWFs acquisitions.  Until recently, Merrill Lynch investment bank considered the US and 
Europe as the main areas for the global structured finance world; however, in 2007 the 
bank started to produce a regular research report on Gulf securitisation issues.  In three 
months November 2007–Feb 2008, Gulf SWFs invested USD 18 billion in Europe and 
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the US (FT, 5 March, 2008).  There is no doubt that Gulf SWFs are increasing in size and 
significance in the global financial market, but that is necessitated by the requirement of 
capital and its accumulation.    
 
5.8 Conclusion   
Qatar insurance sector, as is the case with the overall insurance market in the GCC, is full 
of prospects and potential for growth as a result of three interrelated elements: steady 
GDP growth, massive investments earmarked for the coming years as part of economic 
diversification and active involvement and support of the government of the insurance 
industry through the work undertaken by QFC.  The increased awareness and visibility of 
the sector and the expansion in takaful and re-takaful markets will help to capture this 
fast-growing insurance market on many levels, life and non-life as well as individual and 
corporate. These changes will increase the sector’s contribution to the economy and to 
employment which remains very limited.   
However, whether the infrastructure is available in Qatar or in the GCC region, in terms 
of human resources, skills and knowledge to capture this potential is uncertain. It is also 
not clear whether the appropriate legislative and regulatory frame is in place. It could be 
argued that focusing on bringing international players into the market through the QFC is 
not the best way to create the necessary local infrastructure to support the development of 
the financial sector.  Mergers, joint ventures and regional cooperation among GCC 
companies is the best way forward to create regional capacity that can sustain the long-
term prospects of the region.  
The Islamic insurance market’s potential is massive but needs to be underpinned by clear 
Shariah directives and procedures.  Another challenge to the policy of diversification is 
the limited ability of Qatar’s private sector to reinvest the liquidity abundance.  This 
means that much of this wealth will remain in government hands and a large part will be 
invested through the Qatar Investment Fund.  Qatar is committed to and focused on 
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encouraging and supporting the expansion of the private sector in order to take full 
advantage, in the long term, of this abundance of liquidity. However, limited domestic 
opportunities make a strong case for further cooperation and consolidation among the 
GCC economies.  The fragmented insurance market and the duplications of financial and 
investment companies across the GCC region will benefit immensely in terms of 
competitiveness and efficiency from increased mergers and cooperation.     
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Chapter Six 
 
The Contribution of the Qatari Financial Sector to Economic 
Diversification 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the previous chapters focused on each sub-unit of Qatar’s financial sector 
and its development and contribution to the economy. In order to complete the analysis, 
the focus of this chapter is on the overall role and function of the sector in the economy 
and its contribution to the government’s economic diversification policy. In other words, 
this chapter will attempt an inclusive assessment of the main objective of the study as to 
how well-posed the financial sector is to contribute to economic diversification. This will 
be undertaken in two ways: firstly, by appraising the performance of the sector against 
three main measures: contribution to economic growth and its share of GDP, employment 
generation and private sector expansion. The discussion reveals that despite the 
significant changes and contributions the sector has made towards the economy, and in 
particular towards economic diversification, it is still limited in its ability and faces many 
challenges.  Aware of these challenges and constraints, the government made the decision 
in 2005 to create the QFC, as part of its effort to modernise and enhance the capacity and 
competitiveness of the financial sector as an essential element of its diversification 
strategy.  Secondly, the chapter will delve into the expected role of QFC and its strategy 
towards achieving the Qatari government’s objective.   
 
The QFC has been instituted as an onshore finance free-zone where international 
financial institutions can set up 100 percent owned businesses and transact with Qatari as 
well as off-shore entities. This model has been created imitating similar entities created 
by Dubai and Bahrain.  The Qatari government believes that QFC will act as a tool to 
stimulate finance sector growth in the country and will in turn become an agent of 
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diversification.  At present, the financial sector accounts for less than ten percent of the 
country’s total GDP.  The Qatari government aims to push QFC to the front of the race 
for financial prominence among Bahrain, Qatar and Dubai.  While Bahrain has an 
advantage as the earliest starter of the off-shore finance centre model, Dubai has a 
reputation for a highly-diversified economy.  However, Dubai’s current financial crisis 
might dampen enthusiasm for the city and undermine investors’ confidence.  The QFC is 
still in its earliest stages and its impact is still limited, nonetheless its strategy and role 
will have a direct impact on the direction of the development of the sector.  As mentioned 
previously, some of the interviewees representing local businesses expressed reservations 
towards QFC.  It will be very interesting to observe how the government can balance the 
needs of local businesses with its desire to transform Qatar into a significant financial 
player.    
 
 
6.2 Assessing the Role of the Qatari Financial Sector 
The financial sector contributes to the overall economy in direct and indirect ways.  
Financial intermediaries are essentially profit-oriented businesses which generate income 
through value-adding services provided to customers and their profits get accounted for 
in the national accounts of the country. In addition to this the investments made by these 
entities get added to the national product.   As for the indirect ways in which the financial 
sector contributes to economic development, these include the generation of employment 
and the supply of credit to businesses, which in turn add to national product.  This section 
discusses and analyses these important ways in which the financial sector contributes to 
the economy – contribution to GDP, generation of employment and private sector 
expansion. 
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6.2.1 Contribution to Gross Domestic Product 
Economic diversification and financial sector development is geared towards moving 
Qatar’s economy away from its heavy dependence on oil and gas and creating a multi-
sector economy.  The hydrocarbon industry’s dominance of the economy can be seen 
clearly from Chart 6.1.  The contribution of the oil and gas sector has been consistently 
over half of the total GDP during recent years. However, since the deliberate 
implementation of economic diversification small declines in the relative share of oil and 
gas sectors and increases in the relative share of other sectors in the economy are 
observable.  The share of other sectors increased to 42.68 percent in 2006 and to 43.36 
percent in 2007.  Qatar is one of the emerging economies in the region, which include 
Bahrain and the UAE, which share the same initiative to deploy the resources created 
through oil income in developing other sectors so that their economies become more 
diversified and thus “Convert the limited and non-renewable oil and gas resources into 
sustainable development and prosperity” (Aissaoui: 2009).  However in 2008, mostly due 
to record oil and gas prices, the contribution of the oil and gas sectors increased steeply, 
to 61.69 percent.  
 
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
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Decreasing the dominance of the oil and gas sector in favour of non-oil sectors is a long-
term prospect and one which necessitates a successful partnership with the private sector.  
Despite this apparent dominance of the hydrocarbon industry in the GDP of the country, 
Chart 6.2 shows one area where government policy has already had a positive impact.  
The change in distribution of credit facilities between 2004 and 2008 in favour of the 
private sector is noticeable from the chart.  We can see that the service sector was given a 
major boost in lending, growing by 241 percent, while contractors and the real estate 
sector grew by 193 percent and 211 percent respectively.  In comparison, the public 
sector saw the smallest increase in credit during the five-year period of 119 percent.  This 
shows the increased role of banks in supporting private activities as part of the 
implementation of the diversification policy.  
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
The financial sector has increased its contribution to the economy through investing in 
domestic and foreign markets; an increase in capital investment in the country by 
accumulating capacities and asset bases.  As seen in Chart 6.3, domestic investments of 
banks in Qatar between the period 2004 and 2008 increased 150 percent. The total 
domestic investment of banks in Qatar in the year 2004 was less than QAR nine billion, 
growing in a five year period to over QAR 22 billion. 
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Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
 
These investments are essentially in financial instruments. In addition to this, the banks 
have also been investing significant resources in fixed assets as they have expanded their 
operations as shown in Chart 6.4. The total fixed asset investment undertaken by all 
banks together was QAR 3 billion in 2008. This  
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
was an increase of over 291 percent from the QAR 771 million seen in 2004. This 
increase in capital expenditure by the banks has added to the economy’s capacity--
building efforts on the one hand and contributed to the growth of allied industries on the 
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other.  Banks have also been active investors in international markets.  The banks in 
Qatar have an active portfolio of financial instruments issued by entities present in 
foreign countries (Qatar Central Bank, 2009c).  These investments, though they do not 
have the multiplier effect typically associated with domestic investments, have 
contributed to the dilution of risks emanating from a concentration of domestic assets in 
banks’ portfolios.  Chart 6.5 shows the extent of the growth of foreign investments by 
banks in Qatar. 
 
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
 
Total foreign investment by banks in 2008 was QAR 26.8 billion. This was an increase of 
over 264 percent from the QAR seven billion seen in 2004.  It can be observed that the 
banks hold a larger share of their portfolio in the form of foreign, rather than domestic 
instruments. This, as discussed in the previous chapter, is due to the limited nature of 
investment opportunities that are present in the nascent financial markets of Qatar.  The 
role of banks and other financial institutions as investors in domestic markets helps to 
increase the overall level of capital expenditure in the country and has a multiplier effect 
which benefits other industries as well (Frank et al., 2007).  On the other hand, the 
investments in foreign economies by banks help to diversify their asset bases.  The 
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present climate in the international market will help shift focus onto investments in the 
region and in emerging markets as opposed to Western countries.   
 
The discussion above reveals an improvement in credit advances in favour of the private 
sector as well as an increase of non-oil and gas sectors in the economy.  This is a good 
indicator that the government is moving towards achieving its ultimate objective of 
creating a multi-sector economy, albeit slowly.  A significant and direct indicator to 
assess this diversification of the economy is through the value-addition generated towards 
the GDP.  Chart 6.6 shows the contribution of the finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services sectors to Qatar’s GDP.  As can be observed from the below chart, the 
contribution of the entire sector to the GDP was QAR 37.02 billion in the year 2008 at 
current prices.  The global slowdown and the sharp fall in investors’ appetite for risk, 
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
along with the reversal in the real estate sector seen during  2008, affected the financial 
sector as a whole, resulting in the decline of the contribution to GDP from 12.32 percent 
in 2007 to 9.94 percent in 2008.  Even though the absolute level of contribution increased 
at a healthy pace of 16 percent, the sharp decline in relative contribution was due to the 
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sector lagging behind the other sectors in the economy.  However, a better understanding 
of sector contribution can be seen from the share of financial services in the country’s 
non-oil and gas GDP, as shown in Chart 6.7.  It can be seen that the finance sector’s 
contribution to non-oil and gas GDP increased at a steady pace from 18.87 percent in 
2004 to 28.42 percent in 2007. Nonetheless, the trend was reversed in 2008 when the 
contribution declined to 25.95 percent.  If the oil and gas factor is taken out of the 
equation, the growth of the financial sector during a five-year period from less than 19 
percent to around 26 percent is notable.   
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
While a direct contribution to GDP could be easily monitored from the national accounts, 
the indirect contribution of the financial sector to the economic product can only be 
inferred from the data.  Qatari banks were fulfilling one of their most important 
functions; that of channelling credit to businesses and individuals and translating savings 
into investments.  In a market such as Qatar’s, where investors tend to prefer less volatile 
investments and where financial investments such as equities are less popular, banks have 
played a very important role by taking deposits and lending to businesses and individuals 
in need.  Bank credit typically produces a much larger impact due to the multiplier effect.  
Domestic bank credit increased 502 percent between 2004 and 2008 as seen in Chart 6.8.  
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The expansion of credit by banks makes capital easily available and contributes indirectly 
to growth in GDP.  However, the banks in Qatar expanded credit at a pace that exceeded 
the growth in deposits and banks were lending out of their own capital.   
 
 
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
 
This massive expansion in credit contributed significantly to the surge in GDP which on a 
current prices basis rose by 44 percent in 2008. However as real estate turned down and 
other businesses suffered due to global slowdown, the banks suffered from a liquidity 
crunch and the Qatari government was obliged to infuse capital into all major banks in 
the country (QNB Capital, 2009).  Notwithstanding the arguments regarding the prudence 
behind embarking on relentless credit expansion by banks (Standard and Poor’s 2008) it 
is evident that the credit expansion per se played an important role in the sharp rise seen 
in Qatar’s GDP in recent years. Banks have been instrumental in helping Qatar recover 
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from economic slowdown through sustaining the supply of credit in spite of the increase 
in risks associated with lending.  
 
It can be observed from Chart 6.9 below that the credit quantity which declined 
marginally during the first two months of 2009 had already started to increase in March 
2009.  This is quite contrary to the behaviour of banks in the US witnessed during the 
same period.  Kahn (1991) states “Fed does not control the availability of bank loans. 
Unexpected changes in the desired mix of loans and securities in banks' portfolios may 
partly or completely offset Federal Reserve actions to restrain or stimulate the economy”.  
On the contrary the banks in Qatar have managed to sustain the flow of credit even 
during the adverse economic climate. This is expected to contribute towards earlier 
recovery in the economy in comparison with the developed economies. Since July 2008, 
the ratio of advance to deposits has been consistently above one.  Thus the banks have 
not allowed the decline in deposits to affect their lending ability.  This is helped by the 
recapitalisation of banks in October 2008 (QNB Capital, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
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Another important indirect contribution of the financial sector, particularly the banking 
subsector, is that it is the main channel through which the monetary policy formulated by 
the central bank gets transcribed into action. However, as mentioned previously, the 
national currency is pegged to the US Dollar and, subsequently, monetary policy changes 
in Qatar closely resemble those carried out by the Federal Reserve in the US.  Inflation in 
Qatar was in double digits due to the sharp run-up in asset prices before they pulled back 
in 2008.  Chart 6.10 shows the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index during 
recent years. 
 
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
Qatar Central Bank (QCB) implements a number of monetary measures including 
changes in repo rates, changes in interest rates, open market operations etc.  However, the 
quantity of money in circulation is influenced by the monetary policy changes made by 
the QCB through changes in lending and deposit rates carried out by the commercial 
banks in the country.  QCB also influences the credit practices of the banks and so can 
alter the quality of lending (Lybek and Morris, 2004).  Chart 6.11 shows the recent 
movements in various interest rates along with the repo rate. 
180 
 
              Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
It can be observed that the short-term interest rates including overdraft rate, bill 
discounting rate, rate on credit for less than one year etc., are altered by banks to match 
the changes in the repo rate. This function performed by the banks ensures that monetary 
policy changes get translated into changes in the quantity of money in circulation. This is 
an important monetary role played by the banks. Changes in interest rates also indirectly 
affect variables such as insurance premiums, brokerage rates etc., which are determined 
by other players in the financial sector (Mahadeva and Sinclair, 2005).  Thus the financial 
sector helps the QCB to bring about effective changes in the monetary condition of the 
country.  In other words, the financial sector micro units act as the conduits through 
which the effects of monetary policy changes trickle down to the final consumer in the 
economy. 
 
6.2.2 Contribution to Employment 
Financial intermediaries have played an important socio-economic role by extending 
financial services to a variety of businesses, thereby stimulating entrepreneurship among 
the local population.  Banks and other financial institutions have also nurtured local talent 
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through employment and have improved the employability of the population through 
training and development programmes. This has contributed to an increase in 
productivity of the local population, which in turn has improved their earning capacity.  It 
can be observed from Chart 6.12 that labour productivity in Qatar has been the fastest 
growing among comparable GCC economies. 
 
 
 
       Source: Harb (2008) 
 
 
One specific noteworthy socio-economic role played by the financial sector is that of 
employer of a female workforce. It is identified that about one-third of the total 
workforce in Qatar’s banks are female (Qatar Statistical Authority, 2008).  About 31 
percent of Qatari banks’ employees are drawn from the female population, while 
European banks in the country have a higher percentage (46 percent) of females in their 
workforce.  About 22 percent of the workforce employed by foreign insurance companies 
is female while the percentage is lower at 14 percent and 16 percent for Qatari insurance 
companies and Arabic Insurance companies respectively. The national average for female 
employees among the workforce is much lower at 12 percent.  
Chart 6.13 below shows the distribution of the labour force between the various 
industries and sectors in the economy. It can be observed that the construction sector 
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accounts for over one third of the total labour force in the economy. Financial 
intermediation, which includes banks, insurance companies, brokerage houses, money 
exchange companies and the stock exchange and allied services, accounts for a little over 
one percent of the total work force.  Thus, in terms of total workforce, the financial sector 
does not account for any significant percentage. This is an area where labour reform and 
policy of Qatarisation of the workforce could make quite an impact.  This would 
naturally require an appropriate strategy of training and development of the Qatari 
workforce and a change in ethics in favour of seeking employment in the private sector.  
Qataris still prefer employment in the public sector based on a belief that it is more 
prestigious.  QFC is expected to play a big role in the training and development of local 
talent to work in financial services. The phenomenal economic growth witnessed in 
Qatar in recent years and the chronic shortages in the labour market create a unique and 
challenging situation for the Qatari government, as it attempts to create a competitive 
financial centre and diversify its economy away from the hydrocarbon sector. The 
ambitious policy of Qatarization and the determination to develop a vibrant labour 
workforce are at the centre of the government efforts in its strategic policy of 
diversification and labour nationalization. 
The key challenge facing Qatar as it endeavours to develop the labour market is to 
formulate policies and reforms that will help develop a domestic workforce with the 
skills and incentives needed to work in the economy’s most important and competitive 
positions. The extraordinary economic growth over recent years is creating a high level of 
demand for skilled labour, which continues to exceed the supply available among Qataris 
and is creating shortages for qualified Qataris to lead the nation’s industries. The 
composition of the labour market where the state provides generous public sector 
employment diminishes incentives for Qataris to acquire valuable skills and to work in 
the private sector. This is holding back the development of Qatar’s financial hub 
ambitions and limiting the contribution of the financial sector to economic growth and 
diversification.  
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Qatar is working hard to overcome these constraints and to develop its workforce by 
subsidizing the establishment of local branch campuses of leading western universities. 
The Qatari government needs to move faster in its effort to highlight the advantageous of 
working in the private sector and provide generous incentives for its citizens to develop 
the professional skills needed in the financial sector in order to lessen its dependence on 
foreign professionals and develop a workforce capable of competing in the international 
marketplace. It needs to spend more on education and training, which are vital to the 
strategic national objective of Qatarization and the successful participation in the global 
economy. Countries with similar GDP per capita levels invest on average twice as much 
in their students, which means that Qataris will join the labour market with less 
preparation than their counterparts from other countries (Berrebi et al, 2009). The 
government needs to accelerate the waiting time for government jobs and advance the 
educational and professional training required to obtain jobs outside the government in 
order to make Qatar a competitive financial hub and more successful in its efforts for 
economic growth and diversification. Labour reform will help generate jobs, employment 
stability and boost confidence in economic growth. Flexible labour laws would also boost 
productivity and efficiency and put Qatar’s economy on a strong growth path. 
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Source: Qatar Statistical Authority (2007) 
 
 
Chart 6.14 shows the total number of employees in all four groups of banks and the 
percentage of Qataris among those employees.  
 
 
 
 
Qatar Statistical Authority (2008) 
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Qatari banks, as would be expected, employ the greatest number of employees, followed 
by European banks. The other Arab banks employ 412 persons while foreign banks 
account for only 77 employees.  We see that about 26 percent of Qatari banks’ employees 
are drawn from the local population. The percentage of Qatari employees in Arab banks 
is 18 percent.  European banks have only ten percent of employees from among the local 
population while other foreign banks have a slightly higher ratio at 14 percent.  The 
average percentage of Qataris among employees in the banking sector in Qatar is 17 
percent.  It is obvious that foreign and European banks prefer to employ non-Qataris 
while Qatari and Arab banks show a higher affinity to Qatari employees. 
 
Chart 6.15 below shows the total number of employees on the payrolls of different 
groups of insurance companies and the percentage of Qataris among them.  We see that 
Qatari insurance companies are the largest with total employee strength of 559. Arab 
insurance companies employ a total of 56 persons, while the foreign insurance companies 
have just nine employees in total.  About 16 percent of employees of Qatari insurance 
companies are drawn from among the local population, while the Arab and Foreign 
insurance companies do not have any Qatari employees on their rolls. Insurance 
companies have 624 employees in total. 
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Qatar Statistical Authority (2008) 
 
 
The following chart (Chart 6.16) shows the average salary paid per employee for each 
group of banks and insurance companies. It can be observed that Qatari banks pay the 
highest average salary followed by European banks, other foreign banks and Arab banks. 
Among the insurance companies, Qatari companies pay the highest average salary per 
employee followed by European, foreign and Arab companies. The average salary of a 
bank employee is QAR 175,118 while that of an insurance company employee is QAR 
165,295. The average salary in Qatar is QAR 94,099. The average salary in the financial 
sector is QAR 139,560.  This shows that the financial sector pays significantly higher 
than most other businesses in Qatar. 
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Qatar Statistical Authority (2008) 
 
 
 
The above discussion indicates that although the sector employs a high percentage of 
Qataris who are paid the highest average salaries, its overall contribution to employment 
is very limited.  This is one of the challenges facing this sector as an essential component 
of diversification; it needs to expand on its ability to create job opportunities especially 
for Qataris.    
 
6.2.3 Private Sector Expansion 
 
The government of Qatar has been trying to increase private sector participation since 
2001 and has gradually either fully or partially privatized key institutions. It has 
transferred the responsibility of the state-owned electricity and water corporations to an 
independent authority; it partially privatized Industries Qatar and Qatar Gas, privatized 
telecommunications and Qatar fuel Company. Nonetheless, the private sector continues 
to represent a small portion of the economy.  In this context the strategy of the 
government through the QFC is to focus on financial services as a means to expand 
private business activities and increase the size of the private sector in the economy. 
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Due to the paucity of data that directly covers the growth and development of the private 
sector, one of the ways to assess the expansion of the private sector is through the credit 
facilities that banks advance.  Qatar has traditionally relied on the public sector for its 
economic growth and banks were used as sources to fund public sector enterprises.  
However, in tune with the government’s policy of diversifying away from the public 
sector, the banks have been actively promoting credit expansion for private sector.  
During the period between 2003 and 2008, private sector credit, as a part of the total 
credit portfolio of the banks, increased from 54 percent in 2003 to 80 percent in 2007. 
Due to the contraction of the global economy, the credit off-take of the private sector 
declined in 2008 and the percentage of credit facilities to the private sector declined to 77 
percent in 2008.  Chart 6.17 shows the change in total credit and sector-wise credit 
between 2003 and 2008.  
 
 
 
Qatar Statistical Authority (2008) 
 
 
It can be seen that total credit increased by 380 percent. Total credit to the private sector 
increased by 586 percent, while credit extended to the public sector only increased by 
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138 percent. This shows the clear push given by the banks to the private sector credit in 
Qatar.  
The public sector includes credit extended to the government, government institutions, 
semi-government institutions and public sector enterprises which are majority owned by 
the government.  It is can be seen from Chart 6.18 that direct bank credit extended to the 
government has been on the decline almost consistently since July 2008.  The 
government has realised the tight liquidity condition in the market and has purposefully 
shrunk its credit requirements of banks sharply.  A similar trend is witnessed in the credit 
off-take of government institutions and semi-government institutions.  On the other hand, 
public sector enterprises have been allowed to enjoy small increases in credit supplied to 
them.  However the overall public sector credit increase has lagged behind the increase 
seen in the credit extended to private sector since the economic slowdown set in.  
 
 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
 
Apart from direct credit, the banks also lend to public and private enterprises through the 
purchase of securities issued by government and private companies.  Banks’ investment 
in government securities has been stable during recent years.  Chart 6.19 shows the size 
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of investment in government-issued financial securities and private sector financial 
securities. 
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank, 2009b 
 
While the claims on account of financial securities issued by the government remained 
stable below the QAR five billion level, the investment in private sector financial 
securities increased 227 percent between 2004 and 2008.  This is in line with the push 
towards private sector lending which the banks embarked on in 2003.   
 
The above discussion suggests an important but limited contribution of Qatar’s financial 
sector to economic diversification.  The mall size of the market and the limited economic 
opportunities, in addition to the constraints of the labour market, mean it will take more 
time and effort on the part of the government and the private sector to take advantage of 
the opportunities and potential that exists for the sector in the Gulf region and the Arab 
region as a whole.  In this context the question remains: is the creation of QFC the best 
option to direct and impact on the growth and development of the sector as part of the 
strategy of economic diversification? The following discussion will attempt to answer 
this crucial question.        
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6. 3 The Role of Qatar Financial Centre 
The government of Qatar has been promoting QFC as an integral part of Qatar’s future 
economic prosperity and as part of its strategy to increase the role of the financial sector 
as a main contributor to its strategy of economic diversification.  It is evident that the 
government is pinning its hopes on QFC quite strongly and backing it with huge 
investments in infrastructure, and it is expected to continue to grow rapidly over the next 
few years, fuelled by large-scale investment (Qatar Financial Centre, 2009a).   The 
government states that QFC has been created “to support the development of Qatar and 
the wider region, develop local and regional markets, and strengthen the links between 
the energy-based economies and global financial markets” (Qatar Financial Centre, 
2009a).  The reasons for the crucial role that QFC is expected to play in Qatar are 
multiple. QFC is expected to become a lynch-pin of the government’s highly ambitious 
diversification policy.  On the other hand, QFC is also expected to leverage the growth 
which the GCC region is expected to undergo in order to gain foreign revenue and 
service exports for Qatar.  These two points, though not spelt out in so many words by 
the authorities are at the core of the importance attributed to QFC by the government and 
other authorities in the country. In addition, QFC is expected to be heavily involved in 
enhancing the competitiveness of the sector by attracting foreign capital, promoting 
transparency, improving regulation of the sector and promoting Qatar brand.   This 
section analyses these expected roles in detail. 
 
6.3.1 Enabler of Diversification 
All of the GCC countries, and particularly the three dynamic ones: Qatar, the UAE and 
Bahrain, have been following a policy of economic diversification for over a decade. As 
mentioned previously, the decline in crude oil prices in the 1980s drove home the point 
that crude oil could be an important resource behind economic development but may not 
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remain so forever.  Since then the GCC countries have realised the need to diversify their 
way out of dependence on fossil fuels.  For Qatar, the government has been investing 
significant capital into various industries to jump-start the growth of those services and 
manufacturing sectors not dependent on oil and gas sectors.  QFC forms an integral part 
of the government’s economic diversification drive and this crucial importance of QFC 
can be understood from the data presented below.  It can be observed (Chart 6.20) that 
the economic diversification policy undertaken by many GCC countries has had a limited 
impact.  
 
 
Source: Saif (2009) 
 
 
It is noticeable that the oil-dependence measured in terms of oil and gas sectors 
contribution to country’s GDP has grown for every GCC country except Oman. For 
Qatar, the diversification policy is of greater importance than for any other GCC 
economy because it is the country with the highest degree of oil-dependence. Oil and Gas 
sectors formed 57.3 percent of the total GDP in 2006.  
 
The chart below (Chart 6.21) shows that the contribution of the oil and gas sector to 
Qatar’s GDP has grown in spite of the massive investments made in developing 
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alternative sectors.  In 2008, due to record oil prices, the oil and gas sector GDP was 
61.69 percent of the total GDP.  It is hoped that the creation of a world-class 
infrastructure for international finance companies to come in and set up a base in order to 
tap the opportunities provided by the region in general and the country in particular is 
considered an important strategy to ensure the development of the finance sector in the 
country.  This in turn is expected to increase the contribution of non-oil and gas sectors 
and lead to a decline in the degree of oil-dependence of the nation.  
 
Source: Qatar Central Bank (2009) 
 
Up until recently, Dubai has been considered the most successful in its diversification 
strategy and the model to follow.  Even though Dubai has a relatively smaller portion of 
its GDP drawn from oil-based businesses, the government has encouraged investments 
from abroad and from within sectors such as trade, manufacturing and services.  
However, the current financial crisis gripping Dubai has sent tremors around the global 
equity market with the shock request by Dubai’s flagship government-owned holding 
company, Dubai World, for a suspension on repayment of part of its debt.  The news 
resulted in a sell-off in Asia and heavy losses on Wall Street.  The FTSE 100 had fallen 
by 2.3 percent and the Nikkei by 3.8 percent, while the Dubai and Abu Dhabi markets 
dropped 7.3 percent and 8 percent respectively (FT: 2009: 27 Nov ).  Such a severe 
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reaction, to what some might consider a “Little pebble in the Gulf” is an indication of the 
fragility of the global market which remain over-leveraged and undercapitalized (ibid).  
In a way Dubai’s USD 80 billion debt obligations to finance its diversification plans pales 
in comparison to Leman Brothers USD 613 billion of liabilities.  Abdulrahman Al-Saleh, 
Director General of Dubai’s Department of Finance, indicated that global markets had 
overreacted to the news but admitted that creditors to Dubai World would be affected in 
the short-term (FT: 2009).  In order to ease fears about its banking system the UAE 
central bank set up an emergency liquidity facility and said it would provide lenders with 
access to fresh liquidity and pledged to stand behind UAE banks and branches of foreign 
groups (ibid).  Abu Dhabi is coming under increasing pressure to come to the rescue of 
Dubai, however, it has always insisted that such issues have to be dealt with at federal 
level for the seven Emirates and it would not simply write Dubai a blank check.   
Nonetheless, the UAE needs to act swiftly because of the repercussion of the crisis on 
investors’ confidence and on the financial stability of the region.   
Qatar, however, is quite different from Dubai in its gradual and more cautious approach 
towards its diversification strategy, additionally; it has the gas reserves to support its 
long-term economic plans.  QFC’s involvement in the promotion of the country’s 
financial sector through participation from international financial institutions in order to 
increase the contribution of financial sector to the overall GDP of the country must be 
approached with the same prudence that has characterised and differentiated Qatar from 
its neighbour, Dubai.  Qatar Financial Centre is in an excellent position to take 
advantage of the meltdown in Dubai and increase its market share in the race for the 
Gulf financial centres’ from its rival Dubai. The severe impact of the financial crises on 
Dubai’s economy presents Qatar with a golden opportunity to compete with Dubai as the 
primary influence on the Gulf financial sector. Dubai, the once-gilded emirate, sees itself 
as a modern financial centre, yet reverts to authoritarianism and censorship in the face of 
bad press, and attempts to silence western media who question the performance and 
handling of its economy. Dubai’s failure to provide free markets for investors by making 
access to information more readily available, open and transparent is causing serious 
damage to its economy. Confidence would be difficult to regain in Dubai, since the 
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failure of Dubai World to honour its obligations shook the international investment 
community’s faith in the emirate. Experienced analysts no longer trust the government 
statistics, claiming they do not fully reflect the amount Dubai owes its foreign creditors. 
While Dubai’s economic miracle staggers and stumbles towards debt Armageddon, Qatar 
is quietly emerging from its neighbour’s shadow, positioning itself as a rapidly 
diversifying, dynamic economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its most 
recent assessment of the economic outlook for the Gulf, said that Qatar’s economy would 
grow by 18 percent in 2009, and would be the only member of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council to record double-digit growth. GDP in Qatar has increased on average 11.8 
percent annually over the last three years, with per capita income reaching an astonishing 
$103,500 in 2008 (Washington Post Global: 2010: 27 June).  
Qatar is also on course to be the regional financial centre of choice, according to Stuart 
Pierce, Chief Executive Officer and Director General of QFC. Its access to a varied array 
of energy and infrastructure-related projects make Qatar more likely to be an attractive 
proposition for investors, a point that the QFC is keen to exploit (interview, July 2008). 
Unlike Dubai, Licensed firms in QFC are an integral part of the Qatari economy, they can 
opt to operate outside of the QFC’s immediate vicinity and take deposits, offer insurance 
and manage retail assets, which is what makes QFC different from Dubai, and better 
equipped to compete in the long run and capture a larger market share. 
The QFC have done much the same in their bid to snatch Dubai’s crown as the money 
centre of the oil world. The cream of the British judiciary, a chunk of Britain’s Financial 
Services Authority, and an army of HSBC veterans have been recruited to create a 21st 
City finance hub in Doha. Qatar regulator, Philip Thorp, is a moral refugee from Dubai, 
where he blew the whistle on underhand property dealing and has since been amply 
vindicated by events. 
Through the QFC Authority, civil and commercial disputes are dealt with by the QFC 
Court, presided over by Lord Wolf, the former Chief Justice of England and Wales. Sir 
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William Blair, brother of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, chairs the regulatory 
tribunal.  
Unlike DIFC, Qatar Financial Centre has developed a technology-based platform to serve 
the insurance and reinsurance market, which also includes Sharai-compliant Takaful. 
QFC has identified that insurance represents a gap in the market as a lot of insurance 
premiums go elsewhere in the world. Creating a regional market for insurance will attract 
brokerages to the QFC and could lead to Qatar becoming a regional force, according to 
Steve Martin, Director of Marketing and Corporate Communications at QFC. Creating a 
regional market for insurance will attract brokerages to QFC and could lead Qatar to 
becoming a regional financial force.  
As it is new to the market, Qatar can sidestep legacy processes and outdated technology. 
The QFC is building an 11,000 square foot teaching facility in Doha for partner 
organisations that currently include the institute of Cost and Management Accountants 
and the Chartered Insurance Institute, both from Britain. Qatar is also  building the new 
Barwa financial district in the new Lusail city and QFC is on track to become a much 
bigger player in regional financial services as well as a more formidable competitor in 
global financial services.  As the Dubai phenomenon ends in a mangle of half-built 
towers and unpaid debts, regional leadership is shifting along the Gulf cost to the 
seriously rich gas sheikdom of Qatar. 
By 2012, Qatar would be producing 5.5m barrels a day of oil-equivalent: half Saudi 
Arabia’s output. Qatar aims to build a hi-tech industrial hub manned by home-grown 
engineers and chemist. Qatar economy has been growing 20pc annually, the fastest in the 
world and the lure for banks is to play a full part in the $130bn of projects scheduled over 
the next five years( Gulf Times, 2010). 
Qatar has sharpened its regional competitive edge with the Cabinet’s amendment to 
investment law allowing 100 percent foreign ownership in the sectors of technical and 
consultation services, information and technology, and distribution. The amendment also 
loosens the controls on foreign ownership in nine other sectors, broadening ministers’ 
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scope in lowering barriers to foreign ownership (The Peninsula, 2001). Qatar’s decision 
paves the way for attracting foreign capital otherwise restricted by ownership limitations 
in the region. This development is extremely timely, as Qatar strategically positions itself 
as a safe haven for foreign investors. Qatar is ranked as the highest in the Middle East in 
terms of business confidence (Ibid).  
In order for Qatar to succeed in its endeavour of attracting foreign investment, it is 
beneficial to undergo further reforms to streamline the ability of foreigners to establish 
businesses in the country. Sustainable development of infrastructure is also of major 
significance in drawing a larger number of foreign investors from Dubai.  
Qatar, however, is quite different from Dubai in its gradual and more cautious approach 
towards its diversification strategy, additionally; it has the gas reserves to support its 
long-term economic plans.  QFC’s involvement in the promotion of the country’s 
financial sector through participation from international financial institutions in order to 
increase the contribution of financial sector to the overall GDP of the country must be 
approached with the same prudence that has characterised and differentiated Qatar from 
its neighbour, Dubai.   
 
6.3.2 Conduit to leverage GCC growth 
Qatar’s GDP grew at a rate of 12.7 percent during 2008, 9 percent during 2009 and is 
projected to grow 18.5 during 2010. This massive growth witnessed in the country since 
2000 and the healthy growth rate seen in the GCC region has created a wide-spread need 
for financial services in the region.  As the growth rate is expected to be healthy for other 
countries in the region and the growth rate of Qatar is expected to be 18.5 percent in 2010 
(Chart 6.22) it is believed that the country and the region may see an increased need for 
financial services.  Qatar is already a country with one of the largest per-capita income 
levels in the world.  As the growth of the economy accelerates, the private wealth of 
individuals in the country may also see a steep rise. This could give rise to an increase not 
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only in the quantity of financial services demanded but also the quality.  In order to meet 
the increased 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2009) 
 
 
quantitative demand, the government has to ensure that more financial services firms are 
provided with licences, and to meet the increased qualitative demand, it should ensure 
that international financial services companies with long track records and regulatory 
compliance are provided permission to operate in the country.  As these kinds of 
international financial institutions find the domestic corporate law and business services 
unappealing, there is a need to create a niche where they could enjoy a set of services of 
international standards and be given adequate freedom to seek and compete for a larger 
share of the market.  The government believes that QFC fulfils this need of international 
financial institutions and encourages them to set up a base in the country thereby 
leveraging the expected steep growth of domestic and regional economies. The 
government states that “Apart from Qatar itself, the QFC also provides a conduit for 
financial services providers to access to over USD 1 trillion of investment in the rapidly-
growing financial markets across the GCC as a whole over the next decade” (QFC, 
2009a).  It needs to be seen how giving these international institutions access to the pie in 
the region will help develop Qatar’s financial sector to the benefit of Qataris and the 
region.  Perhaps more attention should be given to meeting this expected increase in 
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demand from within the region itself by enhancing the capacity of the companies that 
already exist in the region.   
6.3.3   Attract Foreign Financial Institutions 
Most of the GCC countries, including Qatar and the UAE, have corporate laws that are 
heavily biased in favour of the local population.  Majority stakes in every company in 
these countries have to be owned by a local individual or company.  This places serious 
restrictions on foreign interest in these nations.  The only legal way for foreign financial 
institutions to operate in these countries is through joint ventures with local companies.  
This is seen as a factor in hampering the growth of many industries, particularly the 
financial services sector.  In order to circumvent these provisions in local law, countries 
such as Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai have created financial free zones – Qatar Financial 
Centre, Bahrain Financial Harbour and Dubai International Financial Centre respectively 
to allow international financial institutions to set up and be entirely owned by foreign 
nationals and foreign companies.   
It is believed that QFC would attract foreign financial institutions because of the liberal 
foreign ownership policies and the scope for growth in Qatar and the GCC. Also, it is 
evident that companies that are incorporated within a country that is part of the GCC are 
treated preferentially over foreign companies while being considered for licences by 
other countries’ regulatory authorities.  Thus the foreign institutions that get incorporated 
in QFC would gain a local identity which may prove useful to obtain licences and set up 
bases in other fast-growing economies in the region including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait 
and Oman. 
 
6.3.4. Promote Transparency 
One of the main reasons for the hesitance of international financial institutions to set up 
base in the region in spite of the explosive growth opportunities is the lack of 
transparency in the system. While local legislations are quite different from those usually 
seen in the UK, the US or European countries, poor governance and lack of transparency 
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have been major problems for foreign institutions in many GCC countries including 
Qatar.  Besides, the entire process of licensing is perceived as difficult in nature with no 
clear guidance on the requirements.  This has affected the growth and entry of foreign 
institutions in Qatar.   
 
However, QFC has special legislative and judiciary authorities that are structured 
perfectly in line with the practices commonly found in developed financial markets, 
which makes it easier for the financial institutions to incorporate and manage.  The 
governance and transparency standards in GCC countries need much improvement, 
however Qatar is still better off than Bahrain, Oman and the UAE in terms of governance 
(Saif, :2009).  According to the World Bank ranking  of GCC countries in terms of ease 
of doing business, Qatar ranks ahead of Kuwait, the UAE and Oman but lags behind 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the GCC (World Bank: 2009).  The constitution of a 
separate regulatory structure and judiciary system for financial services on the one hand 
would help to increase the overall level of governance and transparency in the country 
but on the other it runs the risk of undermining local business.  The creation of two 
parallel systems in the country, one for foreign and one for local businesses cannot be a 
beneficial way forward for the long-term prospects of the country’s financial sector.  
Local businesses need to be supported and encouraged to comply with international 
standards and regulatory requirements, not left to operate under a less rigorous and less 
transparent system.     
 
6.3.5   The Regulatory Structure of International Standards 
Those developed countries with advanced financial markets, such as the UK and the US, 
were thought of as having established strong regulatory structures for their financial 
institutions (banks, broking houses, insurance companies, and investment houses etc.) 
which deal with customers’ funds on a regular basis.   The current global financial crisis 
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questioned the efficiency and competence of these regulatory bodies and in the process 
created a lot of scepticism about the validity and usefulness of these structures.  
Regardless of the inadequacies of the Western model, it is still the source for 
international standards that many developing countries are striving to implement.  The 
GCC countries are no exception.  Their regulatory structures are considered very fragile, 
in view of the nascent nature of their financial markets and hence their regulatory 
authorities are at the beginning of the learning curve.   
 
In a way, they are at an advantage as they can avoid the pitfalls of what happened in the 
West and can learn from the mistakes of Western regulatory bodies.  QFC was hoping to 
alleviate the regulatory risk by ensuring a high-quality regulatory infrastructure 
constructed on the basis of the existing structure in the UK and the US.  This has been the 
trend followed by all the financial free zones in the GCC including the Bahrain Financial 
Harbour and the Dubai International Financial centre.  QFC Regulatory Authority has 
created deals with regulatory agencies in the US and the UK in order to inherit their 
regulatory structure in QFC. Philip Thorpe, Chairman and CEO of QFC Regulatory 
Authority, says, “We believe it is important that an institution is being supervised by their 
home state regulator as they can offer a prudential oversight such as looking at the 
balance sheet, while we look after everything else” (Aaron, 2007).  This approach, 
considering the failure of these regulatory systems to predict or avoid the current 
financial crisis, might have to be slightly adjusted to take into account why and how these 
systems failed to protect the funds entrusted into these financial services, whether in 
banks or non-banking institutions.  Qatar, as well as the rest of the GCC, needs to 
improve on their regulatory infrastructure in order to attract international financial 
intermediaries.  This is expected to be a major contribution of QFC in its endeavour to 
enhance Qatar’s attractiveness to foreign investors.    
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6.3.6 Promote ‘Brand Qatar’ 
Qatar is actively engaged in diversifying its interests away from oil and gas based 
industries, as has already been explained.  The government has plans to spend over USD 
130 billion over the next five to seven years in a number of sectors including health, 
social welfare, education and transport.  It is believed that these investments would kick 
start the emergence of these sectors in the country which would then be followed by 
capital flow from the private sector as well as from abroad into these sectors.  Qatar is 
well-known as the emerging power-house of gas reserves and an important player among 
crude oil suppliers. However, Qatar has not been very successful in attracting foreign 
investments into non-oil and gas sectors.  Chart 6.23 below shows the comparison 
between GDP growth rate and rate of change of FDI inflow for all GCC countries along 
with the GCC average.  It can be seen that Qatar had one of the highest GDP growth rates 
during the period 2002-2006. The average GDP growth rate of Qatar was 15.5 percent 
which was second only to Kuwait whose average GDP growth rate was 18.1 percent.  
 
 
Source: Faras & Ghali (2009) 
 
 
 
In spite of this explosive growth rate Qatar has not been successful in attracting FDI 
inflows as much as its peers.  The GCC average has been a GDP growth rate of 11.22 
percent and an FDI inflow change rate of 101.67 percent on a yearly basis. However the 
FDI inflows into Qatar have grown at a below-par rate of 48.28 percent per year during 
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the five year period. The UAE, on the other hand has attained 215 percent growth rate in 
FDI inflows every year during this period inspite of having a GDP growth rate of 9.39 
percent which is much less than the regional average.  One of the reasons for this 
dichotomy between growth and inflows could be the promotion of brand.  The UAE, 
particularly Dubai, has been expending resources in promoting the country as a brand, 
particularly in the developed countries such as the US and the UK.  Qatar has recognised 
the need to promote itself but has not been very successful in implementing the plans.  It 
is believed that QFC would play an important role in promoting Qatar as a preferred 
investment destination for overseas investors and institutions.  In 2007 Qatar recorded the 
fasted growth in FDI in the MENA region of USD 1.1 billion, seven times larger than in 
2006 (The Peninsula: 27 Sept, 2008). Nonetheless, foreign investment in Qatar has 
remained confined primarily to the hydrocarbon sector and there has been very little 
foreign investment in other sectors of the economy (World Bank: 2007).  It is perhaps 
more prudent for foreign capital to invest in proven sectors of the economy than take 
risks in the more nascent ones.  
6.4   The Impact of the QFC on the Economy  
Qatar Financial Centre distinguishes itself from other peers in an important way in that 
the businesses incorporated within the QFC are allowed to transact business with clients 
outside the zone and can also deal in their currency of choice. Because of this feature, it 
is expected that the growth in QFC will be reflected in the growth of the entire financial 
sector in Qatar. In strictly off-shore financial centres, such as Dubai International 
Financial Capital (DIFC), the members are restricted to doing business with only certain 
classes of high net worth clients and those who are incorporated inside the zone. This 
places severe restrictions on the businesses and the compulsion to deal only in USD may 
also hamper the spread of benefits from the growth of DIFC into the mainstream 
domestic financial sector.  
Since its inception in 2005, 115 companies have been licensed to carry out permitted 
activities in QFC (Qatar Financial Centre, 2009b). The permitted activities are classified 
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into regulated and non-regulated activities. The regulated activities include a number of 
activities wherein the client’s funds are transferred to the service provider in some form. 
The non-regulated activities include professional services such as auditing, management 
consulting, IT services, legal services etc (Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority, 
2009). The firms seeking to indulge in regulated activities need to obtain an authorisation 
to that effect from the QFC Regulatory Authority. Of the 115 firms licensed to operate in 
QFC, 68 companies have been authorised to provide regulated services to their clients. 
The regulated activities include investment banking, investment management, private 
equity, venture capital, etc. These firms, most of which are well-established in multiple 
regulatory domains around the world, attract foreign capital into the country because of 
the inherent attractiveness and steep growth of the country. Thus they act as conduits for 
the flow of capital into the country as well as the region.  
 
QFC is the most recent financial centre among its peers. No official data is available on 
the volume of business transacted by the businesses incorporated in the financial centre.  
Therefore it is not possible to measure the direct impact of QFC on the economy.  On the 
other hand, it is believed that QFC has played an important role in the growth of the 
financial services industry in the country. As discussed earlier, the contribution of the 
financial sector to the GDP has increased steadily, except in 2008 when the global 
financial meltdown caused a decline in the financial sector’s contribution to Qatar’s 
GDP..  It is believed that the QFC would have contributed to at least some part of this 
growth in the financial services industry.  
 
QFC also includes the Qatar Finance and Business Academy (QFBA) which “is a 
specialised educational academy for the financial sector based in Doha under the auspices 
of the QFC Authority in partnership with Qatar Foundation (QF)” (Qatar Financial 
Centre, 2009c). The objective of QFBA is to impact finance knowledge to the human 
resources within the country and the region so that the country can develop into a 
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knowledge-based diversified economy. QFBA already has over 300 programmes lined up 
for the next year (Othman, 2009). These knowledge initiatives are expected to have a 
profound impact on specialised financial services in the country.  
 
6.5   Lessons from other Financial Centres  
QFC is still in its nascent years as less than five years have passed since the creation of 
the Centre. However QFC has learned and incorporated a few major points into the 
structure, taking advantage of its relatively later entry into the financial centre 
competition in the region. Bahrain has been functioning as an off-shore financial centre 
for many years as the country has made it easy for foreign financial institutions, including 
banks, to set up companies in the country which leverage their regional incorporation to 
gain entry to closer and tougher markets such as the UAE and Kuwait. DIFC was 
founded in 2004 and has been more successful in attracting foreign financial institutions, 
primarily due to the more diversified nature of Dubai’s economy of (Oxford Analytica, 
2005).  The following is a discussion of some of the lessons that Qatar has learned and 
problems it hopes to avoid in the operations of its financial centre.   
 
6.5.1   On-Shore Financial Centre 
One of the major aspects of QFC that distinguishes it from its closest rival, DIFC, is that 
QFC is not positioned as a financial free zone but as a business environment.  In a 
financial free zone such as DIFC there are restrictions imposed in terms of scope of 
operation and regulation. In particular, the firms incorporated in the DIFC are not 
allowed to do business with firms incorporated outside the Centre.  This condition is built 
in so that the firms in financial free zone do not compete directly with those incorporated 
under separate statutes (Wigglesworth, 2006).  Besides, the companies in DIFC are 
essentially required to operate from within the DIFC area. This places an extra burden in 
terms of increased cost of operations due to heavy rent for offices, as DIFC is fast 
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becoming one of the costliest office spaces in the emirate.  As DIFC aims to create a 
unified international structure, the companies in the zone are required to conduct 
transactions only in US Dollars. These restrictions and requirements have been 
considered too rigid and have hampered the growth of the financial centre.   
QFC has learnt from the experiences of DIFC and other financial centres and has, from 
the beginning, aimed to create an on-shore financial centre instead of an off-shore centre. 
This means that the companies in QFC can conduct transactions freely with companies 
outside the zone.  The QFC licensed companies are allowed to operate from anywhere in 
the country as long as they conform to certain minimum requirements.  This ensures that 
the companies are not bound to a specific area but operate from places that suit their 
budget and operations.  Business can be conducted either in the domestic currency, Qatari 
Riyals, or in US Dollars as per the choice of the company.  This helps the companies to 
indulge in both local and overseas transactions.  However, it could be perceived, as some 
of the interviewees suggested, that the operations of businesses associated with the QFC 
are in direct competition with local businesses.   
 
6.5.2   Avoidance of Over-Regulation 
The regulatory structure created by QFC and DIFC have been borrowed from well-
known regulatory structures already existing in international financial centres such as 
London. However it has been stated that these agencies have taken the most difficult 
provisions from the developed economies in their attempts to create the safest business 
environment.  This is evident from the words of Philip Thorpe, the CEO of QFC who 
states that, “I would term ourselves as ‘experienced plagiarisers’: we have looked at 
different legislation and regulatory solutions around the globe and have cherry-picked the 
best ones” (Aaron, 2007).  By ‘cherry-picking’ the best regulations from around the 
world QFC, like DIFC, has created a regulatory environment which is quite against the 
interest of the companies operating in the centre.  International Law firm, Simmons & 
Simmons suggests that, “The people who have drafted the regulations have looked at 
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other jurisdictions around the world and have taken the most heavily-regulated 
jurisdictions and applied it rather than recognising that we are in an emerging market and 
need to take baby steps” (Business Intelligence Middle East, 2009).   
The regulatory environments in centres such as London and New York have reached  the 
present stage through a process of evolution which has kept pace with the developments 
in the financial sector.  However, in a country like Qatar, where financial services other 
than banking are at nascent stages, subjecting them to the regulatory requirements of 
advanced economies could prove to be counter-productive.  This is an important lesson 
that QFC has to learn from DIFC, which has also incorporated tough regulatory 
requirements which the firms find difficult to comply with. 
 
6.5.3   Unified Regulator 
QFC is regulated by QFC Regulatory Authority that was created by a special order and 
statute of the Emir of the country, called QFC Law.  QFC Regulatory Authority has 
sweeping powers to supervise, license and regulate all firms within the QFC jurisdiction. 
This includes banks and insurance companies.  In addition to this the banks and 
intermediaries incorporated outside the QFC are regulated directly by agencies that fall 
under the Qatar Central Bank.  This diverging structure has been adopted from the 
structure created for DIFC.  However, unlike the DIFC, the firms in QFC are allowed to 
operate as on-shore finance companies, which permit them to access the same clients and 
resources as the other companies licensed by the country’s Central Bank.   
 
This, as mentioned earlier in the study, creates a dichotomy in regulatory structure as the 
two regulators are known to have different rules and requirements and have varying 
levels of severity in their approaches.  The government has already recognised the need 
to unite the regulators under a single authority and implement uniform regulatory 
procedures.  Even though it has been stated that “Qatar can be a viable financial centre 
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only if the business climate in its entirety is modernised and placed under an overall 
authority” (Perumal, 2008), the government has come to realise that the task is difficult to 
carry out under current global economic circumstances.  The IMF’s Staff Report on the 
issue states that unification of regulatory structures could be quite challenging.  
Subsequently, the plans for unification have been put on hold.  It is difficult to speculate 
on the effects of this on the progress of QFC especially as the issue of regulation is one of 
the major challenges facing financial sector development. 
 
6. 6 Conclusion 
The creation of Qatar Financial Centre is an acknowledgment that the domestic financial 
sector does not have the ability to contribute significantly to the government policy of 
economic diversification.  It has been made clear from the data and analysis presented in 
this chapter that the sector has changed and its role has grown in the economy, however 
its contribution remains limited in the three significant measures of diversification: share 
in GDP, employment generation and private sector expansion.  This could also be 
contributed to the fact that a shift in an economy dominated by the hydrocarbon industry 
needs more time to effect such substantial changes.   
 
Thus, Qatar Financial Centre has been touted as an important development in Qatar’s 
economy and a contributor to the growth of the country’s finance sector and its GDP. 
This is due to the number of crucial roles that the centre is expected to perform: as an 
enabler of economic diversification, by attracting the interest of foreign financial 
institutions into Qatar’s nascent domestic finance sector and the greater region, by 
promoting brand Qatar and attracting FDI inflows into the finance sector and other 
sectors in the economy and lastly by elevating Qatar’s transparency and governance 
standards and regulatory environment akin to the home regulatory environment in which 
the target institutions already operate.  So far QFC has attracted 115 members and its 
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short history makes it difficult to make any valid judgement on its expected success or 
failure.  To increase its chances of success and in order to differentiate itself, QFC has 
learnt or has to learn a few important points from its peers.  QFC has observed the 
problems associated with being a pure-breed off-shore finance centre and so has been 
created as an on-shore finance centre right from the beginning.  Also it has learned from 
the frictions seen in DIFC that over-regulation could become a problem considering the 
nascent nature of finance sector in the country.  However, being an on-shore centre, its 
present system of multiple regulators of the financial sector is expected to cause a 
dichotomy and regulatory risk for institutions especially as the government’s plan to unite 
the regulators under a single mandate has been put on hold.    
 
An important point to consider is the ability of this nascent domestic sector to compete 
with the type of institutions that the financial centre is expected to attract. The limited 
domestic market and small population size, especially considering the large blue-collar 
workers in the economy, limits demand and the possibility of the sector to increase its 
contribution to economic diversification be it through increased share in the GDP or 
expansion in the private sector.  It might be more prudent to create Gulf financial 
institutions by joint ventures and mergers that can enter the regional and international 
markets as competitors to well established international players, rather than give the 
opportunity to those international players to enter the region through the platforms of 
financial centres.  For the long-term economic viability of Gulf States, developing GCC 
financial companies and institutions that already operate in the market might be the more 
prudent approach.   
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
This study has demonstrated that the relationship between financial sector development 
and economic development is ultimately country specific.  Contrary to the common 
position put forward in the mainstream literature, financial sector development in Qatar 
has followed its economic development and is conditioned by that development.  In a 
hydrocarbon, one-sector economy, other economic sectors develop as a consequence of 
the growth and expansion of this main engine of growth.  Over time the relationship 
becomes more dynamic and complex and interfaces among sectors start to be determined 
by a multiple of factors.   In Qatar the financial sector is still nascent and its influence on 
the economy, although it has substantially increased over a short period of time, is still 
very limited.  The markets of the developed countries took a long time to mature and to 
establish highly-complex and advanced financial services that have provided essential 
financial instruments and products to facilitate the growth of the economy as well as to 
service the different needs of customers.  However, as the current crisis demonstrates the 
financial sector can also have devastating effects on the real economy in times of 
financial crisis.      
The prospects for the growth of the financial sector are immense due primarily to the 
strength of Qatar’s hydrocarbon industry and the planned extensive programmes of 
expenditure spearheaded by the government and its public sector in a multitude of 
sectors: infrastructure, tourism education etc., These extensive investments will increase 
demand on all types of financial intermediaries, especially insurance.  This is an immense 
opportunity for Qatar to exploit in order to increase financial sector participation in the 
economy.  Equally the challenges facing financial sector development are enormous and 
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need addressing if the potential that exists in Qatar, and in the region as whole, is to be 
captured.   
Key among these challenges is the lack of executives and managers who can handle the 
administration of public institutions that will steer that ambition, in addition to the lack of 
a local talent pool in financial services.  Like other sectors in the economy there is a 
heavy reliance on foreign labour.  All the interviewees suggested that investment in 
human capital and adopting the correct and effective training programmes is of utmost 
necessity for financial sector development and successful diversification.  In addition 
there is a need for a cultural and attitudinal change from Qataris towards employment in 
the private sector; Qataris’ employment is concentrated in the public sector.  The rigidity 
in the labour market needs to improve and the dichotomy in the economy of 
public/private, Qataris non-Qataris needs to be removed.  The modernization of the 
education system and the role of the QFC in enhancing training systems in financial 
services will be extremely beneficial to achieving such a necessary objective.    
Nonetheless, changes of this nature take time and require the correct mix of educational 
and economic incentives.  With young and fast growing national populations, job creation 
outside the public sector is a challenge faced by all GCC countries.  It is also a big 
constraint on financial sector development as Michael Mainelli suggests, “Successful 
financial centres are places with strong concentrations of financial professionals and their 
firms'.  It's the people that matter” (Lecture to Gresham College, London, 14 0ct 2009).  
Stuart Pearce, emphasising the importance of professionals says,” We need all the good 
people we can get to achieve our goal establishing a viable financial centre for Qatar” 
(Interview, July 2008).  He indicates that the uncertainty in London and New York might 
encourage talented people to move to the region.  Qatar will depend on a pool of talent 
drawn from around the world to help in implementing its vision for financial sector 
development.  But this needs to be a short-term outlook if Qatar is to create enough job 
opportunities for its nationals and establish a local capacity.   
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Also, as the study demonstrated, the potential that exists in Islamic finance (banking and 
sukuks and insurance) is immense.  However, that also requires specialists and expertise 
in Shariah law to create the regulatory frame that clarifies procedures and identifies the 
financial instruments and products that are compliant with Shariah law.  A legal frame 
that can protect investors needs to be put in place to maintain the credibility of the 
market.  The recent events in Dubai of the possible defaulting of Dubai World on some of 
its sukuk issuance seem to emphasize this point.   
Qatar’s economic fundamentals remain strong despite the global financial crisis: a deep 
pool of liquidity and openness to international investors, both necessary for stimulating 
the development of the financial sector.  Even so, successful financial centres such as 
Hong Kong and Singapore provide more than that; they provide a business environment: 
regulatory frame, a clear legal structure, physical infrastructure with well developed 
communications, transport, telecommunications and services. Qatar is investing heavily 
in order to improve and upgrade its business environment, but some of these aspects such 
as regulation, transparency and corporate governance are developing slowly.  These 
issues can also be addressed more effectively within the GCC as they are common to 
most GCC countries and it would be more effective if they were addressed collectively.   
The discussion has also demonstrated that the most effective way forward for 
implementing diversification strategy depends on the GCC speeding up their plans of 
integration, including monetary union.  Over the years a great deal of lip service has been 
paid to the concept but little has happened on the ground.  Competition and rivalry seems 
to be on the increase with the duplication of a large number of institutions and projects in 
a market that is too small to sustain such a multitude of similar companies.  The current 
crisis in the global market, combined with very healthy forecasts for these economies, is a 
unique chance to capture a bigger share in the global market.  While Europe, with its 
diversity of language, culture and economies is edging ever closer towards economic and 
political integration,  the GCC, which enjoys the advantage of having similar linguistic 
and cultural attributes and faces similar economic challenges, is unable to move forward 
in its strategy and plans for economic integration.  If Europe is able to set aside 
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differences and focus on commonalities, then the task should be much easier within this 
comparable group of countries.  Does the region really need three financial centres 
competing against each other? Dubai, Bahrain and Qatar could achieve more by 
increased cooperation among these centres rather than each vying for dominance.   
During a recent conference organised by Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 
association with the GCC Chambers of Commerce and Industries on “The impact of the 
Financial Crisis on the Gulf States Economies” - experts and key people in the region 
called for a unified stance from GCC states during this global crisis, especially as it is 
thought that Gulf States are not disclosing the extent of the impact the crisis.  The 
accumulative wealth of the hydrocarbon industry is helping them to cover the deficits.  
They also agreed on the necessity of encouraging merger plans across the GCC to 
enhance the resilience of their economies toward the crisis.  Moreover, they 
acknowledged that the single Gulf Currency will open Gulf States to new opportunities of 
cooperation (Elshamy: 2009). 
This crisis is in fact an opportunity for Gulf States to actualise their vision of many years 
for economic integration; there is a strong case as discussed in this study for the 
integration of stock markets, bond markets and merging financial companies to create 
more efficient and more competitive ones.  Gulf States need to start acting not as 
individual states but in terms of an economic bloc- similar to Europe.  That is where 
long-term sustainability and successful diversification lies for the GCC.  The possibilities 
that such an eventuality can create far outweigh the benefits that the QFC can bring to the 
country.    
However, it is very difficult, considering the short history of QFC, to make a judgment on 
the appropriateness of this model to achieve the desired objective of diversified and 
sustained development in Qatar.  The question remains as to how much an increased role 
of international players operating from Qatar will achieve in terms of creating local 
capacity and imparting their skills and expertise into the local economy.  Over the longer 
term, Qatar needs to ensure greater availability of a deep pool of skilled financial sector 
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manpower domestically.  This might not replace the need to tap talent from overseas but 
it will help develop local talent and address shortages of expertise.  Reliance on foreign 
talent to meet the demand for expertise in specialist and management positions should be 
a short-term position.  It is crucial to overcome gaps in manpower capabilities, not only 
in the financial sector in but all economic sectors.  This will not eliminate the need for 
foreign talent but it will create diversified employment opportunities for nationals.   
With the aggravation of unemployment in the Arab region, tapping into the talent that 
exists in the Arab region is crucial.  It will on the one hand alleviate the problem in the 
Arab World and at the same time provide the needed labour from within the region for 
the benefit of the region.  The Arab labour market needs to create 5.5 million job 
opportunities annually in order to tackle unemployment; however, only three million jobs 
have been created over the past two years.  There are as many as 17 million jobless in the 
Arab world - 14 percent of the total workforce (Nainar: 2009).  This is an alarming trend 
that could pose serious internal security and stability for many Arab states and the region 
as a whole.  The Arab Economic Summit held in Kuwait during 2009 stated in its final 
communiqué that setting up the Arab Common Market in 2020 would go a long way 
toward solving this problem (ibid).  The social and economic ills of this unemployment 
problem are compounded because of the lack of adequate social security in most Arab 
states.  Thus cooperation in the Arab region is required on two levels, firstly, on a GCC 
level and then on an Arab region level, if the region is not going to waste another chance 
to create a more viable economic unity.  There is a unique opportunity that must not be 
missed in the region to put aside political differences and follow the example of Europe 
to move forward in political and economic integration for the benefit of future 
generations in the region.  
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